5会计学-外文翻译-英文文献-股权集中度在私营企业的职责学士学位论文.doc

毕业设计（论文）外文文献翻译毕业设计（论文）题目国有企业改制的财务问题基于台州某百货公司的案例分析翻译（1）题目股权集中度在私营企业的职责： 披露标准，审计员选择，审计等基础设施翻译（2）题目系财经学院专 业会计学姓 名 班 级 学 号 指导教师 O M R A N E G U E D H A M I A N D J E F F R E Y A.P I T T M A NDOI:10.1111/j.1475-679X.2006.00219.xJournal of Accounting ResearchVol.44 No.5 December 2006Printed in U.S.A.股权集中度在私营企业的职责： 披露标准，审计员选择，审计等基础设施 摘要 我们依靠一个独特的数据集来估计对来自31个国家的股权集中度在190的私有化公司的披露标准和审计相关特性的影响。会计透明度，有助纾缓该机构之间少数投资者和有控制权的股东的冲突。在一定程度上的股权集中度，是显而易见的，因为征用公司的资源，取决于这些私人利益被隐藏起来。 在控制了其他国家一级和公司一级的影响因素，我们发现弱的证据表明，广泛披露标准（审计员选择）减少股权集中度。相比之下，我们报告得强劲，稳健的证据表明，在国家证券法律指定一个较低的举证责任中，股权集中度低，在民事和刑事诉讼中反对审计员关于Ball 2001 预言。同样地，我们的研究暗示少数的投资者在全世界合法的机构审计结果中财务报告没有更好的揭发标准。1. 导言 在这篇文章里，我们提供来自31个国家的190个公司的披露标准和审计员等相关特性的新证据，来减少控制及少数股东之间的信息不对称。我们主要是有助于现存研究通过检查审计纪律对股权集中度对于法定机构的重要性。Ball 2001年P128 辩称孤立的改革，旨在改善财务报告质量等，需要一个国家的企业是跟随国际会计标准而不改变其证券法律，却持有审计更负责重大的误导财务报表这将是徒劳无益的行为： 如果被迫提名单一位置由此而开始改变一个国家的系统中的公共财务报告和披露，我会坚持开放细则股东和贷款人的诉讼。风险诉讼激励经理和审计师增加透明度，尤其是披露坏的决定和报告损失。 许多其他体制的特征-包括会计标准确实落实管理人员和财务报告的质量和披露实际取决于内在刺激经理和审计师的遭遇。一个有效的对私营诉讼制度比外源性强加给各国政府的命令有更多的做更多改进实际实践。 最近的研究表明，虽然所有权集中减轻管理征用，但由此产生了另一个代理问题，即小股东和其他利益相关者被有控制权的股东的潜在征用。这些显性股东通常充分发挥对经理的控制和经常持有控制权超出其现金流动的权利，为他们提供了强大的动力，以提取私人利益而不惜牺牲小股东（La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, hereafter, LLS 1999 ）。根据Shleifer和Vishny 1997年P758 ：大的投资者，代表他们自己的利益，不需要配合其他投资者或雇员和经理人的利益。在这一过程中使用他的控制权使自己的福利最大化，大投资者以高效率和无结果的方式可以从其他投资者那里重新分配财富。与这种观点相一致的，国际问题研究关于大区段贸易选举权（Dyck and Zingales 2004）和双重企业（Nenova 2003）的报告显示控制保费，显示私营企业福利的管制措施。其他的研究发现，提取的私人好处，主要是用来塑造法律环境，这将会付出很高的代价，而对于控制股东和公司而言，可以提高股票融资和坚定价值（La Porta et al., hereafter, LLSV 2002 and Durnev and Kim 2005）。我们调查是否供选择统治机制，即披露标准及审计员有关的特点, 改善缩短被节制在比较少量中导致集中的所有权的代理商问题，给予合法的保护环境。 我们对在特定背景下的国际抽样的31个国家的私有化进行分析。公司经历一个离散性和戏剧性所有权变更私营化后，该模式将创造了一机会来对企业管治的测试。从LLSV1998开始最近有相当多的研究建议结构和执法法律保护投资者在，这在一个国家中对企业统治的质量起着决定性的因素。集中的所有权脱颖而出成为一位理性的替代时，那么对少数股东的保护是微弱的,如Boubakri, Cosset, and Guedhami 2005所证明的私营化企业的情况。因此，成功的私有化进程中提高公司业绩在很大程度上取决于法律制度，避免土地被新的控制权的股东征用。 此外，对于一个国家法律体系的重大改革往往伴随着从国有到私有制的改变，这是一个自然的转变，以促进国际企业管治研究(Djankovand Murrell 2002, Denis and McConnell 2003)。事实上，国家实行大规模私有化的项目通常是急于实现现代化的公司治理机制。举例来说，私有化的政府经常成立（或加强）一个监管机构类似于美国证券交易commission.3 bushman和史密斯 2003 辩称的一个国家内实行的轮班制度，其中包括私有化对国有独资企业，探索适应金融会计质量和经济成果。Megginson等人 2004 依赖类似的论据来说明审查体制因素为何选择私人和公共资本市场的背景私有化。 我们定量小股东不愿投资在公司，随着控制手段的较大，在私有化企业中，股权集中度的控制程度越大。在控制了国家一级及其他企业级的决定性因素后，我们不认为存在一个审计员可以影响股权集中度。虽然这一结果是为了模型规格的敏感度，我们所提供的证据较薄弱可以加强披露标准降低股权集中度。相较之下，我们将报告得越强劲，稳健的证据表明，国家审计等基础设施，外来投资者及控股股东之间的冲突与Ball2001的预言一致。具体来说，我们发现在司法管辖区的证券法规中股权集中度低，在民事和刑事案件，对审计就会订立较低的举证责任。经济上,我们的结果暗示所有权集中将经过35%和31%一均方差的变数,代表在我们退回中文明和犯罪诉讼中证明的负担的分别减退。此外,我们在多变量的试验中发现,这些使审计员受到更严重私有和公共实施的条款主导的中找出在解释所有权集中方面其它法律上和额外-法律上具有公共机构特征的因素。最后,重新估计我们在西方欧洲公共公司的宽广样品上退回提供相似在全部的我们预言上证据。 我们解释我们的研究,是暗示其投资者估价法律上机构在重视法律在财务报表情形下，如果发生财务报告关于审计员选择和较好揭发标准失败审计员的。在用文件证明文明和犯罪诉讼的醒酒对关于财政报道过程强迫作者的刺激的冲击方面，我们的证据补充最近国际研究,其发现影响主管刺激的机构比正式揭发标对品质的要求更高,例如Ball, Robin, andWu2003, Francis, Khurana, and Pereira 2003, and Haw 等等 2004。我们结果也加强证实在LLSV1997和DeFond和Hung2004中一强烈围绕物实施基础是与其说是广阔不如说是投资者保护法律对好社团的统治重要的证据。 与Dyck 和 Zingales 2004 和Haw et al. 2004对比，我们发现税执行的严肃不影响归属集中，相当数量的代理人私有控制是有益的。反而，我们的研究建议统治改革意味缓和在控股股东和外部投资者之间的代办处冲突在降低提供证据的责任应该焦点在民用和犯罪的反对f公司的审计员，并且，较小程度，要求更多透露的案件。幸好,为了改进他们的债券市场,这些政策规定是有政府直接执行的。实际上，这样可行的改革应该提高财务报表的质量，对从那以后更高的税金服从的正面客观性的引导共有资源的保护转换有益于税务局在投资者之外。 本文剩下的部分如下继续。第2部分开发我们实验假说。第3段描绘样品和报告概要有关退回变数描述性统计。第4段讨论以经验为依据的发现.第5段结束。 但是,我们通过向Balls2001和Leuzs2001召唤研究无意中发现是否训练审计员的法律上机构通向变得更好些在资本市场市场中知道公司主要向我们对国际社团的统治的理解捐赠。特别是,我们估计跨过国家在证明的负担中差异的影响需要进入文明和对着有关所有权集中审计员刑事案件。这证据暗示真正使审计员接触文明和犯罪处罚的政府从公司,已经更多驱散所有权建议少数民族投资者察觉到公司的财政声明在这些司法中是更可信受益。此外,在多变量的试验中,我们发现方便对着审计员文明和犯罪诉讼的债券法律包含其它法律上,包含揭发标准和额外-法律上因素的影响. 重新估计我们在一西方欧洲公共公司的宽广样品上退回提供相似在全部的我们预言上证据. 与Dyck 和 Zingales 2004 和Haw et al. 2004对比，我们发现把更严重私有和公共实施强加给审计员主导在用我们数据解释所有权集中方面税顺从。