论文：上海家化股权激励失败的案例分析.pdf

目录1.1 研究的背景和意义.11.2.1 关于股权激励与公司业绩的探究.31.2.2 关于股权激励实施的因素研究.31.2.3 关于股权激励实施效果的研究.41.2.4 文献评述.51.3 研究思路与研究方法.51.4 论文的基本框架.52股权激励的概述及理论基础.82.1 股权激励的概念.82.1.1 股权激励的定义.82.1.2 股权激励的特点.82.1.3 股权激励的基本模式.82.2 股权激励的相关理论基础.102.2.1 委托代理理论.102.2.2 人力资本理论.102.2.3 双因素激励理论.112.3 股权激励失败的具体表现.112.3.1 企业业绩受到影响.112.3.2 导致经营者的短期行为.122.3.3 人才流失严重.123上海家化股权激励方案.133.1 上海家化的概况.133.1.1 上海家化的集团架构.133.1.2 上海家化的发展历程及发展现状.133.1.3 上海家化的经营范围及旗下品牌.143.2 上海家化股权激励的背景.143.2.1 上海家化实施股权激励的动因.143.2.2 实施股权激励的过程.143.3 上海家化股权激励设计方案分析.153.3.1 股权激励方式的选择.15I332激励对象的授予范围.153.3.3 激励对象持股比例的设置.153.3.4 行权考核指标的设计.163.3.5 股权激励成本的摊销.164上海家化股权激励存在的问题及失败原因分析.174.1 上海家化股权激励存在的问题.174.1.1 股权激励的股票来源受到限制.174.1.2 股权激励设计和实施受管理层控制.184.1.3 绩效考核缺乏有效性.194.1.4 导致企业过度投资问题.204.2 上海家化股权激励失败的原因分析.214.2.1 公司治理结构和控制权的不完善.214.2.2 缺乏有效的经理人市场.224.2.3 业绩考核指标体系不健全.234.2.4 资本市场的弱有效性.244.2.5 股权激励监督机制不健全.245完善上海家化股权激励的对策建议.275.1 完善国有上市公司治理结构.275.1.1 完善国有产权主体对国有控股上市公司的管理.275.1.2 发挥好独立董事的作用.275.1.3 完善企业内部治理机制.285.1.4 优化股权结构.285.2 引入以EVA为基础的绩效考评体系.295.3 建立有效的经理人市场.305.3.1 优化我国职业经理人的市场环境.305.3.2 完善我国职业经理人需求者的整体素质.315.3.3 提高猎头产业的发展.315.4 建立有效的资本市场.325.4.1 构建多层次资本市场结构体系.325.4.2 完善信息披露制度.325.4.3 加强对资本市场的监管.335.5 建立完整的股权激励监督机制.335.5.1 加强政府的监督力度.335.5.2 加强社会群体的舆论监督.34II553加强管理层对股权激励的治理与防范.346结束语.35致谢.39IIIContents1 Introduction.11.1 background and significance of research.11.2 related literature review.31.2.1 on the equity incentive and the performance of the company.31.2.2 on the implementation of equity incentive factors.31.2.3 on the implementation of equity incentive.41.2.4 literature review.51.3 research ideas and research methods.51.4 basic framework of the paper.52 Overview and theoretical basis of equity incentive.82.1 the concept of equity incentive.82.1.1 definition of equity incentive.82.1.2 equity incentive features.82.1.3 basic mode of equity incentive.82.2 theoretical basis of equity incentive.102.2.1 principal agent theory.102.2.2 human capital theory.102.2.3 two factor theory.112.3 specific performance of the failure of equity incentive.112.3.1 business performance is affected.112.3.2 leads to short-term behavior of the operators.122.3.3 brain drain serious.123 Shanghai Jahwa equity incentive plan.133.1 overview of Shanghai Jahwa.133.1.1 Shanghai Jahwa group structure.133.1.2 The development process and development status of Shanghai Jahwa.133.1.3 The business scope and under the flag of Shanghai Jahwa brand.143.2 Shanghai Jahwa equity incentive background.143.2.1 The implementation of equity incentive motivation Shanghai Jahwa.143.2.2 The process of implementation of equity incentive.143.3 Design analysis of Shanghai Jahwa equity incentive.153.3.1 The choice of equity incentive mode.15V3.3.2 award range of incentive objects.153.3.3 set of incentive target stock ownership.153.3.4 The design of exercise assessment index.163.3.5 amortization of equity incentive costs.164 Analysis of Shanghai Jahwa equity incentive problems and causes of failure.174.1 Shanghai Jahwa equity incentive problems.174.1.1 equity