外文翻译-国有企业会计监督体系的构建.doc

外文翻译：
国有企业会计监督体系的构建
By Ron Kasnik
国有企业改革的基本方向是建立现代企业制度，公司制企业是现代企业制度的一种有效形式，公司法人治理结构是公司制企业的核心。中国国有企业改制后，国有企业虽然建立了公司制，但国有企业法人治理结构尚存在诸多问题。改制的国有企业治理结构不完善，导致了企业行为短视和不规范，不仅如此企业经营者还出于各种目的操纵会计工作，屏蔽财务会计真实信息，使得国有企业存在严重的会计信息失真问题。企业会计信息失真造成国有资产大量流失，证券市场发育不良等，严重降低了会计信息质量，影响了会计信息使用者的正确决策，进而在客观上影响了国民经济运行秩序。在当前会计信息普遍失真的情况下，企业一般来说主要面临着两个基本问题:一是完善会计流程;二是加强会计监督。这两项职能都是处于一定的内部控制条件下的，内部控制环境是内部控制的前提和基础，加强内部控制环境建设，才能使内部控制得以顺利进行，各项会计任务才能有效实施，会计信息质量才能真正提高。然而，目前我国理论界在讨论会计信息失真问题时，大多强调制度的建设，却在一定程度上忽视内部控制环境的作用或者将内部控制环境与内部控制制度混为一谈。故此，本文将从研究内部控制环境入手，将内部控制环境与会计监督相结合，通过探讨内部控制环境各要素对会计监督的影响来寻找一些切实可行的方法以提高会计信息质量。
会计监督是为保证会计信息质量、防范会计信息失真而对会计信息进行的各种监督。会计监督被看作是会计信息质量的保证体系。会计监督不力是导致会计信息失真的直接因素，会计监督问题对于完善公司治理结构有着重要意义，对于改制的国有企业更有特殊的强调意义。
我国在从计划经济向市场经济转轨过程中，由于内部人控制的弊端，以及外部监督、中介组织的缺陷，导致会计委派制的产生有了现实意义。但会计委派制单独运行也存在一些问题，无法满足现代化管理的需要。应该正确认识内部审计的必要性，将会计委派制与内部审计二者相结合，发挥会计委派制的作用，强化内部审计工作，促进单位在管理分权条件下经营管理整体目标的实现。
财务监督机制改革是国有企业建立现代企业制度的关键，也是众多其它性质的企业能够发展的关键。纵观近几年很多企业，有过辉煌的成绩，但都只是昙花一现，从中不难发现具有共同的特点，就是在构建现代企业制度过程中，缺乏应有的财务监督。我国最早由深圳市政府为维护国有企业所有者利益，防止国有资产流失，用会计委派制的财务监督模式率先在部分国有企业中实行了财务总监制度或财务部长逐级委派制度。目前，在一些国有企业中，特别是大中型集团化经营企业中，陆续建立了会计委派制度;另外，在一些非国有企业和公司制企业中，也尝试着建立会计委派制度。
中国有企业的财务监督体制经历了三个阶段，日趋达到完善。第一阶段:80年代初-1988年。这一阶段探索的结果表明，仅仅从企业层次着手是建立不起现代企业制度的，必须从宏观出发，建立合理的国有资产管理体制。第二阶段:1988年-2003年。此阶段运行中，各个部门均没有放权，如国有资产的资产权归财政部管，投资权归国家计委管，日常经营归经贸委管，人事权归企业工委管，多个部门可以对同一个企业发号施令，弊端颇多。第三个阶段:2003年-当前。这一阶段以建立国有资产管理新体制、建立健全现代产权制度、使股份制成为公有制的主要实现形式为核心任务。2003年年初，国资委成立，之后三年，围绕调整国有经济布局结构，深化国有企业改革，加强国有资产监管三个方面进行了诸多的探索。完善公司治理结构、加大企业为主体的科技创新、规范国有企业改制、加强对国有企业日常监管等方面均取得了显著的效果。
国有企业治理中仍存在很多没有解决问题，主要有以下几项。第一项国有企业缺少竞争力与创新精神。第二项国有企业建立产权结构多元化遇到了困难。第三项国有企业的董事会和经理人在控制权的配置上难以形成合理的分配。第四项国有企业资产管理基本法律体系仍不完善。第五项国有企业的重组推进仍缓慢，国资委直接管理的国有企业数量仍太多。
以上问题造成了国有企业财务监督体制中出现了缺陷。首先缺少对企业经营管理者重大财务决策行业的有效监督。其次缺少对国有企业经营管理高层个人经济状况的监督。再次缺少对国有企业虚假、隐瞒财务信息的有效监督。同时中介财务监督机构也没有尽到应付的责任。最后造成企业内部财务监督机构专职人员的地位与归属不一致。
财务监督评价系统划分为系统管理、个性工具、财务管理、客户服务、企业运营、企业发展、系统评价等7个子系统，系统管理包括部门管理，职务管理，人员管理，用户管理，用户组管理，菜单管理等功能;个性工具提供个人信息维护功能;财务管理、客户服务、企业运营、企业发展分别是针对企业财务状况、客户数据及关系、企业主营业务及增值业务、企业文化及人员方面的指标的编辑和评分;系统评分是显示系统的总得分，并且根据规定将当前财务监督水平划分到具体的等级。
国有企业会计监督失效是由诸多原因造成的，以公司治理为理念，对国有企业会计监督体系重新构建，建立了多元化、多层次的国有企业会计监督体系。所谓多元化，是指会计监督主体由各公司治理主体、各政府部门以及司法部门组成:所谓多层次，是指会计监督中最基础的是会计机构和会计人员的会计监督，然后是经营者的会计监督，再次是除经营者之外的各利益相关者的会计监督，最后是单位外部会计监督，其中司法部门的监督是最高层次的会计监督。在除经营者之外的各利益相关者的会计监督中，要强调国家所有者对国有企业的会计监督。
对于国有企业会计监督体系的设计，国有企业会计监督体系应以公司治理结构为依据，划分为单位内部会计监督和单位外部会计监督。单位内部会计监督又分为内部利益相关者的会计监督和外部利益相关者的会计监督。内部利益相关者的会计监督要在企业内部形成相互制约的机制。单位内部会计监督即公司治理结构中的会计监督，不仅应满足经营者对经营管理的需要，同时还应满足各派利益相关者为维护自身经济利益而对经营者进行再监督的需要。此外，由于中国国家所有者对国有企业会计监督的好坏是国企改革的重要问题之一，所以对于国有企业的会计监督还应能满足国家所有者对经营者加强监督的需要。
国有企业的会计监管模式是多方面的。全面实施这些模式将会浪费资源,提高会计管理的难度。针对性的选择两个或两个以上的会计监管模式来实现会计监督根据运行特点监督国有企业是非常必要的。笔者认为,一般来说,内部审计系统是一个传统的系统。如果你想选择系统分配的会计系统中,分配的监事会制度和外部董事系统,系统数量的选择更好的不超过两个。与此同时,你就不需要实现分配会计师系统和调度的监事会制度在相同的企业,它不太合适,促进外部董事系统在较大范围的。
信息不对称理论表明,私人信息被察觉到的代理,隐藏的行动是无凭无据,因此带来的最大问题是投机行为。因此,不需要强调国有企业会计监督的多种形式,但有必要强调实际结果,会计监管的效率,并限制代理的机会主义行为。首先,任命和分配任务人员应迅速掌握企业的财务信息如财务业绩、经营成果、现金流量,熟悉企业的生产和经营活动。其次责任必须分配到个人,保障机制的实施措施应该被建立,某人应该分配给追踪、监督、检测和评价这一制度的实施。建立一个国有企业的全国的会计监管专家的数据库,加强职业培训,在企业管理方面建立一个有高水平和丰富经验的专业的团队。最后,在会计监督模式实施过程中所获得的各种各样的信息应该被共享。国有资产监督管理委员会应组织各种交流会议,现场会议和研讨会,能吸引更多的任命和作业人员参加,磋商出现在会计监督和沟通措施中的问题并提出解决方案。