和Balls2001的预言完全一致,我们强烈,强健证据建议使管理审计员的法律上基础自由主义化有改进通过支持高质量的-财政报道订合同。相应地，在套可行的公众政策改革之中，我们的国家研究应该追求制定证券法的磨练。实际上，国家能剪裁这些改革适合他们的法律传统降低提供证据的责任和共同的(民用)法律国家反对审计员的civil (犯罪)案件。 Ownership Concentration in Disclosure Standards,AuditorChoice,and Auditing InfrastructureABSTRACT We rely on a unique data set to estimate the impact of disclosure standards and auditor-related characteristics on ownership concentration in 190 privatized firms from 31 countries.Accounting transparency can help alleviatethe agency conflict between minority investors and controlling shareholders,which is evident in the extent of ownership concentration,since the expropria-tion of corporate resources hinges on these private benefits remaining hidden.After controlling for other country-level and firm-level determinants,we find weak(no)evidence that extensive disclosure standards(auditor choice)reduce ownership concentration.In contrast,we report strong,robust evidence that ownership concentration is lower in countries with securities laws that specify a lower burden of proof in civil and criminal litigation against auditors,consistent with Balls2001predictions.Collectively,our research implies that minority investors worldwide value legal institutions that discipline auditors in the event of financial reporting failure over both the presence of a Big 5 auditor and better disclosure standards.Re-estimating our regressionson a broad sample of western European public firms provides similar evidence on all of our predictions. 1.Introduction In this paper,we provide new evidence from 190 firms in 31 countries on the role of disclosure standards and auditor-related characteristics in reducing information asymmetry between controlling and minority shareholders.We mainly contribute to extant research by examining the importance of legal institutions that discipline auditors to ownership concentration.Ball 2001,p.128argues that isolated reforms intended to improve financial reporting quality such as requiring a countrys firms to follow international accounting standards will be futile without concurrent changes to its securities laws that hold auditors more responsible for materially misleading financial statements(his italics):If forced to nominate a single place from which to start changing a countrys system of public financial reporting and disclosure,I would advocate liberalizing the rules governing stockholder and lender litigation.The risk of litigation motivates managers and auditors alike to increase transparency and,in particular,to disclose bad decisions and report losses in a timely fashion. Many other institutional featuresincluding the accounting standards actually implemented by managers and the quality of financial reporting and disclosure actually achievedare determined endogenously by the incentives that managers and auditors encounter.An effective system of private litigation does more to improve actual practice than fiat that is exogenously imposed by governments. Recent research suggests that,although concentrated ownership mitigates managerial expropriation,it engenders another agency problem,the potential expropriation of minority shareholders and other stakeholders by controlling shareholders.1 These dominant shareholders usually exert full control over managers and frequently hold control power in excess of their cash flow rights,providing them with strong incentives to extract private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders(La Porta,Lopez-de-Silanes,and Shleifer,hereafter,LLS1999).According to Shleifer and Vishny1997,p.758,“large investors represent their own