The-economy.doc

The economy
The haves and the have-nots

But even rich Arab countries cannot squander their resources indefinitely

Jul 13th 2013 |From the print edition

  1 THE SWEET PERFUME wafting over northern Iraq does not come from the wildflowers that
speckle its rumpled plains in spring. It is the smell of oil and it is everywhere, flaring at wellheads,
sloshing from the tanker trucks that grind up potholed roads to backyard refineries in the Kurdish
hills and fuming from their chimneys. Nor is this the oiliest part of Iraq. That lies in the deserts to
the south where it literally seeps from the ground. In fact the whole of Iraq sits atop seams and
pockets of the sticky stuff. There is plenty to go around, if only the Iraqis could agree to stop
shooting each other.

  2 There is plenty for other Arabs, too. Taken together, their 19 countries hold some 46% of the
world’s total proven oil reserves (as well as a quarter of its natural-gas reserves). The ones with
the most have it doubly easy. Saudis or Kuwaitis spend just $3 to tap a barrel from their most
accessible wells. Small wonder that their oilmen scoff at looming competition from America’s
fancy frackers and shalers. The technical wizardry of the modern drilling techniques that may
soon make America self-sufficient in energy can push the cost of extracting a barrel well beyond
$100.

  3 The Arab world’s hydrocarbon riches are unevenly shared. Saudi Arabia alone holds the bulk
of all reserves. Just eight Arab countries have actually grown rich from energy exports, though
some of them spectacularly so: in the tiny emirate of Qatar some 14% of households are dollar
millionaires, a higher proportion than in any other country. Divided among its 250,000 citizens
(the other 85% of Qatar’s population of 2.1m are foreign workers), the tiny emirate’s GDP comes
to $700,000 per person. Average incomes across the Arab Gulf states are around 50 times those in Yemen, Sudan and Mauritania.

  4 This may change. Poorer Arab states are not about to become new Qatars, but many, such as Yemen, Tunisia, Sudan and Egypt, already export oil or gas, and the lingering energy paupers are doing better too. Morocco, until now completely reliant on imports, pins high hopes on offshore exploration that is just getting under way. Its Atlantic shelf shares the same promising geology that oil companies in Mauritania are already exploiting. Much of this potential lode skirts the long coast of the Western Sahara, where sovereignty remains contested despite four decades of de facto Moroccan control. But there may be plenty in undisputed waters, too.

A wobbly balance

  5 Huge gasfields in the eastern Mediterranean also sprawl across maritime borders.
Egypt has been tapping its patch for years, with Israel following more recently. Lebanon has
untangled itself from internal bickering. Some day Gaza should have a share of the crowded
territory’s only resource aside from people. Perhaps in the future the other part of Palestine, the
West Bank, will also profit from the small deposits of crude oil that Israeli firms have found under
its hills. Even Jordan may at last be able to stop begging its neighbours for fuel. If oil prices hold
steady above the $100 mark around which they have fluctuated in recent years, the shale oil that
sits under 60% of Jordan’s surface will become commercially viable.

  6 That is a big if. In 1999 this newspaper speculated that oil prices might collapse to $5 a barrel. Instead they soared, peaking in 2008 at $145. The world’s current mix of political instability in oil-producing zones and surging demand from Asia leads some to think that despite expanding oil production worldwide, a wobbly balance between supply and demand might be maintained. But experience suggests that high prices sustained over long periods encourage massive investment in exploration and improved yields from existing infrastructure.

  7 That is what happened in the 1970s, when high prices spurred energy conservation and made it cost-effective to produce in places like Alaska and the North Sea. The resulting oil-price collapse in the 1980s lasted a long time, despite rising Asian demand and supply shocks such as the eight-year war between two of the biggest exporters, Iran and Iraq. Arab producers were badly hit. GDP per person in Saudi Arabia and Libya shrank by a third and took 20 years to regain its 1981 level.

  8 A similar price fall today might not seem as threatening to the bigger Arab producers. Over the past decade they have racked up surpluses approaching the size of the combined GDP of all 19 Arab states, $2.9 trillion. About half of that is sitting in sovereign-wealth funds or foreign-currency reserves. But many governments, wary of unrest, have also raised state spending to potentially unsustainable levels. The so-called fiscal break-even point (the oil price needed to balance exporters’ budgets) is currently over $80 for Saudi Arabia and $110 for Algeria, which relies on energy exports for 70% of its government revenue.

