数据系统和主要的代理模式.pptx

Click to edit Master title style,Click to edit Master text styles,Second level,Third level,Fourth level,Fifth level,*,*,Click to Edit Master Title Style,Click to edit Master text styles,Second Level,Third Level,Fourth Level,Fifth Level,Dr.Chak-Tong Chau,*,*,Click to Edit Master Title Style,Click to edit Master text styles,Second Level,Third Level,Fourth Level,Fifth Level,Dr.Chak-Tong Chau,*,*,Information Systems under Principal-agent Modeling,Dr.Chak-Tong Chau,仇澤棠博士,U.S.Fulbright Professor,中美交流富布萊特教授,1,数据系统和主要的代理模式,第1页,What Is Information?,Broadly defined,information,is any device that helps to reduce,uncertainty,.,Alternatively,information should be helpful in:,detecting,the,current,state of the world,or,forecasting,the,future,state of the world,Dr.Chak-Tong Chau,2,Fulbright Guest Lecture Materials,数据系统和主要的代理模式,第2页,Good Information Should be Useful in:,Improving production decisions telling us to do the right things.,Optimizing the scope for risk sharing so that some people can not make profits by harming other people.,Eliminating“information asymmetry”so that,ex ante,(before-the-act)private information can be known,ex post,(after-the-act).,Dr.Chak-Tong Chau,3,Fulbright Guest Lecture Materials,数据系统和主要的代理模式,第3页,Time line of a typical agency contract,Contract agreed,Effort selected,Payoff revealed,Pre-contract information,Pre-effort selection information,Post-effort information,Post-payoff information,Timing,Information Availability,To agent only(private),To all parties(public),Pre-contract,Agents proprietary knowledge,Historical information,Post-contract,pre-effort,Information set under decentralization,Post-effort,pre-payoff,Voluntary disclosure relevation principle,Post payoff(,ex post,),Not interesting,Financial reporting,Dr.Chak-Tong Chau,4,Fulbright Guest Lecture Materials,数据系统和主要的代理模式,第4页,Usefulness of Information,How do we know,a priori,that information is“useful”?,Consider the following payoff structure(known to all):,Effort,S,1,S,2,S,3,S,4,S,5,S,6,Expected Payoff,e,1,=10,2,3,3,4,5,5,3.67,e,2,=5,2,2,3,4,4,5,3.33,Dr.Chak-Tong Chau,5,Fulbright Guest Lecture Materials,数据系统和主要的代理模式,第5页,Usefulness of Information,Now,we have an information system that will generate these signals:,S,1,S,2,S,3,S,4,S,5,S,6,Y,1,Y,2,Signal:,Y,1,Y,2,S,1,S,2,S,3,S,4,S,5,S,6,e,1,=10,2,3,3,4,5,5,e,2,=5,2,2,3,4,4,5,In a sense,the information system partitions the matrix as follows,Question:Are the signals,Y,1,and Y,2,useful?,Dr.Chak-Tong Chau,6,Fulbright Guest Lecture Materials,数据系统和主要的代理模式,第6页,Usefulness of Information,Now,we have another information system that will generate these signals:,S,1,S,4,S,5,S,6,Y,1,Y,3,Signal:,Y,1,Y,2,Y,3,S,1,S,2,S,3,S,4,S,5,S,6,e,1,=10,2,3,3,4,5,5,e,2,=5,2,2,3,4,4,5,This new information system partitions the matrix as follows,Question:Are the signals,Y,1,Y,2,and Y,3,useful?,S,2,S,3,Y,2,Dr.Chak-Tong Chau,7,Fulbright Guest Lecture Materials,数据系统和主要的代理模式,第7页,Can Private Information to Agent Benefit the Principal?,Consider the following payoff structure(known to all):,S,1,S,2,S,3,S,4,Expected Payoff to Principal before Payment to