incentive stock sources are limited.174.1.2 equity incentive design and implementation of management control.184.1.3 performance assessment lack of effectiveness.194.1.4 lead to over investment in Enterprises.204.2 Analysis of reasons for the failure of Shanghai Jahwa equity incentive.214.2.1 corporate governance structure and control of imperfect.214.2.2 lack of effective manager market.224.2.3 performance evaluation index system is not perfect.234.2.4 weak effectiveness of capital markets.244.2.5 equity incentive supervision mechanism is not perfect.245 countermeasures to perfect Shanghai Jahwa equity incentive.275.1 improve the governance structure of the state-owned listing Corporation.275.1.1 to improve the management of state-owned property rights of state-owned holding listing Corporation.275.1.2 play a good role in the independent director.275.1.3 improve the internal governance mechanism.285.1.4 optimizing ownership structure.285.2 the introduction of EVA based performance evaluation system.295.3 to establish an effective manager market.305.3.1 to optimize the market environment of our countrys professional5.3.2 to improve the overall quality of professional managers in China.315.3.3 to improve the development of executive search industry.315.4 to establish an effective capital market.325.4.1 to construct a multi level capital market structure system.325.4.2 perfect information disclosure system.325.4.3 to strengthen the supervision of the capital market.335.5 to establish a complete equity incentive supervision mechanism.33VI5.5.1 to strengthen the governments supervision.335.5.2 public opinion supervision of social groups.345.5.3 strengthening management and prevention of equity incentive.346 concluding remarks.35Reference.36Acknowledgements.39VII摘要股权激励是针对于企业中高端管理人员和技术人员的一种激励方法，使这些 员工获得一定的公司股权，以股东的身份去经营管理企业，共享利润与风险。股 权激励有效解决了代理问题的种种不足，这一方面在西方经济发达国家和地区已 经得到了证实c我国是最大的发展中国家，股权激励正在曲折发展并且逐步完善 中。一般而言，企业员工与所有者之间的利益应该是不完全一样的。企业的主要 经营管理者和关键性技术人才因为企业实施了股权激励而变成了企业的股东后，公司的利益与其个人的利益将渐渐变为一致，从而形成企业利益共同体，因此两 者之间的矛盾得到了有效地弱化。在当企业主要的技术以及管理人员成功转变为股东之后，便能够享受到红利待 遇。股权激励会人人提高企业技术人员和管理人员的主动性、创造性和积极性，这是因为经营管理者会因自己工作业绩的好坏得到不同的奖赏或者是处罚。股权激励是一种具有长期和长效性质的激励机制，不仅仅在经营管理者任职期 间可以得到适当的回报，而且就算是在经营者经营期之外，也有可能得到部分奖 励。这就要求经营者要注重自己任期内的业绩，同时更要注重企业的远期发展效 益，从而确保能够获得在自己任期之外的那一部分收人，由此进一步去弱化经营 者为了追求企业短期利益的行为，更加可以保证公司长远的利益，提高公司的综 合竞争实力。从上述可见，对股权激励的探究具有很多现实的实践价值。本文通过对上海家 化股权激励失败案例的分析，分析其产生的原因，并针对其原因提出建议，为国 有企业股权激励提供了更多的实践经验。同时，股权激励在公司治理的角度有着很深远的意义，它的产生和发展都有 着很深的理论基础，这些理论都为股权激励理论的提出和更好地发展提供肥沃的 土壤和丰富的养分。第一，这些理论都是经济学家们在公司治理的过程中提出来 的，它有它自己的经济背景和社会背景，具有它自己的独特性和普遍性。第二，这些理论在我们研究各种理论实践问题时给予了我们理论依据和理论基础。作为经营者激励机制体系中的重要问题，我们现在对股权激励的探索仍然在 继续着。目前，对于股权激励方面的探究虽然数量很多，但是很少有对国有背景 下企业的股权激励实施状况展开深入研究的，现有的研究均是将关注点集中到那 些上市公司。同时，对国有企业背景下实施股权激励计划失败的案例分析少之又 少。本文结合上海家化这个案例，通过对国有控股背景下的股权激励实施失败的 原因着手，从公司治理理论、企业业绩考核体系理论、经营者激励理论等方面进 行分析，对完善现有理论具有一定的学术价值。1为此，本文选取了老牌国有企业一一上海家化，对其2008年实施的第一次股 权激励和2012年实施的第二次股权激励进行对比分析，发现2008年还是国有控 股上市公司的上海家化实施的股权激励是失败的，没有达到预期的效果，同时也 带来了一系列的问题，例如分配的问题、道德的问题以及绩效考核的问题等。