inflation通胀.doc

The central problem in the stock market is that the return on capital hasn’t risen with inflation. It seems to be stuck at 12 percent.

1 It is no longer a secret that stocks, like bonds, do poorly in an inflationary environment. We have been in such an environment for most of the past decade, and it has indeed been a time of troubles for stocks. But the reasons for the stock market's problems in this period are still imperfectly understood.
股票市场的资本回报率没有随着通货膨胀而上升，而似乎是停滞在了12%
股票在通货膨胀环境下像债券一样表现不佳，这已经不是个秘密。在过去10年里，我们一直处于这种通胀环境里。确实，这是一个股票遇到麻烦的时期。但是，在这段时间里造成股票市场难题的原因仍然没有被人们完全理解。

2 There is no mystery at all about the problems of bondholders in an era of inflation. When the value of the dollar deteriorates month after month, a security with income and principal payments denominated in those dollars isn't going to be a big winner. You hardly need a Ph.D. in economics to figure that one out.
在通胀时期债券持有者所遇到的问题一点也不神秘。当美元月复一月地贬值，一种本金和收入都用美元支付的证券不会是个大赢家。你根本不需要一个博士学位就能搞懂这个问题。

3 It was long assumed that stocks were something else. For many years, the conventional wisdom insisted that stocks were a hedge against inflation. The proposition was rooted in the fact that stocks are not claims against dollars, as bonds are, but represent ownership of companies with productive facilities. These, investors believed, would retain their Value in real terms, let the politicians print money as they might.
一直以来，人们认为股票是不同的。多年来，传统智慧坚持认为股票是对通货膨胀的对冲。这个说法来源于一个事实，那就是股票不像债券一样是对美元的所有权，而是对有着生产设施的公司的所有权。因此，股票投资者们相信，无论政客们如何印钞票，股票投资者仍然能保持他们投资的实际价值。

4 And why didn't it turn but that way? The main reason, I believe, is that stocks, in economic substance, are really very similar to bonds.
但是为什么实际上不是这么回事？主要原因在于：我认为股票在经济实质上非常类似于债券。

5 I know that this belief will seem eccentric to many investors. They will immediately observe that the return on a bond (the coupon) is fixed, while the return on an equity investment (the company's earnings) can vary substantially from one year to another. True enough. But anyone who examines the aggregate returns that have been earned by companies during the postwar years will discover something extraordinary: the returns on equity have in fact not varied much at all.
我知道我的主张对很多投资者来说显得古怪。他们马上就观察到债券的回报（利息）是固定的，而股票投资的回报（盈利）会每年变化极大。这确实是事实。但是，任何研究战后公司总体回报的人都会发现一个现象：资本回报率实际上并没有变化那么多。

A. The coupon is sticky
停滞的息票

6 In the first ten years after the war - the decade ending in 1955 -the Dow Jones industrials had an average annual return on year-end equity of 12.8 percent. In the second decade, the figure was 10.1 percent. In the third decade it was 10.9 percent. Data for a larger universe, the FORTUNE 500 (whose history goes back only to the mid-1950's), indicate somewhat similar results: 11.2 percent in the decade ending in 1965, 11.8 percent in the decade through 1975. The figures for a few exceptional years have been substantially higher (the high for the 500 was 14.1 percent in 1974) or lower (9.5 percent in 1958 and 1970), but over the years, and in the aggregate, the return on book value tends to keep coming back to a level around 12 percent. It shows no signs of exceeding that level significantly in inflationary years (or in years of stable prices, for that matter).
战后10年，一直到1955年，道琼斯工业指数里的公司的资本回报率是12.8%。战后的第二个10年，这个数字是10.1%。在第三个10年，是10.9%。财富500强（历史数据最早到50年代中期），这一个更大范围的数据显示了相似的结果：1955-1965年资本回报率11.2%，1965-1975资本回报率11.8%。这个数字在几个特殊年份里非常高（财富500强的最高值是1974年的14.1%）或者非常低（1958年和1970年是9.5%）。但是，过去这些年，总体上，净资产的回报率持续回到12%的水平。在通胀时期，这个数字没有显著超越这一水平。在价格稳定的时期净资产的回报率也没有超越这一水平。

