国际收支危机在欧元区外围国家.doc

FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK
Volume 20, Number 2 ❖ 2014 ❖ www.newyorkfed.org/research/current_issues
I N E C O N O M I C S A N D F I N A N C E
The Balance of Payments Crisis in the Euro Area Periphery
Matthew Higgins and Thomas Klitgaard
Countries in the euro area periphery borrowed heavily from abroad in the years leading up to the sovereign debt crisis, largely to finance increased consumption and housing investment. When the crisis hit in 2010, capital flight by private investors forced these countries to bring domestic spending back into line with domestic incomes—the same adjustment required of countries facing a typical balance of payments crisis. Nevertheless, adjustment to the pullback of private capital was not as harsh as might have been expected, owing to the workings of the euro area’s system for managing cross-border payment imbalances between regional commercial banks. This system, known as Target2, offset much of the capital flight with credits extended collectively by euro area central banks to central banks in the periphery.
The euro area sovereign debt crisis started with Greece in early 2010 and soon spread to other “periphery” countries such as Portugal, Spain, and Italy. Evi-dence that the Greek crisis stemmed from an unsustainable fiscal situation led many observers to believe that fiscal mismanagement underlay the problems in these other countries as well.
An alternative interpretation, however, traces the crisis in the periphery to an excessive reliance on foreign capital. Periphery countries were borrowing heavily from abroad before 2010 to support domestic consumption and housing booms. When foreign investors became unwilling to extend new credit, periphery countries faced wrenching adjustment pressures. In particular, the withdrawal of private capital forced these countries to bring total domestic spending—govern-ment and private—more closely into line with domestic incomes.

However, the tightening in credit conditions in the periphery economies proved considerably less severe than what would ordinarily result from capital flight on the scale observed. Why was that? In this edition of Current Issues, we identify one fac-tor that proved crucial: Much of the capital flight was offset by cross-border credits to deficit countries’ central banks. The credits were extended collectively by other euro area central banks as part of the Eurosystem’s1 mechanism for managing pay-ments imbalances among member countries. This balance of payments financing was paired with policies to supply liquidity to periphery commercial banks to offset the drain of funds abroad. Absent these twin stabilizing mechanisms, periphery
1 The Eurosystem is the umbrella organization that comprises the European Central Bank and the euro area national central banks.
CURRENT ISSUES IN ECONOMICS AND FINANCE ❖ Volume 20, Number 2

2
countries would have experienced even steeper recessions from the sudden withdrawal of foreign capital.
The Risk of Depending on Borrowed Money
Countries regularly borrow from and lend to one another. The scale on which a country borrows and lends is reflected in its current account balance, a broad measure of the trade balance. A country whose imports exceed its exports is spending more than it produces, and must borrow abroad to make up the difference. As an accounting identity, a country’s borrowing is also equal to the difference between domestic investment spending and domestic saving. Again, a country where domes-tic saving is not sufficient to finance investment spending has allowed total spending to run ahead of income and must turn to surplus foreign saving to make up the difference.
In the years following the formation of the monetary union in 1999, euro area periphery countries were spending more on consumption and on investments such as housing than could be paid for by income earned from domestic production. The problem was not simply that government spending exceeded tax revenues; the private sector was also running up debts with the rest of the world. Spain relied on borrowed money from abroad to fund a housing bubble and, along with Italy, Portugal, and Greece, a consumption boom. All this borrow-ing was encouraged by the low domestic interest rates that came with membership in the monetary union.
The periphery countries started to cut back on domestic spending with the global recession in 2008, thereby reduc-ing their reliance on foreign borrowing.2 Over the next two years, Greece, Portugal, and Spain saw notable improvements in their current account balances; Spain, for example, suc-ceeded in cutting its deficit roughly in half, to 5 percent of GDP (Chart 1). Nevertheless, at the onset of the sovereign debt crisis in 2010, Greece and Portugal still had large gaps between spending and income, amounting to about 10 percent of GDP.3
The sovereign debt crisis and subsequent rush from periph-ery markets by foreign investors greatly intensified the adjust-ment pressures on the periphery countries. The countries responded by reining in spending even more forcefully. The result was a substantial further narrowing in periphery current account deficits, with exports rising relative to imports, and saving rising relative to investment spending. By mid-2013, the painful task of bringing spending down to the level of domestic incomes was largely completed.
