1、EPCIC OF WELLHEAD PLATFORMS,ASSOCIATEDPIPELINES AND TIE-INSOFZAWTIKA DEVELOPMENT PROJECT PHASE 1BHAZID Terms of ReferenceDOCUMENT CLASS:1A121-jun-14Issued for ReviewREVDATEBYDESCRIPTIONCHECKAPPR.CHECKAPPR.ENGINEERING APPROVALCOMPANY APPROVALREVISION CODE:A = Issued for Review B = Issued for Approval
2、 C = Approved for Design or Approved for Construction or Issued for Implementation or Issued for Purchase or Issued for Purchase SpecificationTOTAL OR PARTIAL AND / OR UTILIZATION OF THIS DOCUMENT ARE FORBIDDEN WITHOUT PRIOR WRITTEN AUTHORIZATION OF THE OWNERPTTEP INTERNATIONAL LIMITEDEPCIC OF ZAWTI
3、KA DEVELOPMENT PROJECT PHASE 1BREVA11 项目概述1.1 GeneralThe Zawtika Project is a gas field development project located in the Gulf of Martaban, Myanmar. The development area covers Block M9 and small portion of Block M11, owned by Myanmar Oil & Gas Enterprise (MOGE). The field lies approximately 300 km
4、 south of Yangon and 290 km west of Tavoy on the Myanmar coast and the average water depth is approximately 140-150 meters.Figure 1.1: Zawtika Field LocationZawtika field development is planned in three phases 1A (existing facilities), 1B and 1C as per Figure 1.2 Zawtika Field Layout. Phase 1A devel
5、opment consisting of Zawtika Processing integrated with living quarter platform (ZPQ), WP1, WP2, and WP3 is currently being developed. Commercial production is expected to commence in the first quarter of . Phase 1B and 1C (remote wellhead platforms) will be developed in order to sustain production
6、plateau through the field life.Figure 1.2:Zawtika Field Layout1.2 ObjectivesThe intent of the HAZOP review is to systematically review the design and operations of the WP4/5/7 and WP4 facilities and Brown Field modifications of existing platforms ZPQ, WP2, and WP3 to identify any safety and operabil
7、ity problems associated with the processes.The risk management objectives of the HAZOP Review are to: Identify safety related hazards and operability concerns related to the process; Determine the consequences for the identified hazards and operability concerns; Identify engineering safeguards and f
8、uture procedural controls already incorporated into the design that will reduce the likelihood, or associated consequence, of the identified problems; Evaluate the adequacy of existing engineering safeguards and future procedural controls in place for the facilities;and Recommend additional engineer
9、ing safeguards and/ or future procedural controls, where necessary.Note that risk ranking will not be conducted for this HAZOP Study.1.3 Scope of studyThe scope of the HAZOP study includes review of topsides design associated with the following facilities: Four new remote wellhead platforms (WHP) na
10、med WP 4, 5, 6, and 7 with pre-installed risers. WP4, WP5, and WP7 are 20-well slot type platform. WP6 is 12-well slot type platform. Four associated pipelines (IP4, IP5, IP6, and IP7) with their dog leg tie-in. The telecommunication and control systems integration WORK into existing facilities in Z
