资源描述
THE VARIETIES OF GOODNESS
by Georg Henrik von Wright
LONDON ROUTLEDGE & KEGAN PAUL NEW YORK : THE HUMANITIES PRESS
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First published 1963 by Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd Broadway House, 68-74 Carter Lane London, E.C.4
Printed in Great Britain by Richard Clay and Company, Ltd Bungay, Suffolk
© Georg Henrik von Wright 1963
No part of this book may be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except for the quotation of brief passages in criticism
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PREFACE
IN 1959 and 1960 I gave the Gifford Lectures in the University of St. Andrews. The lectures were called 'Norms and Values, an Inquiry into the Conceptual Foundations of Morals and Legislation'. The present work is substantially the same as the content of the second series of lectures, then advertised under the not very adequate title 'Values'. It is my plan to publish a revised version of the content of the first series of lectures, called 'Norms', as a separate book. The two works will be independent of one another.
I take this opportunity to express my thanks to the University of St. Andrews for honouring me with the invitation to give the Gifford Lectures and to the members of staff and students at St. Andrews, with whom I was able to discuss the content of the lectures when they were in progress. Giving the lectures afforded me with an urge and opportunity to do concentrated research, for which I am deeply grateful.
In the course of revising the contents of my lectures and preparing them for publication I have had the privilege of regular discussions over a long period with Professor Norman Malcolm. I am indebted to him for a number of observations and improvements and, above all, for his forceful challenge to many of my arguments and views.
There is very little explicit reference to current discussion and literature in this book. I hope no one will interpret this as a sign that the author wishes to ignore or belittle the work which is being done by others. It is true, however, that the works of the classics have provided a much stronger stimulus to my thoughts than the writings of my contemporaries. In particular have I learnt from three: Aristotle, Kant, and Moore. I have been successively under the spell of the Kantian idea of duty and the Moorean idea of intrinsic value. In fighting my way against Kant I was led to reject the position sometimes called 'deontologist', and in resisting Moore I became convinced of the untenability of value-objectivism
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and -intuitionism. In this largely negative way I arrived at a teleological position, in which the notions of the beneficial and the harmful and the good of man set the conceptual frame for a moral 'point of view'. Perhaps one could distinguish between two main variants of this position in ethics. The one makes the notion of the good of man relative to a notion of the nature of man. The other makes it relative to the needs and wants of individual men. We could call the two variants the 'objectivist' and the 'subjectivist' variant respectively. I think it is right to say that Aristotle favoured the first. Here my position differs from his and is, I think, more akin to that of some writers of the utilitarian tradition.
From what has just been said someone may get the impression that this is a treatise on ethics. It is not. (See Ch. I, sect. 1.) But I think that it contains the germ of an ethics, that a moral philosophy may become extracted from it. This philosophy will hardly strike one as novel in its main features. What may be to some extent new is the approach to ethics through a study of the varieties of goodness. I think that this approach is worth being pursued with much more thoroughness than I have been capable of. I hope others would find it inviting to work out in greater detail things, which are here presented in the form of a first sketch.
GEORG HENRIK VON WRIGHT
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CONTENTS
PREFACE page
v
1.
The idea of the conceptual autonomy of morals -- a Kantian tradition in ethics. A philosophic understanding of morality must be based on a comprehensive study of the good in all its varieties
1
2.
The idea of a sharp distinction between is and ought and between fact and vatue -- a Humean tradition in ethics. Normative ethics and meta-ethics. Doubts as to whether the two can be sharply distinguished
2
3.
Our inquiry is conceptual. Remarks on the nature of conceptual investigations. Moral words in search of a meaning. The moral philosopher as a moulder of concepts. The importance of ethics to our orientation in the world as moral agents
4
4.
Division of ethically relevant concepts into three main groups, viz. value-concepts, normative concepts, and anthropological (psychological) concepts. Concepts between the groups. The narrow and the broad approach to ethics. The broad approach and the idea of a Philosophical Anthropology. The broad approach and a General Theory of Norms and Values
6
5.
The Varieties of Goodness. Illustration of the multiplicity of uses of the word 'good' by means of examples. Distinction of some principal forms of goodness
8
6.