Although the adjustment in the periphery countries largely followed a standard pattern, it was in one important respect
2 Higgins and Klitgaard (2011) examine the challenges faced by periphery countries in adjusting to greatly reduced access to foreign capital.
3 Italy stood apart from this trend, with its deficit holding roughly steady at 2 to 3 percent of GDP in the run-up to the debt crisis.
unusual. Typically, large-scale capital flight induces a sharp fall in the value of the domestic currency, making exports cheaper in foreign currency terms for foreign consumers and making imports more expensive for domestic buyers. However, the periphery countries, as members of the euro area, no longer have independent national currencies to act as adjustment tools. Indeed, the “exchange rate” with their trading partners elsewhere in the euro area is irrevocably fixed.
Adjustment: Exports and Imports
It is better for a country losing access to foreign capital to boost exports rather than to cut back on imports. Higher exports translate into higher domestic production and income, reduc-ing the need to cut spending. To be sure, lowering imports can have the positive effect of moderating job losses if consumers and businesses are switching to domestically produced goods and services. However, current account adjustment through imports generally means the adjustment is being achieved through a cutback in overall spending.
In 2013, much of the trade adjustment that brought the current accounts to near zero in Italy, Spain, and Portugal came from higher export revenues (Table 1). From 2010 to 2013, nominal goods and services exports in these countries rose 15 percent or more, an increase roughly in line with the rise in Germany’s exports. Higher exports in these countries supported growth, softening the ongoing economic downturns. Greece, in contrast, saw export sales rise only 6 percent over this three-year period—an increase that provided more limited help in easing the country’s severe downturn. For the most part, the periphery countries’ success with exports was achieved through sales to countries outside the euro area (Chart 2). (See Box 1 for more information on how export performance reflects Chart 1 Periphery Current Account Balances Percentage of GDP, four-quarter rolling average -20 -15 -10 -505 10 Germany Portugal Greece Spain Italy 13 12 11 10 09 08 07 06 2005 Source: Eurostat. Note: Data for Spain, Italy, Greece, and Germany are through 2013:Q4; data for Portugal are through 2013:Q3.
trends in periphery competitiveness.) Lower import spending also contributed to the closing of current account deficits in Italy, Portugal, and especially Greece.
Adjustment: Saving and Investment Spending
Higher public and private saving also contributed to the end of external borrowing, with Italy and Spain recording modest in-creases in saving while Greece and Portugal experienced more substantial increases (Table 2). In addition, the narrowing in periphery current account deficits owed much to reductions in investment spending, with declines ranging from 3 percentage points of GDP to almost 5 percentage points.
While higher saving and cuts in investment spending were instrumental in restoring balance to current accounts in the periphery, they had the effect of reducing output and raising unemployment. In addition, the drop in investment spend-ing, particularly outside of the residential sector, has negative implications for future growth by limiting productivity im-provements (Chart 3). This disadvantage is particularly acute because the recent drop in investment came on the heels of an
Table 1 Export Sales and Import Spending Percentage Change, 2010 to 2013
Exports
Imports
Greece
6.4
-17.4
Italy
15.1
-1.0
Portugal
23.6
-3.6
Spain
22.0
4.2
Germany
16.7
16.0
Sources: Eurostat; Haver Analytics.
Notes: Data are for goods and services, in nominal euro terms. Data for 2013 are through the third quarter.

