金融学专业外文翻译-股市严重性讨论股权市场现象政府政策与金融全球化大学论文.doc

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毕业论文（设计）外文翻译
外文题目：Taking Stock Seriously: Equity-Market Performance, Government Policy, and Financial Globalization
出 处：International Studies Quarterly
作 者：Mosley, Layna Singer, David Andrew
Are equity markets just another facet of global finance, or are they unique in their responses to—and influences on—government policies and institutions? Recent work has explored the impact of political factors on bond market behavior and foreign direct investment, but little attention has been paid to stock markets. On the basis of the particular concerns of equity investors, we hypothesize a positive association between stock-market valuations and levels of democracy, shareholder rights, legal traditions, and capital-account liberalization, a negative association with real interest rates, and no association with fiscal deficits or surpluses. We assess our expectations by analyzing the political and institutional determinants of aggregate price-to-earnings ratios for a sample of up to 37 countries from 1985 to 2004, using both cross-sectional and time-series cross-sectional analyses. We find support for most, but not all, of our hypotheses. Our findings suggest that we must disaggregate the effects of different asset markets to understand the impact of economic globalization on government policies.
How do government policies and institutions affect equity-market performance a cross countries? As stock markets grow broader and deeper in both the developed and developing worlds, this question becomes more critical. In 2004, global stock-market capitalization stood at $37.2 trillion, compared to global GDP of $41.3 trillion. While this figure was slightly less than global commercial bank assets, it markedly exceeded the total size of outstanding public debt securities, which were $23.1 trillion.1 The bulk of global stock-market capitalization represents developed-country equity markets, but less developed country markets—which accounted for 14 percent of total capitalization in 2004—are quickly gaining ground. Some emerging market countries, such as Malaysia, Singapore, and South Africa, have total stock-market capitalizations that exceed their respective gross domestic products .Equity markets enhance corporate efficiency, spur innovation, and provide a valuable source of capital for long-term economic development. They also provide a useful mechanism for governments to raise capital through the sale of state-owned enterprises. Moreover, equity-market investments constitute an important element of individuals’ assets, particularly as governments shift their pension systems toward the private sector. In short, it is clear that equities constitute an increasingly important capital market in the world economy. However, we currently know very little about how government policy choices and political institutions influence equity investors’ decisions.
The few extant analyses of stock markets and politics tend to focus on one or two developed countries, or on sectoral variation within a particular market, rather than on the determinants of national-level market outcomes in a broader cross-country context. For instance, David Leblang and Bumba Mukherjee consider the impact of government partisanship and elections on stock market outcomes in the United States and Great Britain. In a wider study, Fiona McGillivray (2003) considers the impact of partisan changes and electoral institutions on stock-market outcomes in fourteen advanced democracies. Her analyses, however, focus largely on industry-level variation, arguing that shifts in political constellations change investors’ expectations
regarding which sectors will benefit from public policies. Indeed, McGillivray is interested less in equity-market outcomes per se than in using such outcomes as a proxy measure of the expectations of economic actors regarding political decisions. Similarly, William Bernhard and David Leblang consider the impact of politics and political uncertainty on daily market behavior in several advanced democracies. Unlike most analyses, theirs considers outcomes in multiple asset markets, including currencies, equities, and government bonds. Bernhard and Leblang’s aim, however, is to explore the consequences of discrete political events—such as elections and cabinet formations—on capital markets, rather than to assess the broader impact of public policy and institutions on capital market outcomes.
This article seeks to round out the literature on financial globalization by exploring the linkages between equity-market outcomes and national government policies and institutions. Its contribution is both theoretical and empirical. Theoretically, we elaborate on the politics of equity-market performance, focusing in particular on the effects of government policies and institutions on stockmarket valuations. We rely on the relatively developed literature on foreign direct investment and sovereign bond markets to underscore the distinctiveness of equity-market reactions to government policies. Empirically, we conduct a novel evaluation of the correlates of total-market, price-to-earnings ratios (P ⁄ E) for a sample of up to 37 developed and emerging market countries during the 1985–2004 period. Cross-sectional and time-series cross-sectional TSCS) analyses reveal that levels of democracy, market liquidity, shareholder rights, and capital-account liberalization are positively associated with equity-market valuations, while real interest rates are negatively associated. We also find that investors are positively disposed toward equity markets in emerging-market countries, and negatively disposed toward markets with high dividend payout ratios. Interestingly, many of the political and economic factors—including inflation, and fiscal policy—deemed highly salient to investors in other financial markets are not statistically associated with stock-market valuations. These results are robust to the inclusion of a number of control variables, including capital-asset pricing model (CAPM) factors and alternative pricing model considerations.