  9 Both governments could simply cut spending, though that involves political risks. They could
also try something else: raise local energy prices. Throughout the region, the combination of big
resources and patriarchal politics has made a hash of economics. The Arab hydrocarbons industry as a whole generates about $750 billion a year, but nearly a third of that, $240 billion by the IMF’s estimate, is frittered away on energy subsidies for Arab consumers.

10 In Saudi Arabia, for instance, petrol costs under $0.20 a litre. Local consumption already eats
up a quarter of Saudi oil output, and on current trends could devour all of it within 25 years.
Domestic oil consumption across the Arab world last year rose by 5.2%, the highest rate in any
region. In the Gulf states it has been growing at an annual 6% since 1980.

11 Rich countries can afford this, though not indefinitely. For poor countries the subsidies have
become ruinous. Yemen’s government, for instance, spends the equivalent of 6% of its GDP on
keeping fuel prices low, more than on health and education combined. Most of this goes on diesel, which feeds the water pumps that irrigate the country’s most important crop, qat, a pleasantly narcotic shrub that keeps millions quiet.

12 The cost to Egypt is just as heavy. The government’s subsidy bill is $18 billion, again far higher than its spending on public schools and hospitals, and almost precisely matches its 11% budget deficit. That might have been fudged in the past, since most fuels were produced by state-owned firms and the cost of subsidies was implicit rather than paid in cash. But with local consumption growing rapidly, Egypt has lately become a net importer. Its central-bank reserves have dropped from $36 billion to $16 billion since the revolution in February 2011.

13 The IMF reckons that in two out of three Arab countries energy subsidies account for more
than 5% of GDP, whereas food subsidies in the region average only 0.7%. It is true that in places
like Egypt cheap transport has encouraged mobility and cheap power has favoured investment in energy-intensive industries such as fertilisers and cement. But the benefits tend to be skewed to the owners of factories and gas-guzzlers. The IMF estimates that 50% of the energy subsidies go to the wealthiest fifth of the population in Sudan and only 3% to the poorest fifth.

14 Rolling back the subsidies is a tricky business, but it can and must be done. Some countries,
such as Jordan and Yemen, have already taken painful measures and so far survived the
consequences. Libya, too, has been surprisingly bold for a country where petrol has been cheaper than water for a generation. Its current budget provides for sharply higher petrol and electricity prices and a shift in the subsidies to monthly cash transfers of about $500 per citizen. “It sounds like a lot, but this will actually save the government a ton of money,” says Faisal Gergab, chief economist at the Libyan Investment Authority.

15 For two years the IMF has been dangling a $4.8 billion loan package in front of Egypt. This could unlock billions more in multilateral and bilateral aid, but it is conditional on budget reform, which in turn depends on fixing the worsening energy muddle. Egypt’s next government will have to knuckle under, no matter how unpopular that may make it. And so, eventually, will countries such as Saudi Arabia. “Now is the time to reform,” says Joe Saddi, the chairman of Booz & Co, an American consultancy with a strong base in the region. “They have the money and they have the time.”

Among friends

16 Mr Saddi has another suggestion: that Arabs should integrate their economies. This is not a new idea. Before the first world war, Mr Saddi notes, people and goods moved freely across Arab borders. The Arab League was founded in 1945 to strengthen regional ties. In the 1960s and 1970s many joint institutions were launched to exchange aid, expertise and investment among Arab states.

17 Those hopeful times saw a first big wave of migration to the Gulf. In those early years of the oil boom, its bounty was seen as best shared among brothers. Fellow Arabs received the bulk of Arab development aid and made up some 72% of the Gulf’s expatriate labour force. Libya, Iraq and Algeria were also important destinations for migrant workers.

18 These days fellow Arabs account for barely a quarter of the Gulf’s expat workforce, and not just because Asian workers will accept lower pay. For political reasons, Gulf monarchies have expelled large numbers of other Arabs from time to time, such as Palestinians from Kuwait and nearly a million Yemenis from Saudi Arabia in the 1990s. New campaigns today, under the guise of rationalising labour markets or prosecuting people who have outstayed their visas, are targeting Shia Lebanese in Kuwait to punish Hizbullah and suspected Islamists in the United Arab Emirates. As many as 300,000 Yemenis in Saudi Arabia also risk expulsion as part of a plan to open more jobs to Saudi citizens.