欧元区主权债务危机始于希腊在2010年初,很快蔓延到其他“外围”国家如葡萄牙、西班牙和意大利。证据表明,希腊危机源于不可持续的财政状况让许多观察家相信财政管理不善衬底在这些其他国家的问题。
另一种解释,然而,外围的危机痕迹过度依赖外国资本。周边国家在2010年之前从国外大量借贷来支持国内消费和房地产繁荣。当外国投资者成为不愿意发放新贷款,外围国家面临痛苦的调整压力。特别是,撤军
私人资本迫使这些国家带来国内总消耗政府和private-more密切与国内收入。
然而,外围经济体的信贷环境收紧证明大大不如通常会导致严重的资本外逃的规模。那是为什么?在当前这个版本的问题,我们确定证明至关重要的一个因素:资本外逃的抵消了跨境信用赤字国家的中央银行学分是扩展其他欧元区央行作为共同的欧元体系管理机制的一部分,成员国之间的收支失衡。这种收支融资搭配政策为外围国家商业银行提供流动性,以抵消国外资金的流失。缺席这两个稳定机制,外围国家将经历了严峻的经济衰退的突然撤出外国资本。

的风险取决于借来MoneyCountries经常借用和放贷。一个国家借钱,贷款的规模,反映在其经常账户平衡,广义的贸易平衡。一国进口超过其出口的支出超过自己的产出,而且必须借用国外来弥补差额。作为一个会计恒等式,一个国家的借贷也等于国内投资支出和国内储蓄的区别。再一次,一个国内储蓄不足的国家财政投资支出使得总支出运行前的收入,必须转向盈余外国储蓄弥补差额。
在接下来的几年中,货币联盟的形成,1999年欧元区外围国家花在消费和房地产等投资比国内生产的收入可以支付。问题不仅仅是政府支出超过税收收入;私营部门也与世界其他国家的债务。西班牙依靠借来的钱从国外基金房地产泡沫,以及意大利、葡萄牙和希腊,消费热潮。所有这些借贷是鼓励国内利率低,加入货币联盟。
外围国家开始削减国内开支2008年全球经济衰退,从而减少对外国的依赖借贷。在接下来的两年中,希腊、葡萄牙、和西班牙看到显著改善经常账户余额;西班牙,例如,成功地削减赤字大约一半,至GDP的5%(见表1)。然而,在2010年的爆发主权债务危机,希腊和葡萄牙仍有大的支出和收入之间的差距,达到GDP的10%。
主权债务危机和随后的热潮从外围市场的外国投资者大大加剧了外围国家的调整压力。作为回应,国家控制支出更加有力。结果是大量外围经常账户赤字的进一步缩小,出口相对于进口的增加,储蓄相对于投资支出上升。到2013年中期,痛苦的任务将支出的国内收入水平在很大程度上完成。
尽管外围国家的调整很大程度上遵循一个标准的模式,它是在一个重要的方面不同寻常。一般来说,大规模的资本外逃导致本国货币的价值大幅下滑,降低出口商品价格为外国消费者在外汇方面,国内买家使进口商品更加昂贵。然而,外围国家,作为欧元区成员,不再有独立的国家的货币作为调整工具。事实上,“汇率”和他们的贸易伙伴欧元区其它地区不可逆转地固定。
调整:出口和进口
最好是对一个国家失去外资促进出口,而不是削减进口。高转化为更高的国内生产和出口收入,减少需要削减开支。可以肯定的是,降低进口放缓失业的能有积极的效果,如果消费者和企业是国内生产的商品和服务的交换。然而,经常账户调整通过进口通常意味着调整是通过整体支出的削减。
2013年,大部分的贸易调整当前账户至近零水准在意大利,西班牙和葡萄牙来自更高的出口收入(表1)。从2010年到2013年,这些国家的名义出口商品和服务增长15%或更多,增加大致符合德国出口的上升。更高的出口在这些国家支持增长,软化持续的经济衰退。希腊,与此形成鲜明对比的是,看到这三年period-an增加出口销售增长仅为6%,提供了更多的有限帮助缓解该国的严重衰退。在大多数情况下,外围国家的成功出口了
通过对欧元区以外的国家销售(图2)。(见框1的更多信息关于出口表现反映了外围国家竞争力的趋势。)低进口支出也导致了关闭的经常账户赤字在意大利,葡萄牙,尤其是希腊。
调整:储蓄和投资支出
更高的公共和私人储蓄也导致了外部借款,与意大利和西班牙记录适度增加储蓄,而希腊和葡萄牙经历更多的大幅增加(表2)。此外,外围的缩小经常账户赤字很大程度上要归功于减少投资支出,减少从3占GDP的百分比几乎5百分点。
而高储蓄和投资支出削减wereinstrumental恢复平衡经常账户在外围,他们减少产出,提高失业率的影响。此外,投资支出的下降,特别是住宅以外的部门,对未来的发展有负面影响通过限制生产力的提高(图3)。这缺点尤为严重,因为在最近的投资下降,已经大在2008年和2009年——在大衰退期间下降但在欧元区危机。
