论如何把我们的观念弄清楚.pdf

皮尔士论如何把我们的观念弄清楚摘自皮尔士“如何把我们的观念弄清楚”（思维清晰能够为重要的思想奠定牢固的基础；思维混乱会导致时间和精力的无谓浪费。思维清晰对年轻人尤其重要，因为他们还有一番事业要做。）我们有正当理由要求逻辑教给我们的第一课是：怎样把我们的观念弄明白。这是极重要的一课，它只是受到未上这一课的人的轻蔑。知道了我们的思想，把握了我们自己所指的意思，就将为伟大的、重要的思想奠定牢固的基础。那些思想单纯而且有限的人最容易学会这一课；他们比起那些无可救药地沉溺于一堆概念泥潭中的人要幸运得多。确实，一个民族，经过几代人的努力，可以克服由过多的语言财富和这种语言必然会伴随有的广阔无边、深不可测的观念所带来的不便。我们在历史上或许会看到这个民族在慢慢地完善着它的文字形式，最后抛弃了形而上学，并通过通常代之而起的坚忍不拔的耐心，在精神探究的每一个领域都获得极其辉煌的成就。虽然历史至今没有告诉我们，这样一种民族最终能否胜过那些观念（同他们语言中的词一样）极少但对这些观念把握得极好的民族。对每一个人来说，几个清楚的观念无疑要比许多混乱的观念更有价值。劝一个年轻人牺牲其大部分思想以拯救其余思想，真是难乎其难。头脑浑浑噩噩的人最不容易看到这样一种牺牲的必要性。对这样的人，我们通常只能将他作为有先天缺陷的人而加以怜悯。时间是会帮助他的，但他的思想在明确性方面的成熟通常是来得很迟的。这似乎是大自然的一种不幸安排，因为明确性对一些人比对另一些人用途较少，前一种人已安于生活，他们所犯的错误大多已产生了结果，而后一种人则还有一番事业要做。可怕的是，我们看到，潜藏在年轻人头脑中的一个不清楚的观念，一条没有意义的准则，有时竟会像动脉中的惰性物质那样起阻碍作用，妨碍大脑的营养供给，并使它的受害者在精力充沛、思想丰富的时刻便枯萎下去。许多人多少年来珍藏某些模糊、混沌的观念作为嗜好。实际上这些观念太没有意义了，甚至我们说它是绝对假的。尽管如此，他仍一直热情奔放地珍爱着它，日日夜夜陪伴着它，对它倾注了全部的精力和生命，并为它之故而放弃了一切其他观念。总之，与它相依为命，直到仿佛与它融为一体为止。然后在一个明亮的早晨，他醒来发现它不见了，就像寓言中美丽的梅卢西那一样消失得无影无踪，他生命的精华于是也随之逝去。我自己就认识这样一个人。谁能说得清有多少关于圆的正方形，关于形而上学家，关于占星学家的故事呢？在古老的德国的传说中又有什么不曾说过或不可能说过呢？The very first lesson that we have a right to demand that logic shall teach us is,howto make our ideas clear;and a most important one it is,depreciated only by mindswho stand in need of（需要）it.Toknow what we think,to be masters of our ownmeaning,will make a solid foundation for great and weighty thought.It is mosteasily learned by those whose ideas are meagre and restricted;and far happier theythan such as wallow（沉迷）helplessly in a rich mud of conceptions.A nation,it istrue,may,in the course of generations,overcome the disadvantage of an excessivewealth of language and its natural concomitant,a vast,unfathomable deep of ideas.We may see it in history,slowly perfecting its literary forms,sloughing（抛弃）atlength its metaphysics,and,by virtue of the untirable patience which is often acompensation,attaining great excellence in every branch of mental acquirement.The page of history is not yet unrolled（展开）that is to tell us whether such apeople will or will not in the long run prevail over one whose ideas(like the wordsof their language)are few,but which possesses a wonderful mastery over thosewhich it has.For an individual,however,there can be no question that a few clearideas are worth more than many confused ones.A young man would hardly bepersuaded to sacrifice the greater part of his thoughts to save the rest;and themuddled head is the least apt to see the necessity of such a sacrifice.Him we canusually only commiserate,as a person with a congenital defect（先天缺陷）.Time willhelp him,but intellectual maturity with regard to clearness is apt to come ratherlate.This seems an unfortunate arrangement of Nature,inasmuch as clearness is ofless use to a man settled in life,whose errors have in great measure had their effect,than it would be to one whose path lay before him.It is terrible to see how a singleunclear idea,a single formula without meaning,lurking in（潜伏）a young manshead,will sometimes act like an obstruction of inert matter in an artery,hinderingthe nutrition of the brain,and condemning（宣告患不治之症）its victim to pine awayin the fullness of his intellectual vigor and in the midst of intellectual plenty.Many aman has cherished for years as his hobby some vague shadow of an idea,toomeaningless to be positively false;he