Himalayanhistrionics.doc

Banyan
Himalayan histrionics
Oct 29th 2009
From The Economist print edition
Asia's two giants still cannot agree where one stops and the other begins
IF THIS is to be Asia’s century, a small prerequisite is that its two rising powers rub along together. Yet recent bonding between China and India has turned to repulsion. Breathless Indian commentary talks of irreconcilable rivalry, even future conflict. As for the Chinese, few had bothered much about India. The superiority of China’s economic and political models was taken as read. That makes an October editorial on the website of the People’s Daily, the Communist Party mouthpiece, all the more striking.
The editorial cranked out insults not levelled in decades. India’s superpower dreams, it said, might appear to be justified. But they are mingled “with the thought of hegemony”. This was setting India on the road to “repeated failure”. Damnable, too, was India’s policy of “befriending the far and attacking the near”. Indian hegemony, the editorial decided, was “100% the result of British colonialism”, when the Raj ruled from Pakistan to Burma. Now, the victim was trying to out-empire even the British.
After wondering where all this leaves China—past colonial victim of Jurchen, Mongol, Manchu, Western and Japanese aggression—it suggests the relationship is pretty dire. Yet, although it has its problems, none seems unmanageable. Trade frictions have increased as Chinese goods have penetrated Indian markets. India has lodged more anti-dumping actions against China than has any other country. It also temporarily banned Chinese toys, citing safety concerns. India’s signature last year of a nuclear co-operation pact with the United States has created distrust in China. Many Indians, for their part, see China’s building of roads, ports and pipelines in friendly countries around the Indian Ocean as a “string of pearls” strategy designed to choke India. They even worry about its involvement in Afghanistan. A rabid Indian press is fed by retired military officers and some serving ones. Some scaremongers are out to earn a buck from American defence contractors hunting for business. China seems to accept this. Until recently, it turned a deaf ear to most of the commentary, and Chinese bloggers give as good as they get.
In truth, the real problem remains the two countries’ long, shared border. Disputes over the western and eastern ends have been unresolved since a bloody war in 1962. In the west, India claims Aksai Chin, a high plateau controlled by China, as part of Kashmir. In the east, China disputes the McMahon Line, agreed by British India and a Tibet then under British rather than Chinese sway. The line is in effect the border today, but China claims a large chunk of the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, which it calls South Tibet. It includes a revered Buddhist monastery at Tawang, near the 17th-century birthplace of the sixth Dalai Lama.
In a “good neighbour” policy, China has now resolved every serious land-border dispute, bar this one. A solution had seemed within reach. In 2005 the two sides laid out the approach. Principles would be agreed, then compromises made, and lastly a line drawn. Only marginal adjustments were expected to the present border. But the prospects of such a deal have crumbled as China has hardened its position. Earlier this year Chinese soldiers crossed the presumed line of control in the west and sent a herder family packing. China has blocked a water project in Arunachal Pradesh financed by the Asian Development Bank. In October it grew shrill over an electioneering trip to the state by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. China has also begun issuing different visas for Indians from Arunachal Pradesh and Kashmir.
What has changed the equation is restive Tibet. Anti-Chinese riots last year highlighted the vulnerabilities for China of the vague, porous Tibetan lands. The Communist government, borrowing its impulse from the reviled Manchus of the Qing dynasty, wants once and for all to hammer down the borders of its supersized empire. All the ambiguities of borderlands and the people who wander about them must submit to the central will.
China’s urgency is reinforced by the Dalai Lama. His flight from Tibet in 1959, via Tawang, fed into border tensions then and he backs India’s border claims today. He plans to visit Tawang on November 8th. There is even talk that his reincarnation might one day be found there. That would be an excruciating outcome for the Chinese Communists, who demand the right to control Tibetans’ relations with the divine. For they could hardly declare such a reincarnation illegitimate on territorial grounds.
Seize the hour
Hence the People’s Daily’s strong words. China may feel that now is a good time to get a border settlement on its terms. After all, India grows economically stronger by the day. And recent signs of American readiness to appease China will have encouraged China to think that America will not do much to back India. Before his first trip to China as president in mid-November, Barack Obama declined to meet the Dalai Lama in Washington. China’s polemics are also designed to resonate with India’s smaller neighbours, who have their own gripes about its overbearing style. They also enjoy China’s material support. The part of the former kingdom of Jammu & Kashmir controlled by Pakistan, for example, is criss-crossed with Chinese infrastructure projects.
In recent days both China and India have called for cool heads and warm hearts. A former Chinese ambassador to India blamed all the two countries’ serious differences on the Indian media. In Thailand on October 24th Mr Singh and Prime Minister Wen Jiabao even made common cause on climate change, before December’s Copenhagen summit. Yet as with earlier alliances over global trade talks, this looks like a tactical marriage in the face of rich-country demands. As for whether India and China can bury the hatchet over the border: that depends as much on China’s understanding of its internal threats as on its robust, sometimes rabid, southern neighbour.
