中国政府审计-问题和改革外文翻译.doc

中文4010字

本科毕业论文（设计）

外 文 翻 译

题 目 政府审计公告制度的现状分析及其对策
专 业 会 计 学
外文题目 Government auditing in China: Problems and reform
外文出处 《Government auditing in China: Problems and
reform》[N]. incorporating Advances in International
Accounting 2008，(24)：119-127
外文作者 杨寿昌，贾森泽忠孝，莫里斯彭德尔伯里

原文：
Government auditing in China: Problems and reform
1. Introduction
For 30 years after its foundation in 1949, the People's Republic of China went through a series of major mass political movements which left it extremely isolated from the rest of the world, especially capitalist countries. At the brink of a total economic collapse, China shifted its focus to economic development, began market-oriented economic reforms, and adopted an open-door policy in 1978.3 These changes revived both government auditing and independent auditing , which had been replaced by other monitoring mechanisms in the 1950s.
As required by the 1982 Constitution of the People's Republic of China (PRC, 1982), the National Audit Office (NAO) was set up in 1983 as a department of the State Council. In addition, regional audit offices were also set up as departments of provincial, municipal and county governments. A regional government audit office is under the leadership of both the government audit office at a higher level and its supervising regional government. For example, the audit office of a provincial government is subject to the joint leadership of the NAO and the provincial government. Under the dual leadership system, for a provincial government audit office, the NAO provides auditing and regulatory guidance and monitoring while the provincial government provides resources and exercises personnel control In addition, the NAO operates a network of branch offices in central government ministries and very large municipalities to audit various government departments, agencies, state owned enterprises under the control of the central government, and their associated institutions. These branch audit offices located in ministries and very large municipalities are under the direct leadership of the NAO.
Although this government audit system has made significant contributions toward China's economic reform and opening up to the world in the past 20 years (Chinese Auditing System Research Group, 1999), it also suffers from the lack of audit independence. The existing problems of government auditing mainly stem from it being under the direct control of the executive body (the State Council). Under this system, various government departments and officials can, both theoretically and practically, interfere with government auditing, thus weakening the objectivity and fairness of the audit. However, the people's congresses at various levels have begun to attach significant importance to, and make increasing use of, the audit report. At the same time, more and more taxpayers have begun to pay attention to how their money is used by the government. While the NAO's lack of independence has always been a problem ever since its establishment, this problem is creating increasing tensions in the current political setting because of the accountability needs of the legislature and taxpayers. The accountability relationship between the government and the legislature is compromised by the fact that the auditor is not independent of the government.
Notwithstanding these problems, the NAO has stepped up the level of public disclosure of audit findings in recent years. In 2003, the NAO for the first time disclosed to the public that serious financial problems existed in four ministries of the central government. This disclosure and the problems exposed attracted much media attention and the phrase “Audit Storm” was used to refer to the disclosure and the issues raised. This “Audit Storm” continued in 2004 and 2005 when the NAO in its annual report disclosed the serious illegal acts in other ministries of the central government. However, although this storm has been useful in drawing attention to some of the problems that had occurred, the level of audit independence means that only a small percentage of the total were exposed. Also, even where problems are exposed, this does not ensure that the same problems will not recur. Thus, the “Audit Storm” has heightened the awareness of the need for government auditing reform.
2. Perceived problems of the current government auditing system
Most interviewees believed that the current problems of government auditing have their origins in its relation to the government, i.e., the NAO is in effect an internal auditing department under the government's direct control. The following paragraphs elaborate the main problems identified in the interviews.
2.1. Lack of audit independence
The majority of our interviewees acknowledged some direct or indirect intervention by people or organisations from outside the NAO. These have a strong negative impact on audit planning, the training and appointment of auditing personnel, the determination of audit tasks, the dealing with problems identified in the audit, and the disclosure of audit results. As a result, theNAOcan hardly perform any independent auditing. A director-general of a provincial government audit office commented: The problems identified in the audit should be dealt with in accordance with law, but if the problems involve the government, the audit office will experience interference from the governmental official in charge or from other authorities.
Some interviewees acknowledged the lack of independence of government auditing, but at the same time they did not want to exaggerate the problem. Being a department directed by the government, how can the audit officework independently free from the interference of the government or the chief government officers (CGO)? Is the result of interference inevitably detrimental? The interviewees found it hard to answer these questions. Besides, the audit office and the government are at different administrative levels and may not always have consistent perceptions on auditing. Under this circumstance, as was revealed in the interviews, the audit office, being at the lower level, would normally follow the government's will — and this is understandable.
We argue that if auditing is supposed to satisfy merely the needs of the government, or if government audit is supposed to play a supporting role to governmental work, then the problem of limited audit independence is relatively partial, because government auditing still achieves its main objective. But if the people's congress and taxpayers outside the government are also audit clients, and entrust the government audit office to investigate how the government implemented fiscal budgets approved by the people's congress, then the control relationship between the audit office and the government becomes a severe problem. An immediate consequence of the lack of audit independence is that the audit report may no longer possess objectivity and fairness and it is therefore less likely to gain the trust and acceptance by the people's congress and the public.
2.2. Restricted disclosure of audit results