通 过一系列的研究分析发现，上海家化实施的股权激励计划存在的问题具体有：股 权激励的股票来源受到限制、股权激励设计和实施受管理层控制、业绩考核缺乏 有效性、激励机制缺乏长期性以及激励缺乏有效监管。导致这些问题存在的原因 在于公司治理结构和控制权的不完善、缺乏有效的经理人市场、业绩考核指标体 系不健全、资本市场的弱有效性和股权激励监督措施不完善。所以，为了进一步 优化上海家化的股权激励计划，文章提出了以下的几点意见和建议：首先要完善 国有上市公司的公司治理结构，可采取的措施有完善国有产权主体对国有控股上 市公司的管理、发挥独立董事的作用、完善企业内部治理机制、优化企业股权结 构；第二要采用基于EVA的绩效考核体系；第三则要构建起相应的经理人市场，如对我国当下经理人市场进行优化、完善我国职业经理人需求者的整体素质、提 高猎头产业的发展水平；第四要建立有效的资本市场，必须要构建多层次资本市 场结构体系，并且完善信息披露制度，同时还要加强对资本市场的监督；最后要 建立股权激励良好的监督机制，可以从政府的监督、社会群体的监督以及管理层 的监督这几个方面入手。本文研究的创新之处在于对国有控股上市公司的股权激励实施状况展开深入 而又详细地分析，不足之处在于研究未有展开实证性的检验工作，并且部分数据 诸如那些长期的激励效果还需进一步的考证。关键词：股权激励；上市公司；上海家化2AbstractEquity incentive is an incentive for the high-end management personnel and technical staff in the enterprises,which can make these employees obtain a certain corporate equity,and operate management companies in the identity of the shareholders,sharing profits and risks.Equity incentive has effectively solved the problems caused by the agency problem,which has been confirmed in western developed countries and regions.China is the largest developing country,equity incentive is windingly developing and gradually improved.Generally speaking,the interests of the enterprise staff and the owner should not be exactly the same.The main business managers and key technical personnel for the enterprise become the shareholders of the enterprise because of implementing the equity incentive,the companys interests and their personal interests will gradually become the same,then form a corporate interests unit,so the contradiction between the two can be effectively weakened.After the companys major technology and management personnel successfully transforms into shareholders,they will be able to enjoy the bonus treatment.Equity incentive will greatly enhance the initiative,creativity and enthusiasm of the technical and management staff.This is because the business managers will be rewarded or punished for their own performance.Equity incentive is a long-term and long-effect incentive mechanism,not only the business managers can get appropriate reward during their presidency,but also may get some part of the reward outside the operation period.This requires operators to pay attention to the performance of his term of office;at the same time,they should pay more attention to the long-term benefit for the development of enterprises,so as to ensure the that part of income outside of his tenure,thereby further weaken the action that operators pursue short-term interests of the company,and even ensure the long-term interests of the company,improve the companys comprehensive competitive strength.From the above,we can see the study of equity incentive has a lot of practical value.Through the analysis of Jahwa equity incentive failures,this article will analyze reasons for this failure,and put forward suggestions for the reason,provide more practical experience for the state-owned enterprises stock incentive.At the same time,equity incentive has a very far-reaching significance in corporation governance,whose