Agent,Prob.,0.25,0.25,0.25,0.25,e,1,=0,0,0,0,0,0,e,2,=5,20,000,20,000,25,000,30,000,23,750,e,2,=6,20,000,30,000,30,000,35,000,28,750,Agents Utility Function:,U=X,-e,2,100,where:X=agents compensationse=the effort level used by the agent,If the Principal can observe effort,how would he pay the agent?,X,-6,2,=100,X,=18,496,Dr.Chak-Tong Chau,8,Fulbright Guest Lecture Materials,数据系统和主要的代理模式,第8页,Can Private Information to Agent Benefit the Principal?,Now,if the Principal,cannot,observe effort,how would he pay the agent?,How about this compensation contract(a fixed salary of$18,496)to agent?Would this work?,S,1,S,2,S,3,S,4,Expected Utility to A,Expected Payoff to P,Prob.,0.25,0.25,0.25,0.25,e,1,=0,18,496,18,496,18,496,18,496,e,2,=5,18,496,18,496,18,496,18,496,e,3,=6,18,496,18,496,18,496,18,496,136,111,100,-18,496,5,254,10,254,Thus,a fixed salary to someone whom you cannot observe wont work.A“moral hazard”problem will come into play.,Dr.Chak-Tong Chau,9,Fulbright Guest Lecture Materials,数据系统和主要的代理模式,第9页,Can Private Information to Agent Benefit the Principal?,Now then,what about a,contingent,salary of$18,496 to agent?Would this improve the Principals payoff?,S,1,S,2,S,3,S,4,Expected Utility to A,Expected Payoff to P,Prob.,0.25,0.25,0.25,0.25,e,1,=0,0,0,0,0,e,2,=5,18,496,18,496,0,18,496,e,3,=6,18,496,18,496,18,496,18,496,0,77,100,0,9,878,10,254,Now,the contingent salary contract will improve by forcing the Agent to give(e,3,=6).,Let us now look at the“private information to agent”issue!,Dr.Chak-Tong Chau,10,Fulbright Guest Lecture Materials,数据系统和主要的代理模式,第10页,Can Private Information to Agent Benefit the Principal?,This,private,information system(only observable to the agent)generates these signals:,S,1,S,2,S,3,S,4,Y,1,Y,2,Would the,contingent,salary of$18,496 to agent still work?,Signal:,Y,1,Y,2,Expected Utility to Agent with Private info,Expected Payoff to Principal with Private info,S,1,S,2,S,3,S,4,Prob.,0.25,0.25,0.25,0.25,e,1,=0,0,0,0,0,e,2,=5,18,496,18,496,0,18,496,105.5,(,100),7,754,(,10,254,),e,3,=6,18,496,18,496,18,496,18,496,Dr.Chak-Tong Chau,11,Fulbright Guest Lecture Materials,数据系统和主要的代理模式,第11页,Can Private Information to Agent Benefit the Principal?,Now,the new private information makes it easy for the agent to cheat.So,what should the principal do?,Consider this new contingent contract,(corresponding payoffs),:,S,1,S,2,S,3,S,4,Prob.,0.25,0.25,0.25,0.25,e,1,=0,0,0,0,0,e,2,=5,14,722,(20,000),14,722,(20,000),0,(25,000),20,544,(30,000),e,3,=6,14,722,(20,000),20,544,(30,000),20,544,(30,000),18,496,(35,000),Would the new plan work?Let us calculate the agents utility and the principals payoff.,Dr.Chak-Tong Chau,12,Fulbright Guest Lecture Materials,数据系统和主要的代理模式,第12页,S,1,S,2,S,3,S,4,Expected Utility to A,Expected Payoff to P,Prob.,0.25,0.25,0.25,0.25,e,1,=0,0,0,0,0,e,2,=5,14,722,(20,000),14,722,(20,000),0,(25,000),20,544,(30,000),e,3,=6,14,722,(20,000),20,544,(30,000),20,544,(30,000),18,496,(35,000),0,71.5,100,0,n/a,10,173.5,Summary of results:,Types of contract,Principals Payoffs,Agents Utility,Fixed salary,effort observable,10,254,100.0,Fixed salary,effort unobservable,-18,496,136.0,Contingent salary,no private information,10,254,100.0,One-amount,with private