Note that the responses of investors to policies and institutions also have implications for future government policy choices. For instance, if a nation’s economy relies more heavily on FDI than on sovereign lending or bank financing, its government may face few pressures to reduce public spending. On the other hand, if a government relies heavily on the bond market to finance its expenditures, but has a relatively low level of stock-market capitalization, it may face greater pressures for fiscal and monetary tightening. And if a country relies on a varied menu of financial inflows, as most do, asset holders will express diverse preferences over public policy. Untangling the various financial-market influences on government policy making is clearly a long term research project. This article, which focuses on the political determinants of equity investors’ behavior, complements similar analyses of sovereign bond markets and foreign direct investment. Once we understand how investors in each market react to government policies and institutions, we can then advance to a broader analysis of the impact of financial markets—along with domestic institutions, interest groups, and other factors—on government policy making and institutional design.
Stock-market performance is increasingly a target of analysis by political scientists, because equity investors may be highly sensitive to the effects of certain government policies and institutions on their investments. Equity investments are generally very liquid, and the time horizons of equity investors are often relatively short. As a result, changes in government policies can trigger a swift response by investors. Government policies that enhance investor confidence—either directly, by providing shareholder protections and ease of exit, or indirectly, by expanding the economy and improving corporate earnings—will be rewarded by higher stock prices and market valuations. On the other hand, investors can quickly withdraw their funds if governments choose market-unfriendly policies, thereby generating downward pressure on stock prices and valuations. Stock markets, in short, are a valuable indicator of financial actors’ preferences over government institutions and policy outcomes.
A fitting alternative measure of performance is the ratio of the stock price to company earnings—or, in other words, the price that equity investors are willing to pay for an expected stream of profits. As with stock prices, these ratios reflect investors’ expectations about future earnings, but they also signal investors’ preferences over time-varying government policy and largely invariant political institutions. Because of the latter, cross-national variation in P ⁄ E ratios persists even when national stock markets are hit simultaneously by global price shocks.
The extant literature on the linkages between globalization and domestic politics has paid scant attention to the diverse ways in which countries are integrated into the world economy. By assuming that financial markets impose a unified influence on government policies, prior studies have overlooked the stark variation in the preferences of investors across different types of financial assets. In this article, we argue that equity investors are becoming an increasingly influential force in the global economy, and that their preferences diverge from those of other financial actors in