production and development all own a very deep theoretical foundation.These theories have provided a fertile soil and rich nutrient for 3the theory of equity incentive.First,these theories are put forward by economists in the process of corporation governance,which has its own economic background and social background,and its own uniqueness and universality.Second,these theories have given us the theoretical evidence and theoretical basis for the study of various theoretical and practical problems.As an important problem in the executive incentive mechanism system,we are continuing with the exploration of equity incentive.At present,there are a lot of research on the stock option incentive,but few have carried out in-depth research on the implementation of equity incentive in the state-owned enterprises;and the existing researches are all focused on those listing Corporation.At the same time,analysis on the failure of the implementation of equity incentive plan in state-owned enterprises are rare.Combining with this special and typical case of Shanghai Jahwa,through the reasons for failure of the implementation of equity incentive under the background of state-owned holding,from the theory of corporate governance,it analyzes the enterprise performance appraisal system theory,incentive theory and other aspects,which has a certain academic value to improve the existing theory.Therefore,this paper selects the old state-owned enterprisesJahwa,do the comparison and analysis on the implementation of the first equity incentive in 2008 and the second implementation of equity incentive in 2012,and finds the 2008 equity incentive implementation in state holding listed companies Jahwa failed,did not achieve the expected results,and also brought a series of problems,such as assignment problem,moral issues,performance appraisal problems and so on.Through a series of research analysis,it is found the specific problems in Jahwa5s implementation of equity incentive plan are:the sources of equity incentive stock were restricted,equity incentive design and implementation management were under the control of the managing hierarchy,the performance evaluation was not effective,incentive mechanism did not last long,and the incentive lacks effective supervision.These problems are caused by the imperfection of corporate governance structure and controlling right,the lack of effective manager market,unsound performance evaluation index system,weak effectiveness of capital market and imperfect stock incentive supervision.So in order to further optimize the equity incentive plan of Jahwa,this paper puts forward the following points of views and suggestions:first,the corporate governance structure of state-owned listed companies should be improved,the measures can be taken to perfect the subject of state ownerships management over state-owned holding listed 4companies,play well the role of independent directors,improve the internal governance mechanism,and optimize the