information,7,754,105.5,Multiple-amount,with private information,10,173.5,100.0,Dr.Chak-Tong Chau,13,Fulbright Guest Lecture Materials,数据系统和主要的代理模式,第13页,Pre-effort“Public”Information?,This time,it is different in that the information is available to all,principal and agent.,(,changed),S,1,S,2,S,3,S,4,Prob.,0.25,0.25,0.25,0.25,e,1,=0,0,0,0,0,e,2,=5,20,000,(18,496),25,000,(0),25,000,(0),30,000(18,496),e,2,=6,20,000(18,496),30,000(18,496),30,000(18,496),35,000(18,496),This,public,information system(observable to all)generates these signals:,S,1,S,2,S,3,S,4,Y,1,Y,2,Is this information useful to the agent?,Dr.Chak-Tong Chau,14,Fulbright Guest Lecture Materials,数据系统和主要的代理模式,第14页,Signal:,Y,1,Y,2,Expected Utility to Agent,Expected Payoff to Principal,S,1,S,2,S,3,S,4,Prob.,0.25,0.25,0.25,0.25,e,1,=0,0,0,0,0,e,2,=5,18,496,0,0,18,496,100,10,254,e,3,=6,18,496,18,496,18,496,18,496,First,the information has no value to the agent.Why?,This is because the agent,by observing Y,1,cannot guarrantee that the payoff$25,000 will not occur.,However,is this kind of information system useful to the Principal?,Dr.Chak-Tong Chau,15,Fulbright Guest Lecture Materials,数据系统和主要的代理模式,第15页,Now,let us look at this new contract,(corresponding payoffs),:,Signal:,Y,1,Y,2,S,1,S,2,S,3,S,4,Prob.,0.25,0.25,0.25,0.25,e,1,=0,0,0,0,0,e,2,=5,15,170,(20,000),15,170,(25,000),15,170,(25,000),17,030,(30,000),e,3,=6,15,170,(20,000),17,030,(30,000),17,030,(30,000),21,074,(35,000),Now,if Y,1,is observed,what would the agent do?,U(e,2,)=15,170,1/2,5,2,=98.17,U(e,3,)=15,170,1/2,*0.5+17,030,1/2,*0.5 6,2,=90.89,Thus,the Principal in fact,tells,the agent to be lazy!,Dr.Chak-Tong Chau,16,Fulbright Guest Lecture Materials,数据系统和主要的代理模式,第16页,Signal:,Y,1,Y,2,S,1,S,2,S,3,S,4,Prob.,0.25,0.25,0.25,0.25,e,1,=0,0,0,0,0,e,2,=5,15,170,(20,000),15,170,(25,000),15,170,(25,000),17,030,(30,000),e,3,=6,15,170,(20,000),17,030,(30,000),17,030,(30,000),21,074,(35,000),Then,if Y,2,is observed,what would the agent do?,U(e,2,)=15,170,1/2,*0.5+17,030,1/2,*0.5 5,2,=101.88,U(e,3,)=17,030,1/2,*0.5+21,074,1/2,*0.5 6,2,=102.03,This time,the agent will want to work hard.,On average,98.17*0.5+102.03*0.5=100,So,this is acceptable to the agent.,Dr.Chak-Tong Chau,17,Fulbright Guest Lecture Materials,数据系统和主要的代理模式,第17页,But for the Principal,why should he care?,Signal:,Y,1,Y,2,S,1,S,2,S,3,S,4,Prob.,0.25,0.25,0.25,0.25,e,2,=5,20,000,25,000,e,3,=6,30,000,35,000,Wages to A,(15,170),(15,170),(17,030),(21,074),Expected Residual,1,207.50,2,457.50,3,242.50,3,481.50,10,389,Note that this is larger than 10,254,the optimal solution under perfect information.,Thus,seemingly,useless information can be useful!,Dr.Chak-Tong Chau,18,Fulbright Guest Lecture Materials,数据系统和主要的代理模式,第18页,In Conclusion,We cannot guarrantee that people will,always,do the ethically correct things.,Therefore,they will have to be monitored and controlled.,Information systems provide us with the means to:,inform us what has happened,and,motivate people to do the ethically correct things.,It is therefore important to consider these points in designing any managerial accounting systems.,Dr.Chak-Tong Chau,19,Fulbright Guest Lecture Materials,数据系统和主要的代理模式,第19页,