19 Arab borders remain more jealously guarded than those in most other parts of the world. True, countries such as Egypt, Iraq and, more grudgingly, Jordan and Lebanon have generously opened their doors to hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees. Most Arab countries still insist on visas for those from elsewhere in the region, although some restrictions have been eased.

Open wider

20 Some irksome barriers remain. Unbelievably, the 1,000-mile-long frontier between Morocco and Algeria, countries that have similar populations and living standards and are culturally, linguistically and historically close, has been sealed for the past 19 years. Few people in either country even remember why their governments shut it (Morocco accused Algeria of involvement in a hotel bombing in Marrakech that killed two tourists). Opening it up would let poor border towns revert from their current concentration on smuggling to more legitimate trade. More important, access to Algeria’s cash-rich but goods-poor market could quickly add $2 billion a year to Morocco’s more dynamic private-sector economy, economists say.

21 Given the vast disparities in wealth, opening all Arab borders is not a realistic option. But there are certainly benefits flowing among Arab nations. Remittances from the Gulf to other Arab countries are currently worth about $35 billion a year, supporting whole villages in places such as Upper Egypt and Sudan. In 2009 remittances made up 16% of Jordan’s GDP. According to the World Bank, the Gulf states have been the world’s most generous donors of aid as a share of GDP. Most of this has gone to fellow Arab states, often at crucial times such as after Israel’s devastation of Gaza in 2009.

22 In the peak year to date, 2008, direct investment from the Gulf states in the rest of the region amounted to $35 billion. Firms such as Qatari Diyar, the UAE’s Emaar and Kuwait’s Kharafi Group have launched giant property developments in many Arab capitals as well as in tourist destinations along the Red and Mediterranean seas. Private Gulf investors are also putting a lot of money into stock exchanges in cities such as Casablanca, Cairo and Amman.
23 There could be much more of this. “It’s a perfect match,” says McKinsey’s Kito de Boer. “The Gulf has about $1 trillion to spend, and that’s about what is needed in regional investment.” The trouble lies with the investment climate in receiving countries. And that is a matter of politics more than economics.
参考翻译：
贫富有别，治国有道

阿拉伯国家的资源再多，也不能挥霍无度

伊拉克北部的空气中常常弥漫着甜甜的芳香，你的脑中是不是已经浮现出了一幅野花点点、绿草茫茫的平原春色图呢？然而这种气味却是由遍及这里每一寸土地的石油而散发开来的——随处可见的开采井口冒着熊熊烈火，油罐车轧着崎岖的路面留下了一路的油渍，而它的目的地便是库尔德山间烟囱耸立的炼油厂。其实伊拉克最为盛产石油的地方还不是这里，而是位于通往南部的沙漠——那里的石油简直是从地面直接渗出来的。假如这个国家族群之间的暴力争斗能够停止的话，那生活在液体黄金之上的全体伊拉克人民一定会过着安居乐业的生活。

