上市公司内部控制制度的研究模板.doc

上市企业内部控制制度完善基于四川长虹案例研究 【摘要】上市企业内部控制制度是否健全、有效对企业长远发展关系重大。本文经过对四川长虹电器股份-财务数据分析，指出其财务情况和经营结果中存在风险；同时结合上述财务数据从上市企业角度分析四川长虹销售和收款循环及存货等业务内部会计控制可能存在问题。最终，针对上述分析得出结果，从怎样完善财务信息披露和内部控制提出对应改革方法。【关键词】 财务指标 财务风险 内部控制一、四川长虹财务数据分析（一）财务指标分析1、对四川长虹存货、应收账款占资产比重情况进行分析,分析得出以下表：表1 应收账款、存货和总资产关系表 单位：万元年度应收账款及存货909,4801,169,0511,230,6571,212,6881,069,273总资产1,763,0641,862,0372,140,0201,564,9031,582,399比重（%）51.5962.7857.5177.4967.57 从上表我们能够看出，这两项占资产总额历年高达50%以上，且应收账款、存货(扣除非货性交易换出和核销已全额计提跌价准备存货非正常降低部分)呈上升趋势，资产也呈上升趋势。不过自企业在对应收账款、存货计提35个多亿减值准备后，总资产降低。从中我们能够得出：应收账款、存货对长虹影响尤其关键，假如没管理好这两项资产，长虹有可能会所以出现危机。2、分析长虹收入及应收账款改变情况,结果以下：表2 应收账款和收入增加情况表 单位：万元时间应收账款增加数105,925133,95076,492-19,97884,800收入增加数-119,259307,056154,801-259,449352,242从上表我们能够看出： 收入降低11多个亿而应收账款却增加了10多个亿；、增加收入有快要二分之一形成了应收账款。这种现象很不正常。这是否是长虹为了扩大其销售额而极大（甚至无条件）地放宽了信用政策？尤其是对APEX企业，下面是对APPEX企业销售额和欠款情况表：表3 APEX企业销售和欠款情况表 单位；万元时间销售额欠款余额 欠款增加数.12.31 77,594.38 34,632.57 34,632.57.12.31554,129.08383,004.58348,372.01.12.31503,826.28444,660.6061,656.02.12.31287,114.91383,876.47-60,784.13.12.31 -3,489.87369,300.40-14,576.07从上表能够看出，尤其是在，长虹企业对APEX企业销售快速增加，其欠款也增加快要35亿元，以后几年其款项增加幅度较小。多年来，长虹企业似乎也意识到了APEX企业巨额欠款严重性，在努力争取让APEX企业向其提供了三部分资产抵押，作为其部分欠款担保情况下，长虹企业在年报中对应收A P E X企业货款从末开始采取部分认定法计提坏账准备，尤其计提坏账准备253,255万元。3、分析长虹净利润和现金流量表改变情况。具体以下： 表4 净利润和净现金流量关系表 单位：万元时间收入951,4611,258,5181,413,3191,153,8691,506,111利润8,85317,62024,165-368,11228,503现金流12,171-64,03911,64894,368-83,661从上表我们发觉了一个奇怪现象：利润趋势线和现金流趋势线呈不一样方向改变。这中间是否存在了人为调整情况呢？因为这恰好利用大家关注利润和现金流心理，使投资者难以权衡。4、对四家彩电业上市企业（四川长虹、海信电器、ST康华、深康佳）相关财务数据进行分析，结果以下：表5 彩电业上市企业毛利率企业名称1999年四川长虹16.3012.0010.0315.5213.6814.3216.21海信电器13.919.4411.1213.9914.9114.1816.12厦华电子14.8815.137.0412.9713.188.559.59深康佳18.5316.5314.0415.0916.0114.7516.45自1999年高速发展后，彩电业出现了下滑趋势。1999年，海信电器毛利率为13.91%，是四个彩电业最低，而深康佳为18.53%。，四家企业毛利率普遍下降。除海信外，其它三家企业全部创下了六年内最低值。经历了最低谷后，彩电企业业绩全部出现了反弹趋势。，除长虹外，其它三家企业毛利率继续上升。，除长虹外，其它三家企业毛利率均下降。1999年之前，彩电业高速发展，彩电业上市企业扩大生产规模，形成规模经济。不过，伴随彩电过量生产，供大于求，大打“价格”战，彩电企业几乎无利可图。在这么背景下，2月再次复出倪润峰为了使长虹摆脱这种局面，利用关税壁垒降低有利环境，走“激进国际化”道路。我们不能否认其战略是错误，但我们不得不考虑其为了出口而选择高风险经营模式是否可取，是否含有可连续发展性。（二）从财务数据看长虹业务控制1、销售和收款循环内部会计控制 经过上述表2和表3我们能够得出此组数据：出口金额为7亿，APEX企业欠款就达3亿多出口收入增加到了55亿，但APEX企业欠款却高达38亿；出口收入下降到50亿，APEX企业欠款却达44亿；出口收入仅为28亿，同时APEX企业欠款也对应下降到38亿；未对其出口，仅为销售退回，欠款余额仍高达36亿。从这组数据我们还是能够比较清楚地看出长虹出口额增加模式：借助APEX企业营销渠道，采取低价介入，其彩电不仅进入了美国市场，而且销售展现爆发式增加。长虹内部为此专门成立了APEX项目组，分别由两位经理负责彩电和DVD业务。同时，在美国设置了一个联络处。不过，这个联络处根本无权过问APEX项目，更不用说对APEX项目进行监控了，联络处实际上成了长虹在美国一个接待站。于是，奇怪事情也就发生了，一车车彩电运出去却没能为长虹换回大把美元，APEX企业总是以质量问题或货未收到为借口，拒付或拖欠货款。有报道指出：长虹和APEX企业签署了规范出口协议，接货后90天内APEX企业就应付款，不然长虹就有权拒绝发货。然而，长虹在首先提出对账要求同时，首先却继续发货，APEX企业总是有意搪塞或少许付款，“对账全部对了十二个月”还没有结果。到了以后，长虹海外营销部发觉这其中风险太大，曾下令不准发货，但神通广大APEX企业总能说服长虹继续发货。就在底，长虹曾专门派出企业高管到美国就欠款问题同APEX企业交涉，但APEX企业撇下这些到美国高管人员，杀回长虹见面高层，结果初长虹又发了3000多万美元货给APEX企业。这种情况令直接经办APEX项目标人员深感担忧，两位分别负责彩电和DVDAPEX项目经理也于底在劳动协议期满时同时辞职。