在所有权和管理权分离的情况下，内部控制理论告诉我们,企业董事在事实上或法律控制企业,并利用管理过程中有效的信息和设施,在企业的管理和决策中获得更多的利益。会计监督是维护经济秩序,防止内部人控制以确保国有企业的经济活动正常进行。国有资产监督管理委员会,人事任命和分配应该清楚地理解会计监督的性质和局限性。会计监督应根据经济发展和企业的经济效益,专注于企业的长远利益。监管不仅应该适当地,也应该适度进行,不应该直接干预或参与日常管理活动。职员可以作为“裁判”,但不应该作为“参赛选手”,更不应充当二者的结合。
根据委托-代理理论,委托人需要代理人的帮助和合作以完成预期目标,委托人将使用一系列的奖励措施来激励代理人努力使得代理总体价值最大化,从而平衡委托人和代理人之间的关系。在市场经济条件下,企业激励机制和约束机制的会计监督是十分重要的，并且和会计监管的效率直接相关。会计监督的主体是人,所以在会计监督的过程中他们也需要被刺激和克制。激励机制促进会计监督人员不断发现问题,并积极对抗会计舞弊。约束机制使得会计监察人员的行动不应超过其法律法规的范围。为了做好会计监督工作,首先,一个鼓励和支持任命人员履行职责应的法律应该被协调。各种形式的激励机制,如发展优先就业,期权激励和回报之间的区别。其次,应加强责任感，约束机制,比如职业禁令,行政处罚,和法律责任问责应该被建立,应加强问责制。
正确的财务管理目标，是企业财务管理系统良性循环的前提，也是财务管理机制赖以建立的基础。根据利益兼顾原则，提出了公司财务管理目标的分层确定观点，即国有公司财务管理目标分为总体目标和具体目标两个层次。总体目标分为实现公司价值最大化的经济目标和承担一定社会责任的社会目标两个层次。具体目标中的经济目标包括公司在筹资、投资和分配管理方面的目标，具体目标的社会目标可分为最大限度地降低社会成本和提高社会效益。
国有公司财务监督机制是建立在内外财务监督关系基础之上的，监督机制的主要方式为审计监督。在外部监督机制中，强调国家审计监督的“龙头”地位和依靠CPA社会审计监督主要力量，并对CPA中介监督出现的信誉危机问题，从国内外相关事件的分析中，查找原因，提出完善的对策。内部监督机制中，应完善公司财务治理结构，保证股东(大会)、董事会、经理层及监事会等各层次监督主体有效行使监督权，同时应加强内部审计监督、会计监督和财务总监制度。
国有公司会计监督机制新模式:市场导向下利益相关者共同控制型模式，即综合激励的动力机制，运转顺畅的运行机制，内外结合的监督机制和科学合理的评价机制具有创新性。

原文正文：
Construct of accounting supervision system of state-owned enterprise
By Ron Kasnik
The modern enterprise mechanism is the basic reform direction of state-owned enterprises in China. Corporation is one kind of effective form of modern enterprise mechanism, and corporate governance is the core of corporation. There are many problems in corporate governance of the state-owned enterprises, which make the operators manipulate the fiscal work and results in distortion of fiscal information The distortion of fiscal information of enterprises can result in large quantities of state-owned assets leak, and then affect the right decision-making of the user. It is the popular phenomena that the accounting information can not reflect enterprises' true financial condition. Under this position, enterprise generally faces two basic problems: One is to develop the accounting process; the other is to strengthen the accounting monitoring. These two functions must be carried out under some internal control condition. Internal control environment is the foundation of internal control system. When internal control environment being developed, internal control system should run smoothly, and accounting measures should be effectively carried out. However, when discussing the problem of false accounting information, scholars pay more attention on developing accounting system; neglect the function of the internal control environment on accounting. Thus this article will integrate the internal control environment and accounting monitoring to find some practicable measure to improve the accounting quality.
Accounting supervision is used as the system of guaranteeing the quality of fiscal information. The deficiency of accounting supervision is the direct factor resulting the distortion of fiscal information. Accounting supervision system is important to reforming state-owned enterprises.