7 For the moment, let's think of those companies, not as listed stocks, but as productive enterprises. Let's also assume that the owners of those enterprises had acquired them at book value. In that case, their own return would have been around 12 percent too. And because the return has been so consistent, it seems reasonable to think of it as an "equity coupon".
让我们先不把这些公司看成上市的股票，而是生产的企业。让我们假定企业的所有人按净资产价值购买了这些企业。如果是这样，这些企业的所有人自己的回报也是12%左右。由于回报如此固定，我们有理由把回报看成“股票的息票”。

8 In the real world, of course, investors in stocks don't just buy and hold. Instead, many try to outwit their fellow investors in order to maximize their own proportions of corporate earnings. This thrashing about, obviously fruitless in aggregate, has no impact on the equity, coupon but reduces the investor's portion of it, because he incurs substantial frictional costs, such as advisory fees and brokerage charges. Throw in an active options market, which adds nothing to, the productivity of American enterprise but requires a cast of thousands to man the casino, and frictional costs rise further.
当然，在现实世界里，股票投资者并不只是购买并持有。相反，很多人在股票市场上反复买卖，试图战胜其它投资者，以获得公司盈利里面自己那部分的最大化。这种争斗，从总体上来说是无效的，对股票及股票自身的盈利无影响，却减少投资者的收益。因为这些活动会造成很高的摩擦成本，比如咨询费和交易费等。一个活跃的期权市场的引入根本无法增加美国企业的生产率，只不过是产生了给这个赌场配置数以千计的人手的需求。而摩擦成本则进一步升高。

B. Stocks are perpetual
股票是永久的

9 It is also true that in the real world investors in stocks don't usually get to buy at book value. Sometimes they have been able to buy in below book; usually, however, they've had to pay more than book, and when that happens there is further pressure on that 12 percent. I'll talk more about these relationships later. Meanwhile, let's focus on the main point: as inflation has increased, the return on equity capital has not. Essentially, those who buy equities receive securities with an underlying fixed return - just like those who buy bonds.
实际上，在现实世界，股票投资者通常并不用净资产价格购买股票。有时他们能在净资产价格之下购买。但是大多数的情况下他们的购买价格要比净资产价格高。这种情况下，就进一步增加了12%的资本回报的压力。在后面的文章里我会进一步谈二者的关系。现在，让我们关注主要的一点：通货膨胀已经增加，但资本回报不变。本质上，买股票的人得到的是内在的固定收益 - 和买债券的人一样。

10 Of course, there are some important differences between the bond and stock forms. For openers, bonds eventually come due. It may require a long wait, but eventually the bond investor gets to renegotiate the terms of his contract. If current and prospective rates of inflation make his old coupon look inadequate, he can refuse to play further unless coupons currently being offered rekindle his interest. Something of this sort has been going on in recent years.
当然，股票和债券有一些重要的不同。首先，债券最终会到期。债券可能需要等很长时间才到期，但是最终债券投资者能够重新谈判合同的条款。如果目前和未来的通货膨胀率上涨使债券投资人旧的息票率显得不够，他可以拒绝再买。除非目前的息票率提高，重新引起他的兴趣。这种情况在近些年一直在持续上演。

11 Stocks, on the other hand, are perpetual. They have a maturity date of infinity. Investors in stocks are stuck with whatever return corporate America happens to earn. If corporate America is destined to earn 12 percent, then that is the level investors must learn to live with. As a group, stock investors can neither opt out nor renegotiate. In the aggregate, their commitment is actually increasing. Individual companies can be sold or liquidated and corporations can repurchase their own shares; on balance, however, new equity flotations and retained earnings guarantee that the equity capital locked up in the corporate system will increase.
股票，与之相反，是永久的。股票具有无限的到期日。股票投资者只能接受美国企业的盈利，无论好坏。如果美国企业注定获得12%的资本回报，这就是股票投资人必须接受的水平。作为一个群体，股票投资者无法退出，也无法重新谈判。从总体上说，他们的投入是增加的。单个的公司可以被买卖或破产清算。公司可以回购股票。但是从总体来说，增发新股和未分配利润肯定会使锁定在公司系统里的资本增加。

12 So, score one for the bond form. Bond coupons eventually will be renegotiated; equity "coupons" won't. It is true, of course, that for a long time a 12 percent coupon did not appear in need of a whole lot of correction.
所以，债券在这点上占了上风。债券最终会被重新谈判，股票的“息票”不会。确实，在很长时间里，12%的息票率看起来并不需要很多调整。