喜马拉雅之秀
 亚洲两大巨人仍未能就一方边境止于何处、另一方始于何处达成协议
 如果21世纪将成为亚洲的世纪，那么一个小小的前提就是亚洲两大新兴国家能设法磨合。然而，中印最近的关系已转向彼此排斥。在印度，关于中印不可调和的竞争乃至两国未来冲突的评论令人屏息。而对中国人来说，却很少有人因印度而感到困扰，人们对中国经济和政治模式优于印度心照不宣。这就使共产党的喉舌人民日报其网站上十月的社论尤为引人注目。
几十年来，人民日报的社论都未曾炮制出如此尖锐的攻讦加诸于印度。社论说，印度的超级大国梦想看起来似乎颇有道理，但其中却夹杂着霸权“思想”，这点注定了印度走上了一条“多次失败”的道路。此外，印度“远交近攻”的政策也极为糟糕。社论做出结论：印度的霸权是“100％英国殖民统治的结果”，当时英国的统治曾从巴基斯坦扩展到缅甸。然而现在，英国统治的受害人甚至试图缔造一个超越大英帝国的王国。
 印度的这一企图会给中国——一个屡遭女真，蒙古，满，西方和日本殖民侵略的受害者——带来怎样的后果？经过深思，社论表明中印关系将变得颇为恶劣。然而，尽管中印关系的确存在着种种问题，但这些问题并非无法解决。随中国产品打入印度市场，中印贸易摩擦有所增加。印度针对中国采取的反倾销行动比针对其他任何国家的都多。它也暂时禁止进口中国玩具，理由是出于安全考虑。去年印度与美国签署的核合作协议更是引起了中国的不信任。然而从许多印度人的角度出发，他们把中国在印度洋周围的友好国家修建公路、港口和管道视作旨在遏制印度的“珍珠链”战略。他们甚至因中国卷入阿富汗问题而担忧。狂热的印度媒体从退役军官和某些在职军官那里获得素材。某些危言耸听者试图从寻找商机的美国国防承包商那里赚上一笔。中国似乎已经接受了这些。直到最近，中国官方对绝大多数印度散布的评论还是充耳不闻，而中国的博客撰写者印度的这些舆论以牙还牙。
 事实上，真正的问题仍然在于两国长期共享的边界。自1962年血腥的中印之战以来，中印东西两端边境的争议一直没有解决。在西部，印度声称阿克赛钦高原应属于自己，阿克赛钦为克什米尔的一部分，现由中国控制。在东部，中国对麦克马洪线提出质疑。当时，麦克马洪线是由英属印度与英国而非中国操控下的西藏划出；目前，该线是两国的有效国界，但中国声称印度阿鲁纳恰尔邦的大片土地应归自己所有，并将其称为藏南。这片土地包括了达旺受人尊崇的佛教寺院，寺院靠近十七世纪第六世达赖喇嘛的出生地。
 除了中印边界争端外，在“睦邻友好”的政策下，中国现已解决了其他所有严重的土地边界争端。而这一争端的解决似乎也曾指日可待。2005年，双方已经提出了解决之道：双方商定了原则，然后各自作出妥协，最终绘制出边界线，预计只对目前的边界进行微调。但当中国立场变得强硬后，达成交易的前景破灭了。 今年早些时候，中国士兵跨过了西部地区的控制推定线，并赶走了原本住在那里的一个牧民家庭。中国阻止了由亚洲开发银行资助的阿鲁纳恰尔邦供水项目。10月，中国对印度总理曼莫汉•辛格的竞选之旅提出强硬高调的抗议。中国也已经开始对阿鲁纳恰尔邦和克什米尔的印度人签发不同的签证。
 打破中印平衡的正是不受管束的西藏。去年排华暴动突出了中国对西藏的控制不明确、漏洞百出的弱点。共产党政府，延续了清代满族千人所指的初衷，想一劳永逸地敲定它超大型帝国的边界。所有关于边界的不明确之处和对之产生犹疑的人们都必须服从中央的意愿。
 达赖喇嘛使中国的危机感加强了。1959年，他乘飞机经达旺逃离西藏，增加了当时边境的紧张局势，现在他支持印方关于边界的要求。他计划于11月8日访问达旺。甚至有传言称也许某一天他的转世灵童会在那里发现。这对要求获得控制藏民与藏神关系的权利的中共来说将是个痛苦的结果，因为他们不能因领土的原因而宣布达赖的转世非法。
 抓住时机
 因此，人民日报用词强硬。中国可能觉得现在是按自己意愿来解决边界问题的好机会。毕竟，印度经济不断发展日益壮大。而近期有迹象显示美国愿意安抚中国，这将鼓励中国认为美国不会采取多少行动来支持印度。奥巴马作为总统于11月中旬首次访华前，拒绝了在华盛顿会晤达赖喇嘛。中国论战的目的还在于唤起印度周边较小邻国的同仇敌忾之心，后者本身对印度的霸道作风就颇有怨言。而且这些国家还享有中国的物质支持。例如，部分前查谟王国和克什米尔现由巴基斯坦控制，这里与中国基建项目纵横交错。
 最近几天，中印两国都呼吁要冷静头脑，彼此体谅。一位前中国驻印度大使将两国所有的严重分歧都归咎于印度媒体。10月24日在泰国，辛格和温家宝总理甚至在12月的哥本哈根首脑会议前联手应对气候变化问题。然而，这就像之前在全球贸易谈判前的联盟一样，似乎是两国面对富裕国家要求时的权宜之计。至于印度和中国是否真能尽释前嫌：这既取决于中国对其内部威胁的认知，也取决于其坚定但有时狂热的南部邻国。