In the process for our country's economy' translation from planned economy to market economy, the internal control problems of external supervision and intermediary organization lead to the existence of the accountant appointment system. But running accountant appointment system separately can't meet the needs of modern management. We must combine the accountant appointing system with the internal auditing so as to promote the realization of the overall target of business management.
Reforming the financial supervision system is the key to establishing the modern enterprising system. A lot of enterprises, which made brilliant achievements years ago, disappeared now, due to the lack of financial supervision. To secure the state-owned enterprise owners interests, to avoid the loss of state-owned assets, accountant appointment system of financial supervision mode was applied in some state-owned enterprises in Shenzhen. At present, accounting appointment system has been established or being established in some state-owned enterprises, especially large and medium-sized ones.
The financial supervision system of state-owned enterprises has experienced three stages in our country, and to achieve perfect increasingly. The first stage: the early 80 s to 1988. The results of exploration in this stage show that it can't afford to establish modern enterprise system only from the enterprise level, but also proceed from the macroscopic and establish a sound management system for state-owned assets. The second stage: 1988 to 2003, In the operation this stage, each department don't give up the right, for example, the assets of the rights owned by the ministry of finance, the state-owned assets investment of the rights owned by the State Development Planning Commission, the day-to-day operations of the rights owned by the economic and trade commission, the staffing of the rights owned by the enterprise work committee, multiple departments can give orders to the same enterprise, So there were many disadvantages in this stage. The third stage: 2003 to now. The core task of this stage is to establish a new state-owned assets management system, establish and improve the modern property right system, make the joint stock system becomes the main form of public ownership. In early 2003, state-owned assets supervision and administration commission was set up, after three years, around the adjustment of state-owned economic layout structure, deepen the reform of state-owned enterprises, strengthen the supervision of state-owned assets of many trials were carried out in three aspects. Perfect the corporate governance structure, strengthening the scientific and technological innovation of enterprises as the mainstay, standardization of state-owned enterprise restructuring, strengthen the daily supervision in state-owned enterprises has obtained the remarkable effect.