C. The bondholder gets it in cash
债券投资者拿的是现金

13 There is another major difference between the garden variety of bond and our new exotic 12 percent "equity bond" that comes to the Wall Street costume ball dressed in a stock certificate.
这是另外一个债券与12%回报的“股权债券”的重要的区别。股票就好像是穿着股票证书华丽外衣参加华尔街化妆舞会的一种新的债券 - “股权债券”。

14 In the usual case, a bond investor receives his entire coupon in cash and is left to reinvest it as best he can. Our stock investor's equity coupon, in contrast, is partially retained by the company and is reinvested at whatever rates the company happens to be earning. In other words, going back to our corporate universe, part of the 12 percent earned annually is paid out in dividends and the balance is put right back into the universe to earn 12 percent also.
通常情况下，债券投资者拿到现金息票。他可以自己决定这笔现金最好的投资方式。我们的股票投资者的“息票” - 盈利，则与之相反，一部分被公司留用并重新投资，而且投资回报率完全取决于公司。换句话说，公司的12%的年资本回报率一部分以现金方式发股息，剩下的重新投入盈取12%的回报。

D. The good old days
美好的旧日时光

15 This characteristic of stocks - the reinvestment of part of the coupon - can be good or bad news, depending on the relative attractiveness of that 12 percent. The news was very good indeed in, the 1950's and early 1960's. With bonds yielding only 3 or 4 percent, the right to reinvest automatically a portion of the equity coupon at 12 percent via s of enormous value. Note that investors could not just invest their own money and get that 12 percent return. Stock prices in this period ranged far above book value, and investors were prevented by the premium prices they had to pay from directly extracting out of the underlying corporate universe whatever rate that universe was earning. You can't pay far above par for a 12 percent bond and earn 12 percent for yourself.
股票盈利的一部分重新再投入的特性，是好消息也是坏消息，这取决于那12%的回报到底有多诱人。在1950年代和60年代早期，这的确是好消息。当债券收益率只有百分之三或四的时候，能够有权自动把股票盈利的一部分再投入，取得12%的回报，具有极大的价值。注意，投资人无法把自己的资金投资其他的东西而取得那12%的回报。在这个时期，股票价格远超过净资产价格。由于价格高涨，无论公司内在的回报率是多少，投资者都无法直接从公司的收益中获得回报。这就好比年息12%的债券，如果你以远远超过票面价值的价格购买，是无法获得12%的回报的。

16 But on their retained earnings, investors could earn 12 percent. In effect, earnings retention allowed investors to buy at book value part of an enterprise that, in the economic environment than existing, was worth a great deal more than book value.
但是，投资者的存留收益可以获得12%的回报。实际上，在当时的经济环境下，存留收益让投资者以净资产价格购买价值远超出净资产价格的企业。

17 It was a situation that left very little to be said for cash dividends and a lot to be said for earnings retention. Indeed, the more money that investors thought likely to be reinvested at the 12 percent rate, the more valuable they considered their reinvestment privilege, and the more they were willing to pay for it. In the early 1960's, investors eagerly paid top-scale prices for electric utilities situated in growth areas, knowing that these companies had the ability to reinvest very large proportions of their earnings. Utilities whose operating environment dictated a larger cash payout rated lower prices.
这种情况让现金股利与收益存留相比没有任何吸引力。确实，能有更多的盈利再投入赚取12%回报，投资者就更认为他们的投资有价值。他们就更愿意付更高的价格。在60年代早期，投资者对增长区域的电力公司股票付出了高价。因为他们知道这些成长型公司有能力再投入大量的盈利赚取更多回报。而由于运营环境的原因付出更多现金股利的电力公司则股价很低。

18 If, during this period, a high-grade, noncallable, long-term bond with a 12 percent coupon had existed, it would have sold far above par. And if it were a bond with a further unusual characteristic - which was that most of the coupon payments could be automatically reinvested at par in similar bonds - the issue would have commanded an even greater premium. In essence, growth stocks retaining most of their earnings represented just such a security. When their reinvestment rate on the added equity capital was 12 percent while interest rates generally were around 4 percent, investors became very happy - and, of course, they paid happy prices.
如果在这一时期，一个高等级，无法回购的年息12%的长期债券存在的话，也会卖的远远超过票面价值的。如果这样一个债券再有另外一个不寻常的特性 - 能够把利息收入的大部分再以票面价值投入到类似的债券中去，那它还会卖得更高。实际上成长型股票把大部分盈利存留下来再投入，就好像前面提到的债券。当资本再投入的回报是12%而银行利息只有4%左右时，投资者非常高兴。当然，他们也付出了高的价格。