The interviewees generally felt that the disclosure of audit results might be restricted. A deputy CGO (a deputy mayor) of a municipal government commented in the interview: The audit report follows governmental arrangements, but this does not necessarily indicate that the government will prevent the disclosure of audit issues. Whoever acts as the CGO faces external pressure and thus s/he will disclose something, explain it to the people's congress, and also save the face of the audit office. But will the CGO disclose all the issues or important issues then? Will the issues concerning his/her annual report be disclosed as they really are? One can never tell. A director-general from the NAO admitted: In fact, some government officials interfere with the audit office in reporting audit results to the People's Congress. They even directly demand the audit office to remove big issues that violate regulations from the audit report.
An official from the NAO also admitted in the interview that some local governments and related authorities interfere with the disclosure of audit findings and the resolution of audit results in order to shirk responsibilities and avoid excessive disclosure that might overshadow their political career. The interview data thus suggests that the audit office is not only constrained by the government in terms of audit planning and the determination of audit tasks, but also the disclosure of audit results. That is, the audit office cannot make its own decisions on what to disclose, how to disclose, and when to disclose. Consequently, there is no assurance on the authority and transparency of audit reports. With the submission of audit reports to the people's congress, this problem of a lack of independence and transparency has aroused increased concerns. Since the Constitution (PRC, 1982) and the Audit Law (PRC, 1994a) lack clear and rigid rules on the disclosure of audit results, the content and degree of disclosure in the current auditing system are determined and censored by the government's discretionary disclosure policies on government affairs and are also heavily affected by the attitudes of CGOs.
2.3. Auditing gaps
Most interviewees mentioned the same problem; the audit is only applied to government units at a lower level of the hierarchy. That is, the audit rarely examines the responsibility and performance of the government itself or its CGO, and hence the depth, level, and scope of auditing are rather restricted. The following comment made by an interviewee who is a director-general at the NAO is representative of the views. From a legal point of view, there will not be any constraint on the audit of decisions made by higher-level officials, but in practice you cannot really question them. If in the audit process we discover problems or mistaken decisions made by high-level officials, we would rather not disclose them. We would assume that the government always does the right thing. That is to say, if the problems arose from decisions made by the government, we will not bother about them any more. How can we supervise our superiors? We are only a department of the government.
Some of our interviewees also mentioned that in budget auditing, since the audit does not actually involve the financial responsibility and performance of the government and its CGO, it is unavoidable that many big issues are overlooked or neglected, especially those related to the government or CGOs themselves. Given that many problems result from governmental activity, the audit office can do nothing and the problems can appear over and over again. This kind of auditing exhibits a serious problem of power centralisation.
2.4. Budget audit as a mere formality
Some interviewees questioned whether audit results would be reported accurately to the people's congress even if the audit office carried out budget auditing at the government level. If the government determines the content of the audit report, budget auditing is in effect the government's “self-inspection”. The Constitution (PRC, 1982) empowers the CGO with respect to both auditing and financial matters. However, in many local governments, the CGO holds the financial decision-making powers while the deputy CGO is delegated to take charge of auditing. This situation might make it more difficult for the audit office to monitor fiscal and financial activities of the government and its CGO simply because the deputy's unwillingness to expose a CGO. This is reflected in the remarks made by one interviewee, a deputy director-general at a provincial government audit office: The difficulty that the audit office faces in performing budget auditing is truly enormous, because fiscal and financial powers rest in the hands of the CGO. Important fiscal and financial issues and the annual fiscal and financial budget must be decided by the CGO. Once the budget is set, any budget adjustment must also be approved by the government and its CGO. Under such conditions, auditing fiscal and financial budgets would be equivalent to the audit of the government and it's CGO. Thus, auditors face not only the finance department but also the CGO. In the auditing process, if the finance department tells the auditor that the CGO does not give permission for something to be audited, then the auditor will not have the necessary access.
Moreover, as the relationship between the people's congress and the government is that of supervisor and supervisee, it is difficult, if not impossible, for the government audit office to serve two “masters”. In such a conflicting situation, the government audit office can only put the government's interests and requirements first, since the government is its direct “boss”. To serve the government in essence and the people's congress in appearance is an inevitable choice of the government audit office under the current system.
The legislature therefore cannot directly exercise audit supervision and can only indirectly monitor the fiscal budget through auditing. The legislature also lacks other practical approaches and tools for monitoring the implementation of fiscal budgets and this limits its ability to obtain an insight into the workings of financial systems and budget implementation. The legislature can therefore play a very limited role in monitoring financial systems and fiscal budgets.
3. Reforming and Conclusion
We carried out interviews in 2002 in order to comprehend and evaluate the current government auditing systemin China and identify a rational and feasible approach to reforming the system. We also examined the impact of the recent “Audit Storm” on the government auditing system. The results of our investigation show that the current government auditing system in China lacks independence and transparency. The lack of independence affects the objectivity and reliability of auditing which is particularly important when auditing the implementation, use and control of budgeted funds by central and regional governments. It is this aspect of government auditing that has the greatest need for audit independence.
Our analysis of the “Audit Storm” shows that ithas increased auditing transparency and attracted much attention from the public, the NPC officials, academics, and government officials to the serious problems in managing public finance. It has also shown that government auditing has an important role to play in protecting public interests. However, merely drawing attention to the problems cannot prevent them from recurring. Also, government censorship means that many problems are not disclosed and it has proved difficult to extend the “Audit Storm” to local audit bureaus. All these weaknesses are rooted in the lack