ownership structure of enterprises.Second,adopt the performance appraisal system based on EVA.Third,build up the corresponding manager market,such as optimizing the current manager market in our country,perfecting the overall quality of professional managers in China,and improving the level of the development of the headhunting industry.Fourth,establish an effective capital market,build a multi-level capital market structure system,improve the information disclosure system,and also strengthen the supervision on the capital market.Finally,we should establish a good supervision mechanism of equity incentive,which can start from the supervision of the government,the supervision of social groups,and the supervision of management hierarchy.The innovation of this paper is that it deeply and detailedly analyzes the implementation of the state-owned holding listing corporation,and its shortcoming is that the research has not carried out the empirical test,and some data such as the long-term incentive effect needs further confirmation.Key Word:Equity incentive；Listing corporation；Shanghai Jahwa51引言1引言本章首先分析本文的研究背景及意义，然后阐述股权激励的相关文献综述，最后介绍本文的研究思路、研究方法以及论文的基本框架。1.1 研究的背景和意义自上世纪开始，科技便成为了人们社会的主导，在极大程度上促进了生产力的 发展，企业规模在日益扩大，企业内部管理问题变得越来越难处理。在企业管理 的传统模式下，企业的所有者对企业的日常事务是可以有直接管理权的，但随着 企业规模的不断扩大，所有者无论是从能力上还是精力上都已经无法对企业进行 很好的管理了 C因此，传统模式开始向新模式转变，即将企业的所有权和经营权 相分离，以便企业所有者更好地管理公司，这样的两权分离也就是后来所说的经 济革命。两权分离所引发的一系列有利影响是不言而喻的，经理人相对企业而言，有 着绝对的经营权和管理权，保证企业能在合理积极的轨道上快速前进。企业所有 者聘请的经理人一般都受过较高的教育，具有较高的专业理论知识水平和较丰富 的工作实践经验，因此，在他们经营下企业的效益业绩和社会形象均会有大幅度 地提升。与此同时，我们也发现了一点，经营者与管理者在利益的追求上是不完 全一致的，例如，经营者因为都是有一定任期，所以他们对企业的利益追求多是 短期的，力求在最短的时间内获取最大的利益，而企业的所有者必然是希望企业 能够长期稳定地发展，所以更加在乎的是企业的长期利益。由于所有者把企业经 营管理权移交给了经理人，再加上自身不具备太强的专业能力，所以很容易出现 所有人对有些日常经营内容不完全了解，两者在信息方面存在有不对称的现象。管理者完全有做出短期最优决策的动机与能力，这会损害到企业所有者的利益。这些问题的出现都大大增加了企业所有者委托代理的成本，为了解决这个问题，从公司治理角度来看，如何对企业管理者的经营和管理行为做出约束，同时激励 他们始终站在企业所有者的角度做出最佳决策便成为了亟需解决的问题。股权激励就是在这样的背景下提出的，股权激励计划是作用于管理者的激励 措施，具体而言，首先赋予管理者相应的股权，即让其成为企业的主人。换而言 之，就是令所有者与管理者两者对于企业的利益有相同的追求，共同承担企业经 营的风险和收益，使经营管理者在决策时始终站在企业所有者的立场上，追求企 业长期稳定的利益，在最大程度上保护所有者的各项权益。上述做法成功将所有 者与管理者在利益层面上整合到了一起，进而从根本上解决了两者间的矛盾，显 著降低了企业的代理成本，让企业的经营管理者能够对企业尽心尽力，对企业毫 1上海家化股权激励失败的案例分析无隐瞒。1950年，美国便出现了股权激励，随后引入欧洲，在上世纪末又辗转传到了 亚洲经济比较发达的地区，股权激励计划开始被逐步地应用并以较慢的速度发展 着，授予范围也随之越来越大，由仅限高级管理人员扩大到企业的技术性人才。在我国，最早的对于股权激励的尝试是在1993年，深圳万科集团起草了一份向全 体员工增发股票的激励计划，经中国人民银行的批准后，于1996年执行了第一期,但是之后的几期因为种种原因没能继续下去。其他企业也纷纷开始了对股权激励 的积极探索，例如国有企业、民营企业等，涉及到的行业也多种多样。那么企业应该如何去设置股权激励方案呢？股权激励的条件只有设置恰当 了，才能给企业带来积极的作用，能够真正地激励员工并引导管理者制定正确的 长期规划与决策。与之同时，如果激励条件过于苛刻，经营者就有可能丧失动力,工作散漫导致企业经营效率低下。如果股权激励条件过于宽松，制定的目标太容 易实现，实质上是不能给经营管理者太多的激励，企业的委托代理成本也会因此 增加。在我国，尚没有有效发挥股权激励措施的外部环境。在落实相应计划时，我 国的企业特别容易遇到各种各样的困难与阻碍，这是因为我国的资本市场缺乏有 效性，公司治理结构也缺乏完整性等，这就使得对股权激励的研究工作有着非常 重要的现实意义。2006年，证监会颁布了上市公司股权激励管理办法。两年后，财政部与 国资委联合下发了关于规范国有控股上市公司实施股权激励制度有关问题的通 知。上述两文件的颁布，相对上市公司实施股权激励措施而言有着极其重要的意 义，即为之提供了有效的参考依据与规范，特别是第二个文件，为我国国有企业 的股权激励的探索指明了方向提出了意见。之后，国企相继开展了这一计划，进 而该项措施也成为股权分置改革后公认的有着较大影响力的再一次改革。上海家化作为资历最老的国企之一，近年来在股权激励方面的探索工作也居 于我国企业前列。早在2001年上海家化便开始了对该项措施的探索工作，期间经 历了企业体制的改革，由国有企业向民营企