The forms of goodness are not species of a generic good. Note on the concept of form
12
7.
The multiform nature of goodness is not due to an ambiguity of the word or a vagueness of the concept. The variety of forms of the good not a variety of analogical meanings. Is goodness a family-concept? The meaningpattern of 'good' as a problem for philosophical semantics
13
8.
Affinities between the forms of goodness. So-called moral goodness not an independent form of the good
17
1.
Preliminary explanation of instrumental and technical goodness. The instrumentally or technically good thing is often, but not necessarily, good of its kind
19
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2.
Instrumental goodness is primarily goodness for a purpose. Instrumental goodness of its kind presupposes an essential connexion between kind and purpose. Functional and morphological characteristics of kinds. The question of unity of the kind
20
3.
In the realm of instrumental goodness the opposite of 'good' is 'poor'. Difference between 'poor' and 'bad'. There is no instrumental badness
22
4.
'Good' and 'poor' connote contradictories rather than contraries. Poorness a privation
23
5.
Judgments of instrumental goodness or betterness are objectively true or false. The subjective setting of any such judgment. The notion of a good-making property. Vagueness and instrumental goodness
24
6.
Sentences expressing judgments of instrumental goodness have a descriptive content or sense. Why they should not be called 'descriptive sentences'. Distinction between the sense of a sentence and its use
30
7.
Instrumental goodness and commending. Why does goodness appeal?
30
8.
Instrumental goodness and preferential choice. Distinction between the real and the apparent good. A man necessarily prefers, with a view to a given purpose, the thing which he judges better for that purpose
31
9.
Technical goodness is primarily goodness at something. Technical goodness of its kind presupposes an essential connexion between kind and activity. Technical goodness is acquired and not innate
32
10.
In the realm of technical goodness the opposite of 'good' is called 'poor' or 'bad'. The opposition is between contradictories rather than contraries. Technical badness is a privative notion
34
11.
Tests of technical goodness. Competition and achievement tests. Tests by symptoms and by criteria. The technical goodness of professionals is secondary to instrumental goodness. Note on the creative arts. Goodness and greatness
35
12.
Technical goodness, commending, and praising. Technical goodness and keenness on activity. A man necessarily wants to practise an art on which he is keen as well as possible
39
1.
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a sub-category of the useful. The beneficial presupposes the notion of the good of a being
41
3.
Relations between instrumental and utilitarian goodness. Instrumental goodness as a degree of usefulness
43
4.
The opposites of the useful and the beneficial. The broad and the narrow sense of 'harmful'. Two senses of 'evil'
45
5.
Remarks on the logic of causal efficacy in the sphere of utilitarian goodness. The meanings of 'favourable' and 'adverse'
47
6.
Are judgments of utilitarian goodness objective? The axiological and the causal components of judgments of the beneficial and the harmful
48
7.
Which kind of being has a good? Good and life
50
8.
Medical goodness -- the goodness of organs and faculties. Relations to instrumental and technical goodness. Essential functions of a being. The concept of normalcy
51
9.
The tripartite division well-weak-ill and the bipartite division good-bad. Illness as basic notion. Weakness as potential illness. 'Good' means 'all right'. Note on aitia
54
10.
Pain and frustration logically constitutive of badness of organs. Badness and sub-normal performance
56
11.
Goodness of faculties. The social aspect of mental illness
58
12.
11. Are judgments of medical goodness objective?
60
13.
12. Health, illness, and the good of a being. The ethical significance of medical analogies (Plato)
61
1.
Pleasure insufficiently discussed in literature. Distinction between passive and active pleasure and the pleasure of satisfaction
63
2.
Passive pleasure. The good-tasting apple as example. Primary and secondary hedonic judgments
65
3.
Criticism of the view that pleasantness is a sensible quality
67
4.
Pleasure and its contraries. The concept of pain
69
5.
Analysis of secondary hedonic judgments. An analogy to the emotive theory in ethics. Distinction between third and first person hedonic judgments. The first person judgments express valuations and lack truth-value. The third person judgments are about valuations. They are true or false -- but no value-judgments
71
6.