has,nevertheless,passionately loved it,hasmade it his companion by day and by night,and has given to it his strength and hislife,leaving all other occupations for its sake,and in short has lived with it and for it,until it has become,as it were,flesh of his flesh and bone of his bone;and then hehas waked up some bright morning to find it gone,clean vanished away like thebeautiful Melusina of the fable,and the essence of his life gone with it.I havemyself known such a man;and who can tell how many histories of circle-squarers,metaphysicians,astrologers,and what not,may not be told in the old Germanstory?（没有差别就没有意义，没有可以感觉得到的后果或效果上的差别，就没有真正的差别。因此我们要判断一个命题有没有意义，我们只需问，这个命题在什么情况下成立，在什么情况下不成立，而这两种情况是不是有真正的差别。如果两个命题成立的条件完全一样，那么这两个命题就是同一个命题。）设想一下，我们概念的对象会有什么样的可以想像的有实际意义的效果。这样，我们关于这些效果的全部概念也就是我们关于对象的全部概念。思想的全部作用就在于产生行动的习惯，任何与思想有关但与思想的目的无关的事情，就只是思想的一种附加物，而不是它的一部分。因此要说明其意义，我们只需确定它会产生什么习惯，因为一件事情的意义就在于它所造成的习惯。一个习惯的特性就在于它如何引导我们去行动，不仅仅是在那些经常出现的情况下，而且也在那些仅仅有出现的可能性（不管这种可能性是多么小）的情况下。习惯的内容取决于它在何时并如何促使我们行动。无论何时，行动的每一个刺激都来自知觉；无论如何，行动的每一个目的都是要产生某种可以感觉得到的结果。这样，我们就得到了可以感觉到的并可以说是实际的东西，把它们看作是思想的每一个实际差别的根源，不管这种差别可能是多么微妙，因为除了某种可能有的实际的差别之外，就没有什么真正的意义上的差别。Consider what effects,that might conceivably have practical bearings,we conceivethe object of our conception to have.The whole function of thought is to producehabits of action;and that whatever there is connected with a thought,but irrelevantto its purpose,is an accretion to it,but no part of it.Todevelop its meaning,wehave,therefore,simply to determine what habits it produces,for what a thingmeans is simply what habits it involves.Now,the identity of a habit depends onhow it might lead us to act,not merely under such circumstances as are likely toarise,but under such as might possibly occur,no matter how improbable they maybe.What the habit is depends on when and how it causes us to act.As for the when,every stimulus to action is derived from perception;as for the how,every purposeof action is to produce some sensible result.Thus,we come down to what istangible and conceivably practical,as the root of every real distinction of thought,no matter how subtile it may be;and there is no distinction of meaning so fine as toconsist in anything but a possible difference of practice.Then,our conception ofthese effects is the whole of our conception of the object.（说一个东西硬，是指这个东西不会被其他东西划破。说一个东西重，是指如果没有相反的力它就会跌落下来。关于力的概念，有一种奇怪的说法：对力的效果我们一清二楚，但对于力本身我们却一无所知。这是不可思议的。）我们举一些例子来阐明这一规则；先从一个最简单不过的例子开始，让我们来考察一下：我们说一种东西硬是什么意思？显然这是指这个东西不会被其他东西划破。这个性质（其他性质也是一样）的全部意义都存在于它的可以想像的效果中。如果不作试验，硬的东西与软的东西就绝无差别。据此，我们假设一个棉花软垫里可以结晶出一块金刚石，并且它一直存在于此，只要这个软垫没有被最后烧尽。因此，说这块金刚石是软的，是否就错了呢？这似乎是个愚蠢的问题。而且事实上，在逻辑领域之外，也确实是荒唐的。但在逻辑领域，这样的问题有最大的用处，因为它使逻辑原则可以比在实际的讨论中更明显地显示出来。在研究逻辑时，我们不能在对之作一个轻率的回答后置之一旁，而必须极其仔细地加以考虑，以便推敲其中所包含的道理。在这里，我们可以变更一下我们的问题。试问：我们为什么不能说，一切硬的物体在被触动之前，完全是软的，而在被触动时，其硬度随着压力的增加而增加，直到它们被划破为止？稍稍思考一下，我们就会发觉：这种说法毫无错误。它实际上改变了我们现今的说法。但这种改变仅涉及硬和软这些词，而不涉及它们的意义。因为它们不代表任何与现有事实不同的事实。它们只是使事实的排列变得非常笨拙。这就使我们注意到，在实际上并没有出现的情况下问会有什么会出现这个问题不是一个事实问题，而只是对这些事实作最明显的排列的问题。下面让我们试着弄清“重”这个观念。这是又一个非常自然的问题。说某物重仅是指，如果没有相反的力，它将跌落下来。这显然就是关于“重”的全部概念（且不顾某些关于它将如何下跌等等的详细说明，这只是物理学家在使用这个词时所关心的）。问某个特定事实能否说明力，这是正常的问题，但我们所说的力本身已包含在它的效果中了。我们是应当说力是一种加速度，还是应当说它引起一种加速度，这纯粹是一个语言是否得体的问题。它同英语中“It is cold”和汉语中对应的用法“天冷”之间的区别一样，同我们的真实意义毫不相干。这样一个简单的事实竟然搞混了人们的头脑，确实令人惊奇。人们不是在许多深奥的论文中把“力”作为“神秘的实体”谈论吗？