interests,which need not coincide with the interests of other investors in the firm, or with the interests of employees and managers.In the process of using his control rights to maximize his own welfare,the large investor can therefore redistribute wealthin both efficient and inefficient waysfrom others.”Consistent with this view,international studies on the value of voting rights of large block trades(Dyck and Zingales2004)and dual-class firms (Nenova2003)report control premiums,indicating high private benefits of control.Other research finds that the extraction of private benefits,mainly shaped by the legal environment,can be costly to controlling shareholders and firms in terms of raising equity finance and firm value(La Porta et al.,hereafter,LLSV2002and Durnev and Kim2005).We investigate whether alternate governance mech,namely,disclosure standards and auditor-related characteristics,improve contracting by moderating agency problems that lead to concentrated ownership in less protective legal environments. We conduct our analysis in the specific context of privatization in an international sample of 31 countries.Firms undergo a discrete and dramatic change in ownership upon privatization,which creates an opportune testing ground in which to understand corporate governance.2 Considerable recent research starting with LLSV1998suggests that the structure and enforcement of laws protecting investors in a country are among the most salient determinants of the quality of its corporate governance.Concentrated ownership emerges as a rational substitute when protection of minority shareholders is poor,as documented by Boubakri,Cosset,and Guedhami2005in the case of privatized firms.Hence,the success of privatization in improving firm performance largely hinges on the legal institutions that prevent expropriation by the new controlling shareholders. Moreover,major reforms to a countrys legal system often accompany the transition from state to private ownership,reinforcing that this is a natural setting for international corporate governance researc Murrell2002,Denis and McConnell2003).Indeed,countries that implement large-scale privatization programs are typically eager to modernize their corporate governance mechanisms as well.For example, privatizing governments frequently set up(or strengthen)a regulatory body resembling the U.S.Securities and Exchange Commission.3 Bushman and Smith2003argue that regime shifts within a country,including the privatization of state-owned enterprises,suit exploring the link between financial accounting quality and economic outcomes.Megginson et al.2004rely on similar arguments to justify examining the institutional determinants of the choice between private and public capital markets in the context of privatization. Our study builds on Boubakri,Cosset,and Guedhami2005,who analyze the relationships among ownership concentration,legal protection, and firm performance after privatization.The authors report high levels of private ownership concentration for a sample of 209 firms from 39 countries.Consistent with Shleifer and Vishnys1997conjecture,they provide evidence that strong investor protection is associated with lower ownership concentration.4 In contemporaneous research,Atanasov2005finds that,in the absence of legal institutions that protect minority shareholders and constrain majority owners,privatization in Bulgaria leads to concentrated ownership and significant control premiums being paid by controlling shareholders who extract more than 85%of firm value as private benefits.Importantly,the large private benefits of control that accompany high ownership concentration are