The logical form of primary hedonic judgments. How is mention of a valuating subject to be worked into the overt formulation of the value-judgment? The liking-relation
75
7.
Active pleasure. Liking to do and wanting to do
77
8.
Discussion of Psychological Hedonism. The doctrine misinterprets the necessary connexion between pleasure and satisfaction of desire as being a necessary connexion between desire and pleasure as its object
79
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9.
Can a man desire the unpleasant?
84
10.
Remarks on Ethical Hedonism. Pleasure is not the sole good, but all forms of the good may have an intrinsic relationship to pleasure
84
1.
Welfare the good of man. Distinction between welfare and happiness. Happiness the consummation of welfare
86
2.
Happiness, welfare, and ends of action. Discussion of the position of Aristotle. Refutation of Psychological Eudaimonism. A man can pursue his own happiness as ultimate end, and the happiness of others as an intermediate or an ultimate end of his action. Welfare only 'obliquely' an end of action. Welfare as ultimate end and beings as 'ends in themselves'
88
3.
Ideals of happiness. Happiness and passive pleasure. Criticism of Epicurean ideals. Happiness and contentedness. Criticism of ascetic ideals. Happiness and active pleasure
92
4.
The conditions of happiness. Happiness as conditioned by luck, internal disposition, and action
94
5.
The mutability and permanence of happiness. The analogical pairs: pleasant-unpleasant, glad-sad, happy-unhappy
96
6.
Analogy between eudaimonic and hedonic judgments. To be happy is to like one's circumstances of life
97
7.
First person judgments of happiness express valuations, third person judgments are true of false statements about the way men value their circumstances of life. Insincere first person judgments. Ultimately the subject is judge in his own case
99
8.
The causal component involved in judgments of welfare. Consequences and causal prerequisites of changes, which affect the good of man
101
9.
Things wanted and unwanted in themselves -- an analogue to the concept of intrinsic value
103
10.
Ends of action and things wanted in themselves both fall under the category 'goods'. How they are mutually related
104
11.
A good and its price. The constituents of a man's good determined. Things beneficial and harmful defined as the nuclei of the positive and negative constituents of a man's good. The concept of need
105
12.
Distinction between the apparent and the real good of a man. Judgments of welfare depend upon knowledge of causal connexions. The limitations of man's capacity of judging correctly in matters relating to his welfare
108
13.
The problem of the 'objectivity' of judgments concerning that which is good or bad for a man
110
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1.
The notion of regret. Repeatable and non-repeatable choices, which are relevant to the good of man. The choice of a life. Note on akrasia
112
1.
Technical goodness and 'good' as an attribute of actindividuals
114
2.
Instrumental goodness and acts. The notion of a 'way of doing' something. The conncxion between way of doing and thing done is intrinsic
115
3.
Utilitarian goodness and acts. The connexion between an act as means and an achievement as end is extrinsic
115
4.
The beneficial and the harmful as attributes of acts. The notion of doing good (bad, evil, harm) to some being
117
5.
The moral goodness and badness of acts is not an independent form of the good, but has to be accounted for in terms of the beneficial and the harmful. A sense in which moral goodness (badness) is 'absolute' and 'objective' -the beneficial (harmful) again is 'relative' and 'subjective'
119
6.
On the possibility of judging of the overall beneficial or harmful nature of an act from the point of view of the good (welfare) of a community of men
120
7.
Criticism of a suggested definition of moral goodness and badness in terms of the beneficial and harmful nature of action. The moral quality of an act essentially depends upon the agent's intention in acting and his foreseeing of good and harm to others
121
8.
Intention. The relation between the intention in acting and the foreseeing of consequences. Foreseen consequences of action are not necessarily intended results of action. Distinction between the intentional and the not unintentional
123
9.
'Good' as an attribute of intentions. 'Good intention' and 'intention to do good'. The notion of the intended good (bad). Distinction between the factual and the axiological object of intention. The utilitarian value of good intcntions for the promotion of good
125
10.
A suggested definition of morally good and bad intention in acting and o
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