组织的经济学与管理学(英文)ch10-Self-enforcing-contracts.ppt

Click to edit Master title style,Click to edit Master text styles,Second level,Third level,Fourth level,Fifth level,Chapter 10,Self-enforcing contracts,George Hendrikse,Economics and Management of Organisations:,Co-ordination,Motivation and Strategy,Folk theorem,Prisoners dilemma,Player 2,Player 1 S T,S (2,2)(-1,3),T (3,-1)(0,0),Aside:experimental evidence regarding the Prisoners Dilemma,In 1950 the PD game was repeated 100 times with the same two players.And a fair amount of cooperation was observed.,Does this reject the notion of NE as being consistent with human behaviour?,Observation:Nash regarding these experimental results,The flaw in the experiment as a test of equilibrium point theory is that the experiment really amounts to having the players play one large multi-player game.One cannot just as well think of the thing as a sequence of independent games as one can in zero-sum cases.There is just too much interaction (AER,2001,p 1403).,A non-cooperative game consists of 5 ingredients,Players,Actions,Payoffs,Information structure,Rules of the game,The Folk theorem resolves the prisoners dilemma,The Folk theorem is able to resolve the prisoners dilemma because it changes the rules of the game by playing the prisoners dilemma repeatedly.It entails that current bad behaviour can be punished in the future.,Figure 10.1:Folk theorem,0,(-1,3),(2,2),(3,-1),Payoff,player 2,Payoff,player 1,Figure 10.2:Discounted payoffs in the repeated prisoners dilemma for the TIT-FOR-TAT strategy as well as the grim strategy,2,0,1,2,3,4,5,t,Payoff with S,2,d,2,2,d,2,3,d,2,4,d,Figure 10.3:The costs and benefits of the choice T when the other player chooses the grim strategy,t,1,2,3,4,5,0,Additional,payoff with,strategy T,The Folk theorem and long term relationships,According the Folk theorem the stability of long term relationships is determined by:,the history of the relationship,observability of decisions,costs and benefits of finishing a relationship,TrustRelational contractsReciprocity,Formal authority resides at the top,while real authority can be delegated or not.,There is a tradeoff between:,search incentives for the employee,private activities of the employee,Self-enforcing contracts and asset ownership,The identity of the party tempted to renege on an informal agreement depends on who owns the asset,because the party with the decision rights makes a promise to the party without decision rights.,The incentive to renege depends on who owns the asset because it determines the bargaining positions.,