看来这只是以一种方式承认作者对获得一个关于这些词的意义的明确把握失去了信心。在最近一部值得称道的有关分析力学的著作中，有这样的说法：对力的效果，我们一清二楚，但对力本身我们则一无所知！这完全是自相矛盾。“力”一词在我们心里激起的观念，除了引起我们的行动，没有任何别的任用，而这些行动除了通过这个行动产生的效果以外，不可能与“力”有任何别的关系。因此，如果我们知道力的效果是什么，我们也就知道了“力”存在这个说法所包含的一切事实，而且除此以外，我们也不需要知道更多的东西。Let us illustrate this rule by some examples;and,to begin with the simplest onepossible,let us ask what we mean by calling a thing hard.Evidently that it will notbe scratched by many other substances.The whole conception of this quality,as ofevery other,lies in its conceived effects.There is absolutely no difference between ahard thing and a soft thing so long as they are not brought to the test.Suppose,then,that a diamond could be crystallized in the midst of a cushion of soft cotton,and should remain there until it was finally burned up.Would it be false to say thatthat diamond was soft?This seems a foolish question,and would be so,in fact,except in the realm of logic.There such questions are often of the greatest utility asserving to bring logical principles into sharper relief than real discussions evercould.In studying logic we must not put them aside with hasty answers,but mustconsider them with attentive care,in order to make out the principles involved.Wemay,in the present case,modify our question,and ask what prevents us fromsaying that all hard bodies remain perfectly soft until they are touched,when theirhardness increases with the pressure until they are scratched.Reflection will showthat the reply is this:there would be no falsity in such modes of speech.They wouldinvolve a modification of our present usage of speech with regard to the wordshard and soft,but not of their meanings.For they represent no fact to be differentfrom what it is;only they involve arrangements of facts which would be exceedinglymaladroit.This leads us to remark that the question of what would occur undercircumstances which do not actually arise is not a question of fact,but only of themost perspicuous arrangement of them.Let us next seek a clear idea of Weight.This is another very easy case.Tosay that abody is heavy means simply that,in the absence of opposing force,it will fall.This(neglecting certain specifications of how it will fall,etc.,which exist in the mind ofthe physicist who uses the word)is evidently the whole conception of weight.It is afair question whether some particular facts may not account for gravity;but whatwe mean by the force itself is completely involved in its effects.Whether we ought to say that a force is an acceleration,or that it causes anacceleration,is a mere question of propriety of language,which has no more to dowith our real meaning than the difference between the French idiom Il fait froidand its English equivalent It is cold.Yetit is surprising to see how this simple affairhas muddled mens minds.In how many profound treatises is not force spoken ofas a mysterious entity,which seems to be only a way of confessing that the authordespairs of ever getting a clear notion of what the word means!In a recent admiredwork on Analytic Mechanics it is stated that we understand precisely the effect offorce,butwhatforceitselfiswedonotunderstand!Thisissimplyaself-contradiction.The idea which the word force excites in our minds has no otherfunction than to affect our actions,and these actions can have no reference to forceotherwise than through its effects.Consequently,if we know what the effects offorce are,we are acquainted with every fact which is implied in saying that a forceexists,and there is nothing more to know.