其实，伊拉克富饶的燃料资源只是整个阿拉伯世界一个缩影。数据显示，全球46%的石油探明储量（以及1/4的天然气储量）都位于19个阿拉伯国家的地下，其中储量最多的那些国家更是轻而易举地就能获取石油资源。沙特和科威特最易开采石油的地方，其最低成本只需每桶3美元，这也就是为什么美国高端的水力压裂页岩油气技术人员带来了日趋激烈的竞争，而当地石油开采工人却还不以为然的原因。这种在美国人眼中的现代钻井技术可能在不久的将来，奇迹般地使美国成为一个能源自给的国家——但是采用这一技术的开采成本却远远高于每桶100美元。不过尽管阿拉伯地区富含烃类物质，然而分布并不均匀——沙特阿拉伯一国就占据了巨额储量。事实上，阿拉伯国家中只有8个通过能源出口成功致富，不过其中仍有几国十分惹眼。酋长国卡塔尔国土面积很小，却有约14%的家庭资产超过百万美元，这一比例可谓世界之最。如果把该国的国内生产总值平分到25万本国国民手中，那每个人可以拿到70万美元（卡塔尔210万总人口中有85%是外国工人）。阿拉伯海湾国家的平均收入几乎是也门、苏丹和毛里塔尼亚的50倍。但这一差距可能并不会永久地持续下去。一些较为贫穷的阿拉伯国家虽然并不太可能成为第二、第三个卡塔尔，但其中许多国家（如也门、突尼斯、苏丹和埃及）也已经开始出口石油天然气，而迟迟没有动作的那些富含能源的穷国也开始有所行动了。摩洛哥直到现在为止仍然完全依赖于能源进口，但她目前正在进行海上能源勘探，并对该项工程抱有很大的希望。毛里塔尼亚的石油公司已经开始在其大陆架上开采能源，而摩洛哥伸向大西洋的大陆架也具有与毛里塔尼亚相似的地质条件。许多这些潜藏的矿脉都是沿着西撒哈拉长长的海岸线分布的。西撒哈拉的主权目前仍然存在争议，而摩洛哥在40年间实际控制了这一地区。不过在没有争议的水域同样也存在着丰富的潜藏矿脉。地中海东部水域的大型天然气田也是蜿蜒曲折，跨过了多国的海上国界。多年以来，埃及一直在这一水域钻井采气，而最近以色列也开始不甘落后、迎头赶上。黎巴嫩已经结束了国家内部喋喋不休的争论。有朝一日，加沙也应该会在人头济济的国土范围内分得一杯羹（当地除了人以外也就剩下燃料能源了）。在巴勒斯坦的另一地区西岸，已经有以色列公司在其山地地下发现了少量原油储量，西岸可能未来也会从中受益。

弱势平衡

甚至约旦最终也可能不必再依赖于邻国的燃料供给。石油价格最近几年一直徘徊在100美元附近，如果能长期稳定在100美元水平之上的话，约旦60%国土之下蕴藏的页岩油资源将会凸显出其商业价值——不过这个“如果”非常重要。本报曾于1999年作出预测，油价可能会暴跌至每桶5美元。随后油价却是一路飙升，于2008年达到最高的每桶145美元。如今，产油地区政治局势动荡，亚洲地区需求急剧增长。据此，有些人认为尽管全球石油产量正在扩张，但目前供需之间的弱势平衡可能很难打破。然而经验表明，长期的价格高企会刺激石油勘探的大量投资，并提升现有设施的采油能力。20世纪70年代便是如此。在当时高油价的影响下，人们纷纷进行能源囤积，而阿拉斯加和北海的石油生产也变得有利可图起来。然而结果却是之后80年代的油价崩盘。尽管当时亚洲需求也在上升、供应也存在冲击（如两大石油出口大国之间历经八年的“两伊战争”），但油价仍然持续下跌，阿拉伯石油生产商受到了重创。沙特阿拉伯和利比亚的人均GDP锐减了1/3，直到20年之后才重新回到了1981年的水平。不过到了今天，即使油价走势重蹈覆辙，阿拉伯大型石油生产企业也已是今非昔比了。在过去的十年间，这些大型企业所积累的净利润已经达到了19个阿拉伯国家的GDP总和（2.9万亿美元）。其中约有一半躺在了主权财富基金和外汇储备之中。但是许多国家政府为了维稳所加大的国家支出，仍已到达了可能难以为继的程度。对于沙特阿拉伯而言，目前所谓的保持财政平衡的油价水平（石油出口国为平衡预算而必要的石油价格）已经超过了每桶80美元，而阿尔及利亚已经到了110美元。其中阿尔及利亚的政府收入，有70%依赖于能源出口。这两国政府固然都可以采取削减支出的简单方法，但这却隐含着政治风险。其实，政府还可以尝试提高当地能源价格等措施。

在整个阿拉伯地区，强大的资源政治和家族政治互相盘根错节，吞噬了大量经济发展潜能。阿拉伯的石油工业每年总共可以贡献7500亿美元的产能。然而据IMF的估计，其中有2400亿美元（约占1/3）浪费在了国内消费者的能源补贴上。沙特阿拉伯每升汽油价格还不到0.20美元，国内能源消费量已经占到了全国石油总产量的1/4，如果按现在的趋势发展下去的话25年内沙特阿拉伯就别想出口石油了。去年整个阿拉伯地区的国内石油消费总量上升了5.2%，这一增速是世界任何其他地区无法比及的。从1980年持续至今