an artifact of poor external corporate governance according to this and prior research,for example,LLSV1998,Bebchuk1999,LLS1999,and Dyck and Zingales2004. We quantify minority shareholdersreluctance to invest in companies with greater private benefits of control with the extent of ownership concentration in privatized firms.After controlling for country-level and other firm-level determinants,we fail to find that the presence of a Big 5 auditor affects ownership concentration.5 Although this result is sensitive to model specification,we provide weak evidence that enhancing disclosure standards reduces ownership concentration.In comparison,we eport strong,robust evidence that countriesauditing infrastructure moderates the agency conflict between outside investors and controll shareholders, consistent with Balls2001predictions.Specifically,we detect that ownership concentration is lower in jurisdictions with securities laws that set a lower burden of proof in civil and criminal cases against auditors.Economically,our results imply that ownership concentration will subside by 35%and 31%,respectively,with a one standard deviation reduction in the variables representing the burden of proof in civil and criminal litigation in our regressions.6 Moreover,we find in multivariate tests that these provisions that subject auditors to more severe private and public enforcement dominate other legal and extra-legal institutional factors in explaining ownership concentration.Finally,re-estimating our regressions on a broad sample of western European public firms provides similar evidence on all of our predictions. Collectively, we interpret our research as implying that investors value legal institutions that discipline auditors in the event of financial reporting failure over both auditor choice and better disclosure standards.7 In documenting the sobering impact of civil and criminal litigation on auditors incentives to constrain insidersdiscretion over the financial reporting process,our evidence complements recent international research that finds that institutions that affect managersincentives matter more than formal disclosure standards to accounting quality,for example,Ball,Robin,and Wu2003,Francis,Khurana,and Pereira2003,and Haw et al.2004.Our results also corroborate evidence in LLSV1997and DeFond and Hung 2004that a strong surrounding enforcement infrastructure is more important to good corporate governance than extensive investor protection laws. In contrast to Dyck and Zingales2004and Haw et al.2004,we find that the severity of tax enforcement does not influence ownership concentration,our proxy for the amount of insidersprivate control benefits.Instead,our research suggests that governance reforms meant to alleviate the agency conflict between controlling shareholders and outside investors should focus on lowering the burden of proof in both civil and criminal cases against firmsauditors and,to a lesser extent,requiring more disclosure.Fortunately,these policy prescriptions are relatively straightforward for governments to implement in order to improve their securities markets.In fact,such feasible reforms should enhance the quality of financial reporting,leading to the positive externality of higher tax compliance since preventing diversion of corporate resources benefits tax authorities as well as outside investors. The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.Section 2 develops our testable hypotheses.Section 3 describes the sample and reports summary descriptive statistics on the regression variables.Section 4 discusses the empirical findings.Section 5 concludes. However,we mainly cont