（皮尔士将他的实用主义原则用于界定人们所持的信念。说一个人抱有某个信念，就是说他在适当的情况下以某种方式作出反应的倾向。如果两个信念对信念持有人的行为方式没有任何影响，那么这两个信念就是同一个信念。）信念的本质是习惯的建立。不同的信念是根据它们产生的不同的行动而被区别的。如果信念在这个方面没有区别，如果信念通过产生同样的行动习惯而平息了同样的怀疑，那么，仅仅在意识这些信念的方式上的差别就决不能使它们成为不同的信念，正如用不同的音调弹同一个曲子不能说是在弹不同的曲子一样。人们往往在只是表达方式不同的信念之间作出虚构的区别，但由此发生的争论实在是无谓的。相信某些东西被安排得如图一所示，与相信它们被安排得如图二所示，是同一个信念。当然可以想像有人会断定其中的一个命题，而否定另一个，但这种错误的区分同把真正不同的信念混淆是同样有害的，都是我们应当时加提防的陷阱，特别是当我们讨论形而上学问题时。The essence of belief is the establishment of a habit;and different beliefs aredistinguished by the different modes of action to which they give rise.If beliefs donot differ in this respect,if they appease the same doubt by producing the samerule of action,then no mere differences in the manner of consciousness of themcan make them different beliefs,any more than playing a tune in different keys isplaying different tunes.Imaginary distinctions are often drawn between beliefswhich differ only in their mode of expression_r;-the wrangling which ensues isreal enough,however.Tobelieve that any objects are arranged among themselvesas in Fig.1,and to believe that they are arranged in Fig.2,are one and the samebelief;yet it is conceivable that a man should assert one proposition and deny theother.Such false distinctions do as much harm as the confusion of beliefs reallydifferent,and are among the pitfalls of which we ought constantly to beware,especially when we are upon metaphysical ground.One singular deception of thissort,which often occurs,is to mistake the sensation produced by our ownunclearness of thought for a character of the object we are thinking.Instead ofperceiving that the obscurity is purely subjective,we fancy that we contemplate aquality of the object which is essentially mysterious;and if our conception beafterward presented to us in a clear form we do not recognize it as the same,owingto the absence of the feeling of unintelligibility.So long as this deception lasts,itobviously puts an impassable barrier in the way of perspicuous thinking;so that itequally interests the opponents of rational thought to perpetuate it,and itsadherents to guard against it.（实用主义在国内学术界和一般人士中被严重误解了。人们一提到实用主义，就会想到“有用就是真理”这个臭名昭著的口号。不错，实用主义的代表人物詹姆士确实提出过这个口号，但这个口号并没有在实用主义者中得到广泛的认同。其错误，正如詹氏后来自己也认识到的那样，在于混同了真理的后果和信念的后果这两个不同的概念。皮尔士的表述虽然也有一些值得改进的地方，但总的来看，他并没有将两者混淆起来。一方面，如果一个命题是真的，那么我们会问它会产生什么样的可观察到的后果？如果无论如何不会有可观察的后果，那么无论说这个命题真还是假都是没有根据的，事实上这样的命题根本就没有意义；如果从这个命题中可以推导出可观察到的后果，那么如果我们真的观察到这样的后果，这个命题就可以被当成真理被接受下来，如果没有观察到这样的后果，这个命题就要被当做假的遭到拒斥。另一方面，如果某个人持有某个信念（即认为某个命题是真的），那么我们会问，他持有这个信念对他的行为造成了什么样的可观察到的后果？如果无论如何不会有可观察到的后果，那么说这个人持有这样的信念便是没有意义的，这和那个命题是否有意义是没有关系的。如果从他的信念中可以推导出可观察到的后果，那么如果我们真的观察到这样的后果，那么他就可以被认为真的持有这个信念，这和这个信念本身是不是真的并没有关系；如果没有观察到这样的后果，那么他就可以被认为没有持有这个信念，这和这个信念本身是不是假的也没有关系。举例说明，因为无论上帝是否存在，都不会带来任何可观察到的后果，所以“上帝存在”是一个无意义的（无真假可言的）伪命题。但这并不影响有人相信上帝，有人不信上帝，因为相信或不相信上帝确实会影响到相信者或不信者的行为，而且这种影响是可以测知的。上帝是否存在的问题和人们是否相信上帝的问题是两个不同的问题，上帝的存在不是由人们相信它得到证实的，不管人们从相信上帝中是不是获得了好处。我们也可以将对命题真假的检验和对人们对命题的态度的检验两者统一起来。对命题态度的检验在某种意义上也是对命题的检验，只不过不是对原有命题的检验。在上帝是否存在的问题里，我们要检验的是“上帝存在”这个命题的真假性；而在人们是否相信上帝的问题里，我们要检验的是“人们相信上帝存在”这个命题的真假性。两种情况要检验的命题并不是同一个命题。）