1、04A future powered by metals but fenced in with iron curtains08From OPEC to OMEC(Organization of Metal Exporting Countries)?12Implications of the EU Critical Raw Materials Act and missing pieces18Support,develop,leverage and strengthen Key takeaways for Europe01 August 2023Allianz ResearchCritical r
2、aw materials:Is Europe ready to go back to the future?AllianzTrade2The future will be powered by metals,but fenced in by iron curtains.Metals and critical minerals such as lithium,cobalt and nickel are crucial for the green transition,used for everything from electric vehicles to wind turbines.The m
3、arket has doubled in size over the past five years,reaching USD320bn in 2022,according to latest IEA estimates,and is set to at least double by 2040 amid surging demand from EVs and battery storage,as well low-emission power generation and electricity networks.But competition for critical raw materi
4、als and their concentration among a small number of countries could create geopolitical risks,including potential cartelizationFrom OPEC to OMEC?China dominates the field of critical raw materials,controlling nearly all of heavy rare earth elements,91%of magnesium and 76%of silicon metal supplies wo
5、rldwide.Similarly,the Democratic Republic of the Congo commands over 60%of the global cobalt market,while South Africa holds a share of 71%for platinum and Russia 40%of palladium.Should these mineral-rich countries decide to form an Organization of Metal-Exporting Countries,it could manipulate price
6、s,disrupt supply and further restrain international trade,posing risks to countries highly dependent on imports,including the EU,Japan and South Korea.Production concentration around leading supply-chain firms,in which Europe is less present compared to the US or China,could also create dependencies
7、 and expose Europe to trade wars between third countries.ExecutivesummaryAno KuhanathanHead of Corporate Researchano.kuhanathanallianz-Luca MonetaSenior Economist for Africa and Middle Eastluca.monetaallianz-Jasmin GrschlSenior Economist for EArne HolzhausenHead of Insurance,Wealth and Trend RMarkus
8、 ZimmerSenior Economist,ESGLudovic SubranChief Economist 01 August 20233In this context,can Europes Critical Raw Materials Act close the gap?Ensuring a stable supply of critical raw materials and diversifying import dependencies is crucial for Europe.The CRM Act proposes a 10%target for EU sourcing,
9、but we find that seven out of the 18 materials listed do not meet the requirement at the mining stage(antimony,borate,manganese,natural graphite,rare-earth elements,tantalum and titanium).For all of these,the EU27 is highly dependent on sourcing from third countries(more than 94%).Moreover,21 out of
10、 24 materials do not meet the requirement that at least 40%of the EU27 annual consumption has to stem from EU refining.Third-country sourcing shares of the EU range from 61%for aluminium to 100%for baryte,beryllium or niobium.The CRM Act also targets at meeting at least 15%of annual consumption via
11、recycling.However,out of 16 strategic raw materials,only four meet the target.Half of the remaining 12 will not be able to meet the target as they are either consumed or converted in the industrial process,or there are simply no meaningful scrap quantities available for the quickly growing demand,as
12、 is the case for lithium.To increase independence,the EU should support a favorable trade-policy environment and diversify global supply chains through strategic partnerships with resource-rich countries.They way forward should also focus on sustainable extraction practices,becoming the critical sha
13、reholder of industry frontrunners and reinforcing recycling.4A future powered by metalsThe EUs concerns regarding raw-material supply date back to the 1977 Councils second Environment Action Programme,highlighting dependence on imports.Two decades later,the European Commission introduced the Raw Mat
14、erial Initiative,an integrated strategy to improve access to raw materials,and established a list of critical raw materials(CRMs)based on their economic importance,supply risk and lack of substitutes.While subsequent EU strategies emphasized the need for secure access to raw materials,recent supply-
15、chain disruptions due to Covid-19 and the Ukraine war have intensified the challenge.Metals,including critical minerals,play a key role in the ongoing energy transition due to their unique properties and their importance in numerous clean-energy technologies.Lithium,nickel and cobalt are essential c