内部会计控制规范销售和收款（试行）第十五条指出“单位在选择用户时，应该充足了解和考虑用户信誉、财务情况等相关情况，降低账款收回中风险”。即使长虹彩电在大规模进入美国市场前，长虹董事长倪润峰和首席运行实施总裁王凤朝全部曾前往美国，做过为时不短市场考察和调研，但她们在考察结束后就把美国市场销售业务全部交给了APEX企业。而其对APEX企业信用情况是否做过深入调查？我们不得而知，因为即使APEX企业在跟长虹交易之前在中国已经因其信用问题而臭名远扬，但长虹假如想经过其打开美国市场从而提升本身利润，也不是不可能。第十七条指出“单位应该根据要求程序办理销售和发货业务。”“金额重大销售协议签订应该征求法律顾问或教授意见”。长虹在同APEX企业交易中显著违反了该要求，关键表现在：在APEX企业未支付货款情况下长虹继续发货；外营销部下令不准发货但其继续发货计提金额如此大坏账准备从侧面反应出长虹要么没有将其同APEX企业交易情况向相关专业人士请教；要么就是对教授意见充耳不闻。为何会出现这种情况呢？一个见解认为是长虹选择高风险经营模式把企业送上了不归路。上世纪90年代初，长虹就和郑百文和建设银行确立了三角信用关系，仅1997年建行为郑百文开具承兑汇票总额就突破了50亿元，这种财务流转模式在郑百文破产后，让长虹吃尽了苦头。长虹和APEX企业合作，和上述模式如出一辙，其货款回收模式也异曲同工，长虹又一次尝到了苦果，甚至血本无归。另外一个见解认为长虹巨亏事件是“人治”下悲剧。在长虹企业内部流传着两句话：一句是“倪润峰当家让人受不了”，另一句是“长虹没有倪润峰不行”。能够说，长虹是“内部人控制下”“独立王国”。当一个人“说一不二”时候，现代企业制度风险约束机制就失去了应有作用。强人治理造成企业治理机构形同虚设和纠错机制缺失，最终酿成了巨亏事件。还有见解认为APEX企业拖欠账款未立即追讨，足以说明长虹产权模糊和全部者缺位。其指出了以下两个数字来印证这一见解：倪润峰这位在大西南运筹帷幄、使长虹成为民族工业一面旗帜前长虹CEO，持有长虹股票为73872股，按其退休时8元左右流通股市价计算还不到80万元；长虹集团给倪润峰、王凤朝、刘体斌三位董事年酬劳总额也不过88.20万元。面对日益严峻国际竞争，企业在产权制度、激励机制等方面存在深层次障碍实在不容回避。笔者认为长虹海外高额应收账款未收回而大额计提坏账准备事件不是简单一两个原因促成，而是由上述多种原因综合结果，谁将为这一事件负责，现在尚无定论。2、存货管理内部会计控制依据长虹第五届董事会第二十五次会议决议审议并经过末盘存物资盈亏处理汇报，我们能够发觉长虹存货控制可能存在问题，因为其在年末就盘盈了5,715,050.15元，盘亏24,347,295.63元，存货实存数和账存数差异金额高达30,062,345.78元，占存货总和0.41%。再加上今年补提准备1,013,804,623.99元，累计影响利润-1,043,866,969.77元，以长虹利润需要快要5年才能补亏。由此其存货内部控制是否健全就可见一斑了。内部会计控制规范存货（试行）第十四条指出“单位应该依据销售计划、生产计划、采购计划、资金筹措计划等制订仓储计划，合理确定库存存货结构和数量”，然而长虹存货却高达70多个亿，相对于其它三家彩电行业上市企业高出30、40多个亿。长虹是否依据销售计划、生产计划、采购计划、资金筹措计划等制订仓储计划，合理确定库存存货结构和数量，这值得探讨。第二十条指出“单位应该建立健全存货成本会计核实系统，正确计算和结转存货成本。”“单位应该加强对存货跌价会计核实，立即掌握存货价值变动情况。确定、计量存货跌价依据应该充足，方法应该正确。”下面看看长虹存货关键项目结构表：表6 长虹存货关键项目结构表 单位：万元项 目原 值跌价准备原 值跌价准备原 值跌价准备原 值跌价准备原 值跌价准备原 值跌价准备原材料146,930112,148214,876225,68556228,11729,07195,618285在产品27,27022,58632,25443,76628936,4364,15627,63679库存商品496,52325,098485,81827,280499,46327,743462,10431,240469,15599,636378,35828,899从上表能够清楚看出，一样作为存货组成部分原材料、均未计提跌价准备，仅计提全部极少跌价准备，而其每十二个月全部对库存商品计提跌价准备。根据企业会计制度要求，期末以可变现净值作为计提存货跌价准备依据，在库存商品高额计提减值准备而原材料未计提是否符合常理呢？经过查阅其它三家彩电业上市企业年报发觉，其对原材料及库存商品计提百分比大致相当。忽略产品结构安全和发展战略失误，是长虹存货偏高一个关键原因。长虹在前期营销战略中，坚持只发展彩电所谓“独生子战略”，尽管后期也推出了VCD、空调等，但一直未从彩电情结中走出来，致使长虹在品牌延伸时出现严重缺位现象，造成支柱产品青黄不接。另外，倪润峰一直提倡以规模和价格作为关键竞争手段，凭借长虹在资金和规模上优势，挤压竞争对手。但在其它彩电企业联盟策略对抗下，长虹扩张策略频频受挫，从而造成了存货高筑。二、提议及对策针对内部会计控制可能存在问题，我们提出以下方法：1、完善上市企业企业治理结构情况前面已经提出，长虹大额计提减值准备而造成巨额亏损事件是强人治理造成企业治理机构形同虚设和纠错机制缺失所造成。现在众多学者研究指出中国企业治理中存在关键问题有：股东大会没有发挥应有作用；关键人（董事长、总经理等高层管理人员）含有几乎无所不管控制权；监事会功效很有限；债权人对企业实施监控作用较小；企业市场价值和治理质量缺乏相关性。对中国现在企业治理问题已经有很多学者进行研究，本文关键结合长虹股权结构对中国国有股比重过高问题进行探讨。