E. Heading for the exits

19 Looking back, stock investors can think of themselves in the 1946-56 period as having been ladled a truly bountiful triple dip. First, they were the beneficiaries of an underlying corporate return on equity that was far above prevailing interest rates. Second, a significant portion of that return was reinvested for them at rates that were otherwise unattainable. And third, they were afforded an escalating appraisal of underlying equity capital as the first two benefits became widely recognized. This third dip meant that, on top of the basic 12 percent or so earned by corporations on their equity capital, investors were receiving a bonus as the Dow Jones industrials increased in price from 138 percent book value in 1946 to 220 percent in 1966, Such a marking-up process temporarily allowed investors to achieve a return that exceeded the inherent earning power of the enterprises in which they had invested.
回首过去，股票投资者可以认为他们在1946到1956年间享受了丰盛的三重盛宴。第一，他们享受了远超过银行利息的公司回报。第二，这些回报的很大部分又重新被投入，获得了其他投资方式无法获得的高回报。第三，当前面两点好处被广泛认知时，他们从股票资产价格的不断上升中又进一步获得了好处。这第三重好处意味着在12%的公司资本回报率之上，他们获得了额外的奖金。道琼斯工业指数股票价格从1946年的相当于138%的净资产增长到1966年的相当于220%的净资产。在这一增长过程中，投资者短暂地获得了超越其所投资企业内在盈利能力的回报。

20 This heaven-on-earth situation finally was "discovered" in the mid-1960's by many major investing institutions. But just as these financial elephants began trampling on one another in their rush to equities, we entered an era of accelerating inflation and higher interest rates. Quite logically, the marking-up process began to reverse itself. Rising interest rates ruthlessly reduced the value of all existing fixed-coupon investments. And as long-term corporate bond rates began moving up (eventually reaching the 10 percent area), both the equity return of 12 percent and the reinvestment "privilege" began to look different.
这一人间天堂式的情形在60年代中期被许多主要投资机构“发现”。但正当这些金融界的大象争先恐后进入股票市场时，我们进入了一个加速通货膨胀和高利率的时期。非常合乎逻辑的是，股票的上涨开始改头向下。升高的利息无情的减少了现存的固定收益投资的价值。当长期公司债券利息开始上升（最终达到了10%的附近），股票投资的12%的回报和再投入的优势都变得不一样了。

21 Stocks are quite properly thought of as riskier than bonds. While that equity coupon is more or less fixed over periods of time, it does fluctuate somewhat from year to year. Investors' attitudes about the future can be affected substantially, although frequently erroneously, by those yearly changes. Stocks are also riskier because they come equipped with infinite maturities. (Even your friendly broker wouldn't have the nerve to peddle a 100-year bond, if he had any available, as "safe.") Because of the additional risk, the natural reaction of investors is to expect an equity return that is comfortably above the bond return - and 12 percent on equity versus, say, 10 percent on bonds issued by the same corporate universe does not seem to qualify as comfortable. As the spread narrows, equity investors start looking for the exits.
股票被认为比债券更加具有风险。在一定时期内，股票的收益率虽然多多少少是固定的，但却每年上下浮动。投资者对未来的态度，很大程度上被每年的这种收益率浮动所影响，而这种影响往往是错误的。股票有更大的风险还因为股票是无限期的。（即使你的友好的股票经纪人有“安全”的100年的债券，他也不敢兜售给你。）由于这些额外的风险，投资者自然预期股票要有令人满意的高于债券的回报。而同样是公司发行的股票和债券，股票回报12%，债券回报10%，这两者的差异还够不上令人满意。当两者的差异缩小时，股票投资者开始寻找逃离的方式。

22 But, of course, as a group they can't get out. All they can achieve is a lot of movement, substantial frictional costs, and a new, much lower level of valuation, reflecting the lessened attractiveness of the 12 percent equity coupon under inflationary conditions. Bond investors have had a succession of shocks over the past decade in the course of discovering that there is no magic attached to any given coupon level - at