11、AWTIKA field. Brown Field modifications of existing platforms ZPQ, WP2, and WP3.The HAZOP review will mainly address normal operating conditions.SIMOPS activities are not included in the scope of work.Vendor packages are excluded from the scope of the study.HAZOP will be conducted based on WP6 and W
12、P4/5/7 Piping and Instrument Diagrams (P&IDs), Issued for Approval Revision, provided by COOEC.Future facilities such as the Booster Compressors on WPX are excluded from the scope of this HAZOP review as the information available for these facilities are still at the preliminary stage.2 执行筹划、参加人员及流程
13、简介2.1 时间和地点HAZID筹划执行2天,将于X月XX日开始,X月XX日完毕。审查时间是每日9:00至17:30,其中涉及1小时午休时间。表2.1 HAZID会议执行筹划表(第一天)Time Activity9.00 am HAZID构成员自我简介9.15 am 推选HAZID组长9.30 am 工程方案分析10.30 am 休息10.45 am 制定HAZID引导词12.00 am 午餐2.00 pm 逐项细化风险辨认与记录(1)3.45 pm 休息4.00 pm 逐项细化风险辨认与记录(2)5.30 pm 结束当天会议Table 2.2 HAZID会议执行筹划表(第二天)Time Ac
14、tivity9.00 am 昨日成果回顾9.15 am 逐项细化风险辨认与记录(3)10.30 am 休息10.45 am 逐项细化风险辨认与记录(3)12.00 am 午餐2.00 pm 重要风险HAZID汇总3.45 pm 休息4.00 pm 防控办法与安全建议总结5.30 pm 结束当天会议2.2 资料准备依照本次HAZID分析目需要,本次HAZID分析所需准备基本资料涉及了如下内容:可行性研究报告、工程方案、海域环境资料、类似工程项目资料以及其她可用资料(如建设地气象水文地理地质数据、建设地社会环境分析、项目描述(项目各项备选方案、拟设计生命周期和生产弹性等)、本项目合用法律法规、核心
15、设计原则或规定等、工艺流程图(PFD)、物料平衡图(表)、总图布置、工艺描述(涉及各种也许操作工况)、安全设计原则和初步操作原则)。2.2 成立项目组1、HAZID小组组织机构:HAZID组长:1人HAZID构成员:4-6人2、HAZID组长规定:本次HAZID分析需要在一位组长引导下完毕。为了保证组长能全身心投入分析引导工作,建议指定专门人员负责分析讨论记录工作。HAZID组长应具备丰富安全评价经验,以保持整个分析能在公平、公正和客观氛围下进行。同步,主席应熟悉HAZID分析技术,具备较高沟通技巧、会议进度控制能力和会场控制能力,可以在规定期间内,引领、激发分析小组所有成员投入HAZID分析
16、过程,开展积极讨论,并带领分析小组获得卓有成效分析成果。ISO310003、HAZID成员规定:所有参加HAZID分析人员,可从事不同专业,涉及但不限于项目管理、工艺、生产调度、操作、安全等。高档管理人员不但要参加全局性、共性和项目执行问题讨论,也要全程参加整个HAZID分析过程。分析小组其她成员,应依照HAZID分析对象和目予以拟定,所选取人员应熟悉项目背景、建设地状况、并理解各种备选方案,具备丰富类似项目经验人员将是分析成员最佳候选人,这在本项目HAZID分析中发挥出明显优势。沟通范畴,业主2.3 内容及过程本次HAZID执行分析过程,涉及危险源辨识(HAZARD IDENTIFICATI
17、ON)、风险评估(RISK ASSESSMENT)、和风险管理(RISK MANAGE MENT)三个某些。危险源辨识作为风险分析第一种环节,不但限于狭义辨认危险源,而是予以了更为宽泛内涵,涉及辨认危险源、分析其因素和也许导致后果,在此基本上进而分析与否需要开展有针对性定量风险评估,藉此提出相应建议或改进办法。3 技术规定及执行要点3.1 研究准备本次研究,在研究准备阶段,需要组建分析小组、收集基本资料、明确分析范畴、拟定分析引导词等活动。本次HAZID分析应关注工程方案自身技术问题,还将讨论全局性、共性和项目执行过程中问题时,则除专业技术负责人外,还应当考虑邀请来自投资方、承包商和运营商等有
18、关方项目高档管理HAZID分析资料种类和详细限度决定了HAZID分析限度深浅。如本项目可依照已有工程方案,同步收集项目建设地资料和项目立项资料,对项目共性问题和在项目执行过程中也许遇到问题进行初步HAZID分析,尽量针对项目中潜在危险源开展较为详尽HAZID分析。3.2 开展分析在进行本次分析时,可参照下面分析引导词进行HAZID分析,分析成果记录在表1分析清单例表中。惯用HAZID分析引导词如下。需要阐明是,下面所列出引导词供HAZID分析参照。依照本项目特点,关注问题应尽量全面。建议借鉴已有类似项目引导词进行补充或筛减。本次HAZID分析勉励头脑风暴,在进行分析时不能拘泥于此处所列举引导词
19、,在分析准备阶段、开始正式分析前,分析小组应依照本项目详细特点,拟定合用于本项目、人们共同关怀引导词或危险源。(1)共性危险源:有外部和环境危险源(自然灾害、人为制造危险、周边设施中也许存在危险源、环境问题)和健康危险源。(2)项目执行过程中问题:项目合同订立方略、项目风险管理方略、项目应急筹划。(3)设施危险源:物料危险源、活动危险源(超压、开停车、施工、维修等)、控制方式和原则、泄漏、火灾和爆炸、公用工程。本项目HAZID分析,可以只讨论与项目全局关于共性危险源和项目执行过程中问题;当项目进行到一定深度,则可进一步就设施危险源中与工程方案有关问题进行分析和讨论。依照准备阶段拟定HAZID分
20、析范畴,一方面可讨论已有类似项目问题,然后讨论与设施危险源有关详细问题。在讨论类似项目问题时,其经验可进行充分借鉴。HAZID小组组长将引导成员按照拟定好引导词顺序,对每个引导词进行头脑风暴式地分析,讨论也许存在危险源、所导致影响或后果,并记录到分析清单中。详细分析流程参见图2。3.3 编制报告分析过程中讨论节点、辨认危险源及其也许导致影响和后果都将录入HAZID分析清单里,以便项目后续HSE风险管理和监控。补救建议办法不是HAZID分析工作范畴内,但HAZID分析小组可以提出某些代替、削减风险建议办法,以作为专家建议供项目组予以考虑,这些建议可以作为后续跟踪内容纳入HAZID分析报告。 分析报告还应涉及项目简介、分析目与范畴、分析基本资料、分析小构成员、分析所用引导词等必要内容。3.4 跟踪贯彻HAZID分析报告及其分析清单应纳入整个工程项目HSE风险管理系统中,建议采用书面成果文献形式予以跟踪贯彻管理。由于HAZID分析也许是项目第一种风险分析活动,故此项目书面成果文献应可以反映所辨识危险源、也许后果、控制办法、贯彻状况、后续风险分析活动及其跟踪状况等等。运用书面成果文献,可以实现对HAZID分析以及项目后续各种风险分析活动持续跟进和管理。