Our country still exist many unsolved problems in state-owned enterprise governance, mainly has the following several. The first item: the state-owned enterprises lack of competitiveness and innovation spirit. The second: problems for state-owned enterprises to establish diversified property rights structure. The third: the board of directors and managers of state-owned enterprises on the configuration of control is difficult to form a reasonable distribution. The fourth: basic management of state-owned assets law system is still imperfect. The fifth: the restructuring of state-owned enterprises forward is still slow, SASAC directly manage the number of state-owned enterprises is still too much.
These problems caused the defects in the financial supervision system of state-owned enterprises. First of all, lack of enterprise operators and managers major financial decisions effective supervision of the industry. Secondly, lack of state-owned enterprises operation and management of high-level personal supervision of the state of the economy. There is lacking of effective supervision about the false and hiding financial information. Financial supervision and intermediary organization also did not deal with the responsibility. The final status of internal financial supervision institution full-time personnel does not agree with attribution.
Financial supervision and evaluation system is divided management, personalized tools, financial management, customer into 7 sub-systems such as service, business operations, systems business development and system evaluation. System management includes sector management, job management, personnel management, user management, user group management and menu management; personalized tools provide personal information to maintain; the system consists of four sub-modules, namely financial management, customer service, business operations and business development, and respectively edits and rates for financial position, customer data and relationships, the main business enterprises and value-added services, corporate culture and personnel indicators; system score is the total score of system, and in accordance with the provisions of the current level of financial supervision divided into specific grades.
There are many factors causing the deficiency of accounting supervision in state:-owned enterprises. The thesis points out the present deficiency of accounting supervision in state-owned enterprises concentrated on the research of accounting supervision system in state-owned enterprises, and establishes multiple accountant supervision system
The thesis suggests that the dividing between exterior accounting supervision and internal accounting supervision in state-owned enterprise should be based on corporate Corporation The accountant supervising of internal corporation should satisfy the needs of both the operators' management and protecting the individual interest of each interest group.
Accounting supervision modes of state-owned enterprises are various. Full implementation of these modes would be a waste of resources, increase the difficulty of accounting management. It’s necessary to targeted select two or more accounting supervision modes to implement accounting supervision according to operation characteristics of the supervised state-owned enterprises. The author believes that, generally, the internal audit system is a conventional system. If you want to select systems among the assigned accountant system, assignment board of supervisors system and outside director system, the number of systems chosen is better no more than two. At the same time, it’s no need to implement assigning accountants system and dispatching board of supervisors system in the same enterprise, and it’s inappropriate to promote outside director system in a large scale.
Asymmetric information theory suggests that private information possessed by agents is unobservable, hidden action is unverifiable, thus the biggest problem brought is the opportunistic behavior. Therefore, it’s not necessary to emphasize the diversified forms of accounting supervision of state-owned enterprises, but necessary to emphasize the actual results, the efficiency of the accounting supervision, and limit opportunistic behavior of agents. Firstly, the appointment and assignment personnel should quickly master financial information of the enterprise such as financial results, operating results and cash flow, and be familiar with production and business activities of the enterprise. Secondly, the responsibilities must be assigned to individuals, safeguard mechanisms for implementation should be established, and someone should be assigned to track, supervise, inspect and evaluate the implementation of the system .Thirdly, establish a national accounting supervision expert’s database of state-owned enterprises, strengthen job training, and build a professional team of high-level and rich experience in business management. Finally, the information acquired in implementation of a variety of accounting supervision modes should be shared. State Asset Supervision and Administration Commission should organize a variety of communication meetings, on-site meetings and seminars which can attract a lot of appointment and assignment personnel to participate in, to consult problems appearing in accounting supervision and communicate measures against the problems.
In the case of separation of ownership and management, insider control theory tells us that directors of enterprise in fact or in law control the enterprise, and make use of available information and the facility of management to gain more interests in enterprise management and decision-making. Accounting supervision is to maintain the economic order and prevent insider control to ensure normal economic activity of state-owned enterprises. State Ass