important ways. To illustrate this divergence, we present empirical analyses of the political and institutional determinants of equity market performance across a sample of developed and developing countries. Among the most interesting findings are that market valuations are significantly associated with capital-account openness, shareholder protections, levels of development, and alternative domestic investments. In addition, equity investors appear indifferent toward government fiscal balances and the partisan orientations of government leaders. Given that countries are integrated into the global financial system in different ways, these findings lead to the question of how government policy makers might reconcile the competing interests of different types of financial investors.

译 文：
股市严重性讨论：股权市场现象，政府政策与金融全球化

在政府的政策和体制影响中，股市是另一个全球金融市场，还是有其独特的反应？最近的工作探讨了政治因素对债券市场的行为和外国直接投资的影响，但很少注意到股票市场。在股票投资者特别关注问题的基础上，我们假设股市估值与它的平均水平之间呈正相关，股东权利，传统法律，以及资本账户自由化，与实际利率之间呈负相关，无财政赤字和盈余。通过我们评估的政治和体制因素的期望值分析，从1985年到2004年，以37个国家的总价格为样本，横轴为时间序列，纵轴为市盈率。我们发现这支持大多数人的说法，但不是所有的。我们的研究结果表明，我们必须集合不同资产市场的影响来了解经济全球化对政府政策的影响。
通过各国股票市场的政策和机制表现，它是如何影响政府的？随着市场更广泛的发展，股票在发达国家和发展中国家的逐渐深入，这个问题变得更加重要。2004年全球股票市值为38.4亿万美元，全球国内生产总值为41.3亿万美元。虽然这一数字略低于全球商业银行资产，但他明显超过了其他公共债券的总规模23.1亿万美元。全球股票市值占大部分发达国家的股票市场，但欠发达的国家市场也取得很大的进展，其中在2004年占总市值得14%。股票市场提升企业的效率，鼓励创新，是提供资金的长期经济发展的重要来源。他们还使各国政府通过提高国有企业销售资金的有效机制。此外，股票市场的投资构成是个人资产的重要组成部分，特别是各国政府转向私营部门的养老金制度。总之，很显然的，股票构成在世界经济中是一个日益重要的资本市场。不过，我们目前所知甚少，对于政府如何选择政策和政治体制是由股票投资者决定的。
对股市和一些现实政治的分析往往集中在一个或两个发达国家，那是某一特定市场部门内部的变化，而不是在更广泛的范围内国家一级市场因素决定的结果。例如，在美国和英国David Leblang 和 Bumba Mukherjee考虑到政府的党派和选举对股市影响的结果。在更广泛的研究中，菲奥娜麦克基利夫雷（2003）认为，先进的民主国家选举机构党派变化对股市的影响。然而，她的分析在很大程度上基于行业水平的变化，她认为政治群体的变化，改变了投资者对哪些行业受益于公共政策的预期。事实上，麦克基利夫雷很感兴趣，作为对决定政治经济行为者的期望的结果没有比股票本身的市场效果大。同样的，在一些先进的民主国家的正常政治上，威廉和大卫考虑到政治的影响和市场的行为是不稳定的。不同于大多数分析的结果，他们认为是在多个资产市场的，包括货币，股票和政府债券市场。然而，Bernhard和Leblang旨在探讨的是政治事件，如选举和内阁离散的后果，，而不是更广泛的评估资本市场公共政策和机构影响的结果。
在国家政府的政策和机构中，本文旨在探讨金融全球化的文献与完善股票的市场的成果之间的联系。它的贡献是理论和实证两个方面。从理论上讲，我们详细说明股票的市场对政治的表现，特别是侧重于股市估值对政府政策和体制的影响。我们依靠丰富的文献对外国直接投资和主权债券市场的比较，强调了股票的市场反应显着性的政府政策。根据经验，我们对新颖的总市场进行评价，在1985-2004年期间，37个发达国家和新兴市场国家以价格对收入的比率（市盈率）为样本进行研究。横向和时间序列横向（TSCS）分析表明，人均水平，市场流动性，股东权益，资本账户自由化呈正相关，与股票的市场估值，实际利率呈负相关。我们还发现，在新兴市场国家投资者对股市的处理，将是高派息率的负面影响。有趣的是，许多政治和经济因素，包括通货膨胀，财政政策做出高度评价，在统计上对其他金融市场投资者的股市估值不相关。这些一个控制变量的结果，考虑的因素包括资本资产定价模型（CAPM）的因素和替代性定价模式。
请注意，投资者的反应，政策和机构也对未来政府政策的选择有影响。例如，如果一个国家的经济更多地依赖于外国直接投资的国家贷款或银行融资，其政府可能会面临一些压力，减少公共开支。另一方面，如果政府在很大程度上依赖于债券市场，以资助其支出，但拥有股票的市值相对较低的水平，它可能会面临更大的财政和货币紧缩的压力。如果一个国家依赖于多样性的资金流入，是因为大多数资产持有人会表达对公共政策的不同喜好。金融市场影响政府决策显然是一个长期研究项目。这篇文章的政治因素中，着重阐述股票投资者的行为，补充主权债券市场和类似外国直接投资的分析。一旦我们了解每个市场投资者对政府政策和体制等因素的影响，我们就可以对财务报表，国内机制，利益团体，政府决策和制度设计上更广泛的分析。
股票市场的表现日益成为政治科学家分析的目标，因为股票投资者对某些政府政策和体制的影响，因此他们可能会对投资非常敏感，股权投资通常是流动的，以及股票投资者的时间范围比较短。因此，政府政策的变化可能引发投资者的迅速反应。政府的政策可以增强投资者的信心，通过提供直接的股东保护，减少出口，或间接地通过扩大经济，提高企业盈利，将得到较高的股票价格和市场估值回报。总之，股市是金融行为偏好者对政府机构和政策成果的一个重要指标。一个合适替代方法的表现是股票的价格和公司盈利，换句话说，价格相当于股本投资者愿意支付的利润预期流。与股票价格下跌相比，这些比率反映了投资者对未来收益的预期，但它们也预示投资者的偏好随着时间的推移而改变政府的政策和不变的政治体制。因为在股票市场中他的市盈率变动，同时还对冲击全球的股票价格。
关于全球化与国内政府的联系，现存的文献也很少注意哪些国家已融入世界经济一体化的不同方式。假设，金融市场对政府政策施加统一的影响，以前的研究都忽略了不同类型的金融资产对投资者的喜好的变化。在这篇文章中，我们认为，股市投资者在全球经济中越来越有影响力，其他金融行为者的偏好者偏离的重要途径。为了说明这种分歧，我们目前的股权经过了发达国家和发展中国家的市场表现的政治和体制因素进行实证分析。其中最有趣的发现是，市场估值显着有关资本账户的公开，股东的保护，发展水平，以及国内投资替代。此外，股票投资者似乎对政府的财政收支和政府领导人的党派取向无动于衷。鉴于国家融入全球金融体系以不同的方式整合，这些发现导致了如何协调政府决策者可能对不同类型的金融投资者的利益冲突问题。

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