下面是长虹和实际控制人之间产权及控制关系方框图：绵阳市国有资产监督管理委员会100% Chartered Accountants Journal May 59I N T E R N AT I O N A LThe first round of internal controlcerti.cations as mandated by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in the United States haverecently been .led by listed companies,or were supposed to have been .led.Allegedly 80 companies could not meet thecerti.cations criteria laid down in SOX.The readiness of the SecuritiesExchange Commission and the PublicCompany Oversight Accounting Board(PCAOB) to learn from the experienceof the .rst year of implementation ofsection 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,by calling for a roundtable and solicitingcomments, is to be commended ifcontinued ful.lment of the requirementsof the Act is to be respected.Section 302 of SOX requires theprincipal executive of.cer and the principal.nancial of.cer to “certify” speci.c items.led in each annual report. Subsections1, 4, 5 and 6 refer to the “signing of.cers”and the responsibilities they are chargedwith, as well as requiring them to disclosespeci.c matters.We are concerned that some of thelargest companies listed on the NewYork Stock Exchange are not giving thesesigning responsibilities the attention theyare due.Three categories of compliance or lackthereof are evident: actual signatures typed names only no signatures or typed names.These categories were evident froma small sample but provide evidence ofserious .agrancy of the spirit of the Act andof the Act itself. We contend that it is notunreasonable to presume that Congressmeant “signed certi.cations” emphasisadded knowing that signatures have anattestation quality that is unique and conveyto the reader an intention to be bound orstand by the certi.cation.This essential quality seems to havebeen ignored by the companies that havefallen into categories two and three.Our comments are based upon ourinspection of annual reports and 10K(annual SEC .ling) reports .led for therespective companies. We are concernedthat categories two and three will becomelike a will that has the name of the maker(testator) typed on it but is never signed!It cannot be acted upon.In the case of unsigned certi.cationsunder section 302, the door for laterdisclaimers of responsibility is wideopen.The public interest and con.denceof investors in the reliability of .nancialreporting will not be well served by suchvariability. Investors will be left doubtfulas to the reliability of such certi.cations.SOX put measures in place designed toimprove disclosure and reporting andinvestor con.dence. In the long run,internal controls and “signed” certi.cationsthereof may be the most important singlestep in increasing reliability.Should the SEC approve the use ofsubstitute signatures (i e printed names)in lieu of real signatures, then we feel thatthe testimony regarding internal controlsbegins to lack authenticity. This will thenleave investors with questions about thesincerity of the certi.cations, and therebyerode the spirit of the Act.An actual signature is possible, asevidenced by some company certi.cations.When such a signature is absent, then themessage