融资资本外逃在欧元区的货币UnionRecent事件有着很多类似的功能的一个典型的国际收支危机,开始与投资者对国内资产的信心的丧失。结果是贱卖,投资者急于把当地货币资产的投资组合转换成美元和其他液体的外国货币。央行致力于固定汇率必须满足快速增长的需求对外国货币通过出售自己的外汇储备投入市场。
事实上,中央银行未能提供外币的要求在现行汇率,放弃率。最后,外汇储备的持续损失常常迫使中央银行货币贬值本国货币或搬到一个浮动的汇率制度。在类似的情况下,国内资产贱卖的欧元区外围国家。但当我们解释下,欧元区的付款安排了不必要的外汇储备资产的销售。
在2011年和2012年上半年,资本外逃的规模从外围是不同寻常的。例如,外国投资者从欧元区内外的卸载€2240亿西班牙语资产在此期间(表3)。(销售列为负值“流入”)。外国投资者也取得了相当大的资产清算在希腊,意大利和葡萄牙,使总€5250亿。更详细的数据将显示,回调是最大的投资组合资产,一个广泛的类别,包括主权债券和票据和私人安全工具
除了衍生品。此外,外国投资者清算可观的投资银行贷款和其他外围国家资产。与此同时,投资者位于外围添加到购买外国资产的净资本流出。结果是提高私募基金的净值退出外围€6760亿。类似的投资者急于退出,在早期丰富的金融资本流入,引发了许多过去的国际收支危机。
资本外逃与投资者在2012年夏天结束把心从7月声明由欧洲央行(ECB)行长马里奥·德拉吉银行随时准备做“尽一切努力”,以支持欧元。进一步保证声明所提供的直接货币交易计划的8月,主权债券市场,欧洲央行将支持符合国家财政调整计划。在2012年下半年,报道外围由外国投资者资产的销售萎缩€430亿,尽管投资者位于外围转移到销售他们的一些外国持有,将所得回家。结果是离开外围
小净资本流入€80亿。外国投资者甚至做了一个试探性的外围市场在2013年的回归。
外围国家是如何能够在资本外逃资金近7000亿€2011年和2012年上半年?在西班牙和意大利的情况下,所需的融资主要或全部来自Target2,欧元区的设施之间的跨境支付结算银行在货币联盟。某种跨欧的自动化实时结算总额表达Target2-the各传输系统自动付款信用延伸到中央银行在国际收支赤字的国家造成商业银行储备外流。特别是,私人商业银行净流出在一个被考察的国家相应的学分,国家的中央银行,信用延伸集体由中央银行在欧元区其他地方。尽管希腊和葡萄牙主要依靠调整贷款从欧盟机构和国际货币基金组织(imf)来抵消外资的飞行,他们也受益于通过Target2系统所提供的支付信用。
Target2事务的机制可以通过一个简单的例子来解释。当西班牙居民写检查购买的德国公司,检查是通过转让银行储备(结算余额)西班牙商业银行,一家德国银行。转移是通过一个匹配的央行Eurosystem-the组织中的事务,正如我们前面提到的,包括欧洲央行和欧元区中央银行。在我们的示例中,德国将对欧元体系获得索赔,西班牙花园和银行将承担同等责任。一个国家的Target2在给定的平衡期只是净金额的支付流涉及到其它欧元区国家。没有规定结算Target2中央银行之间的平衡,也没有限制大小的平衡。(关于Target2的更多详细信息,请参阅盒2。)
理解的角色Target2欧元区危机期间需要审查的所有资本流动如何适应整体平衡的家庭。交易分为两类:经常账户,交易的商品和服务,和金融账户,投资和贷款交易。通过建设,经常账户和金融账户应该总和为零。(差异报告和一般微不足道的资本账户通常意味着这个规则并不准确。)毕竟,一个国家进口更多比出口支出超过收入,必须吸引国外资金的流入来弥补差额。
表4总结了最近的金融账户交易在欧元区外围国家,把数据放在官方净流入与上面讨论的净私人资本流入的数据。(因此,表中第一列重复第三列在表3)。官方流分为两类:调整援助提供给欧盟机构和外围国家的国际货币基金组织(imf)和支付额度提供集体通过Target2欧元区中央银行。
现在考虑发展希腊在2011年和2012年上半年。在此期间,中国仍然需要从国外借,金融账户盈余共计€240亿。但私人投资者逃离在此期间,把€1110亿的国家,资金缺口的€1350亿。大部分的差距是由€1160亿年调整贷款从欧盟和国际货币基金组织(imf)的机构。或一些€190亿,其余部分是由Target2学分.