being conveyed is weaker. Asigned certi.cation conveys to the readerwho could not be present at the signingevent that the signer wishes to representthat the internal controls are functioningas speci.ed.We propose that sections 302 and 404should be reinforced by implementing arequirement that a “signature event” becreated for these certi.cations. As anexample, managements certi.cation oninternal controls could be signed off atthe annual meeting of the company infront of the gathered stockholders. Somestockholder representatives could witnessthese certi.cations.The power of witnesses testifying as tothe authenticity of the signatories at such四川长虹电子集团四川长虹电器股份53.63% Chartered Accountants Journal May 59I N T E R N AT I O N A LThe first round of internal controlcerti.cations as mandated by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in the United States haverecently been .led by listed companies,or were supposed to have been .led.Allegedly 80 companies could not meet thecerti.cations criteria laid down in SOX.The readiness of the SecuritiesExchange Commission and the PublicCompany Oversight Accounting Board(PCAOB) to learn from the experienceof the .rst year of implementation ofsection 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,by calling for a roundtable and solicitingcomments, is to be commended ifcontinued ful.lment of the requirementsof the Act is to be respected.Section 302 of SOX requires theprincipal executive of.cer and the principal.nancial of.cer to “certify” speci.c items.led in each annual report. Subsections1, 4, 5 and 6 refer to the “signing of.cers”and the responsibilities they are chargedwith, as well as requiring them to disclosespeci.c matters.We are concerned that some of thelargest companies listed on the NewYork Stock Exchange are not giving thesesigning responsibilities the attention theyare due.Three categories of compliance or lackthereof are evident: actual signatures typed names only no signatures or typed names.These categories were evident froma small sample but provide evidence ofserious .agrancy of the spirit of the Act andof the Act itself. We contend that it is notunreasonable to presume that Congressmeant “signed certi.cations” emphasisadded knowing that signatures have anattestation quality that is unique and conveyto the reader an intention to be bound orstand by the certi.cation.This essential quality seems to havebeen ignored by the companies that havefallen into categories two and three.Our comments are based upon ourinspection of annual reports and 10K(annual SEC .ling) reports .led for therespective companies. We are concernedthat categories two and three will becomelike a will that has the name of the maker(testator) typed on it but is never signed!It cannot be acted upon.In the