意大利和西班牙也继续借2011年和2012年上半年,尽管大幅回调的外国私人投资者。然而,对于这些国家,由此产生的资金缺口是几乎完全由Target2学分,总计€2740亿年在意大利和西班牙€3570亿。总之,周边国家扩展Target2€6650亿学分,对官方调整援助规模的4倍。相应的信贷头寸主要由德国央行(Bundesbank)举行,但在卢森堡和荷兰中央银行也持有大量信贷。
Target2余额大幅消退自2012年夏季以来,本着从外围资本外逃的结束。不过,西班牙有责任在Target2€2410亿年与意大利未来与€2150亿(图4)。其他外围国家的负债头寸也还是相当大的。
我们回顾外围澄清金融账户交易的一个重要观点:Target2信贷起到了一定的作用类似于外汇储备在一个典型的国际收支危机。面对资本流动的突然逆转,央行致力于固定汇率必须出售其外汇储备资产进入市场融资的经常账户赤字和私人金融净流出。Target2信贷充满了外围国家的融资缺口几乎以相同的方式,除了中央银行对外负债增加资产而不是下降。在这两种情况下,中央银行对外净资产收缩位置。
支持银行系统失去ReservesTarget2融资也帮助外围国家在国内信贷适度收缩,通常源于资本外逃。从商业银行系统支付外流泄水储备,减少银行的放贷能力。
中央银行可以通过提供新的储备应对商业银行通过扩大再融资操作。银行会有流动性,以满足支付外流。但是通过提供额外的燃料资本外逃,这样的行动会使央行的外汇约束咬越早。实际上,资本外逃使得中央银行一个非此即彼的选择。它可以保卫货币或支持银行系统;它不能做两件。
在欧元区外围国家,不过,中央银行面临无情的选择更少。最重要的是,他们能够满足支付通过借鉴Target2流出。自动和开放式字符Target2信贷意味着央行在外围没有推高了对绑定外汇限制。没有这个约束使外围国家中央银行采取有意义的步骤来支持银行系统通过扩大他们的再融资操作,为商业银行创造新的银行储备对保证担保。欧洲央行政策举措也帮助,理事会代理几次扩大再融资资格的抵押品池。(在欧元区的分散体系,重大决策集体,但中央银行信贷操作在国家层面上进行。)这些行为的影响是明显的在图5中。中央银行信贷的商业银行在西班牙和意大利,最为明显的国家看到最大的银行存款外流。没有这个中央银行的生命线,商业银行将被迫向外国投资者出售资产来抵消跨境损失银行的储备。相反的趋势是在德国,商业银行应对沉重的储备资金流入减少他们从欧洲央行借款。
最近,周边商业的依赖banks-particularly那些西班牙中央银行信贷逐渐减少的资本外逃。可以肯定的是,外围国家的信贷条件严格,缺乏资本的商业银行不愿意放贷。但信贷条件会缺席Target2信贷紧缩外围国家中央银行和中央银行的再融资商业银行的生命线。
结论
欧元区外围国家严重依赖外国借贷推动他们向前后加入货币联盟的国家。加入货币联盟显著降低了借贷成本,与这些国家的反应是增加他们的消费和投资支出。随后,2008年的全球经济衰退表明,债务杠杆和不良后果,2010年,担心希腊主权债务可持续性的担忧蔓延到其它欧元区国家的能力来偿还他们的债务。
我们认为欧元区危机最好被视为国际收支危机引发了对外资的过度依赖。在一个典型的国际收支危机,外围国家遭受痛苦的收缩在国内消费,公共和私人,他们难以应付外国借款的结束。此外,两国国内金融体系遭受大规模的资本外逃随着投资者试图拿回他们的钱。
一个特性,杰出的欧元区危机从其他国际收支危机,然而,所扮演的角色是为欧元区中央银行结算系统。同一Target2金融流动机制,解决常规失衡并确保欧元区支付系统的运行平稳也填写造成的国际收支融资缺口撤退从外围经济体的投资者。特别是Target2机制抵消私人跨境流出信用延长欧元
区域外围国家的中央银行的中央银行。这些信贷宽松政策的一个重要因素外围国家的经常账户调整压力。
现在的希望是,这些国家的外部平衡的恢复将为有意义的复苏创造了条件。最近投资者的行为,国际收支数据,明显是