case of unsigned certi.cationsunder section 302, the door for laterdisclaimers of responsibility is wideopen.The public interest and con.denceof investors in the reliability of .nancialreporting will not be well served by suchvariability. Investors will be left doubtfulas to the reliability of such certi.cations.SOX put measures in place designed toimprove disclosure and reporting andinvestor con.dence. In the long run,internal controls and “signed” certi.cationsthereof may be the most important singlestep in increasing reliability.Should the SEC approve the use ofsubstitute signatures (i e printed names)in lieu of real signatures, then we feel thatthe testimony regarding internal controlsbegins to lack authenticity. This will thenleave investors with questions about thesincerity of the certi.cations, and therebyerode the spirit of the Act.An actual signature is possible, asevidenced by some company certi.cations.When such a signature is absent, then themessage being conveyed is weaker. Asigned certi.cation conveys to the readerwho could not be present at the signingevent that the signer wishes to representthat the internal controls are functioningas speci.ed.We propose that sections 302 and 404should be reinforced by implementing arequirement that a “signature event” becreated for these certi.cations. As anexample, managements certi.cation oninternal controls could be signed off atthe annual meeting of the company infront of the gathered stockholders. Somestockholder representatives could witnessthese certi.cations.The power of witnesses testifying as tothe authenticity of the signatories at such 经过上图能够看出长虹股权结构特点是：股权高度集中且为国有股一股独大，这也是中国现在股权结构存在普遍现象。这种股权结构轻易使企业出现产权模糊和全部者缺位，严重影响了企业决议和监督有效运行。要处理这种企业治理结构，笔者认为现在实施股权分置对长虹而言是比较合理。其一是长虹所处行业并非关系国计民生行业，其改革不会影响到国家经济命脉；其二是长虹现于上海挂牌长虹国有股约有11.6亿股，占总股本53.63%，符合中国证监会公布相关上市企业股权分置改革试点相关问题通知条件；其三是绵阳市政府支持，绵阳市市长蒋仁富在中国绵阳科技城投资合作洽谈会暨电子信息产业投资合作论坛新闻公布会上透露期望长虹国有股能逐步退出，但指出退出是有条件（具体条件没说明）。另外，长虹给年酬劳列前三位高级管理人员总额为88.20万元，为94.50万元，91.03万元。显然，长虹在高级管理人员考评和激励机制和处罚机制值得我们去深思。 2、加强应收账款管理，提升应收账款安全，降低其风险市场经济是信用经济，企业销售步骤极难完全做到“钱货两清”而不发生赊销预付，所以必需科学地确定赊销额度和健全应收账款控制制度。对应收账款控制，应分为事前、事中控制和事后监管三个步骤进行。这三个步骤是相互联络和相互制约，做好每个步骤控制对应收账款立即回收意义十分重大。（1）应收账款事前控制：建立健全赊销内部控制制度。建立货款回收责任制。对每笔应收账款明确责任部门和责任人，激励和约束机制相结合，实施“谁经手谁负责，谁审批谁负连带责任”制度。建立销货往来用户资信审议制度，制订合理信用政策。企业财务部门应和销售部门亲密配合，最少要设专员对用户资信进行审议。（2）应收账款事中控制：加强赊销业务协议管理。妥善办理赊销手续，为对挂账信用进行有效管理提供依据。企业对销货往来较频繁用户不得已采取挂账赊销时，除必需加强对用户资信情况进行分析了解外，还必需妥善办理赊销手续，使赊销凭证和统计能立即、正确地反应应收账款发生时间、金额及责任等全方面情况，便于事后监管。（3）应收账款事后监管：建立应收账款内部汇报制度。企业财务人员应依据应收账款形式时间长短和企业收账政策，进行账龄分析，定时编制企业应收账款一览表，并设法使这项工作能得到主管领导高度重视和业务经办人员大力支持和配合。做好应收账款定时对账和债权确实定工作。企业财务人员或应收账款相关责任人应定时和债务方查对往来金额，并请对方财务人员在对账清单上签字并加盖单位公章给予确定。建立应收账款坏账准备金制度。企业应遵照谨慎性标准，对坏账损失可能性进行预先估量，主动建立填补坏账损失准备金制度。同时，企业必需主动采取应收账款风险化解和维权方法。具体为：经过应收账款让售和资产证券化进行融资，化解应收账款风险。应收账款让售是企业将应收账款出让给信贷机构