16、omponents of lithium-ion batteries,which are widely used in electric vehicles(EVs)and energy-storage systems.Although there are emerging technologies that try to reduce or cut entirely the use of lithium,it remains key as the world moves towards more renewables and demand for energy-storage systems
17、booms.Not to mention the fact that global demand for EVs is skyrocketing as more and but fenced in with iron curtainsTable 1:Summary of selected CRM and their main usesMaterialMain usesUS CRM listEU CRM listEconomic importanceSupply riskLeading producing country and%Primary import source for the USA
18、luminumTransportation,packaging,construction5.81.2Australia(28%)JamaicaAntimonyFlame retardants,metals,defense,construction5.41.8China(56%)ChinaArsenicHerbicides and insecticides,wood preservatives,semiconductors2.91.9China(44%)ChinaBaryteDrilling applications,mechanics3.51.3China(44%)ChinaBeryllium
19、Satellites,medical equipment,automotive,defense5.41.8US(88%)KazakhstanBismuthPharma,grinding,semiconductors5.71.9China(70%)Chinamore countries aim to reduce their greenhouse-gas(GHG)emissions.Rare earth elements such as neodymium and dysprosium,key components of wind turbines and electric vehicles,a
20、re another set of highly sought-after metals.Thanks to its excellent conductivity,copper is also widely used in electrical applications,though it is categorized as strategic,not critical,given its key role in electric vehicles,wind turbines and solar photovoltaics.Finally,silver and platinum group m
21、etals(PGMs)are also critical in photovoltaic solar cells and fuel cells,respectively(see Table 1 for a summary).The critical minerals market has doubled in size over the past five years,reaching USD320bn in 2022,according to latest IEA estimates.Investment in the sector jumped by+30%rise in 2022,fol
22、lowing a+20%increase in 2021.And the EU is not alone in recognizing the strategic value of CRMs:In fact,Canada,the US and UK established their respective lists of CRMs in 2021 and 2022.This underlines the risk of potential tensions ahead between large advanced economies.Indeed,out of the 32 minerals
23、 that the US and the EU consider as critical,21 are deemed critical by both regions.Competition for these minerals might disrupt geopolitics and alliances.01 August 20235Source:USGS,EU Commission,Allianz ResearchMaterialMain usesUS CRM listEU CRM listEconomic importanceSupply riskLeading producing c
24、ountry and%Primary import source for the USChromiumStainless steel and heat-resisting alloys7.20.7South Africa(44%)South AfricaCobaltBatteries,superalloys,engines6.82.8DRC(63%)NorwayCopperCables,construction,electrical products4.00.1Chile(28%)ChileFluorsparMetals,nuclear industry,construction3.81.1C
25、hina(56%)MexicoGalliumOptics,integrated circuits,light-emitting diodes(LEDs)3.73.9China(94%)ChinaGermaniumElectronics and solar applications,pharma,metals3.61.8China(83%)ChinaGraphiteBatteries,steelmaking,lubricants3.41.8China(65%)ChinaHafniumSuperalloys,nuclear industry4.31.5France(49%)GermanyHeliu
26、mMRI machines,scientific research2.91.2USA(56%)QatarIndiumLCD screens,semiconductors2.60.6China(59%)South KoreaLithiumElectric vehicle batteries,smartphones3.91.9Australia(53%)ArgentinaMagnesiumMetals,chemicals,agriculture7.44.1China(91%)IsraelManganeseSteel and metals,batteries,animal feed,fertiliz
27、ers6.91.2South Africa(29%)GabonNickelAlloys and steels,chemicals5.70.5China(33%)CanadaNiobiumAerospace,superalloys,MRI machines6.54.4Brazil(92%)BrazilPGMsCatalysts,electronics,medicine7.12.7South Africa(75%)South AfricaRare earthsCatalysts,magnets,alloys5.93.7China(85%)ChinaRubidiumDefense,biomedica
28、l research,electronicsN/AN/AN/AGermanySilicon metalAlloys,chemicals,semiconductors,solar industry4.91.4China(76%)BrazilTantalumAerospace,drilling,lenses,automotive4.81.3DRC(35%)ChinaTelluriumCooling,energy generation,metals,solar industry3.80.3China(53%)CanadaTinChemicals,tinplate,alloys4.50.9China(
29、31%)PeruTitaniumAerospace,defense,medical implants,power generation5.40.5China(43%)JapanTungstenConstruction,drilling,electronics8.71.2China(86%)ChinaVanadiumSteel alloys,catalysts,batteries3.92.3China(62%)CanadaZincGalvanized steel,metals4.80.2China(33%)CanadaZirconiumCeramics,abrasives,nuclear ind
30、ustry3.50.8Australia(36%)South Africa6Figure 1 shows the expected development of mineral demand for clean energy technologies under three IEA scenarios.The Stated Policies Scenario(STEPS)outlines a course based on existing and developing governmental policies worldwide.The Announced Pledges Scenario
31、APS):presumes all energy and emission targets,including net-zero commitments,will be achieved punctually and fully,even without current policy support.The Net Zero Emissions by 2050(NZE)Scenario presents a roadmap for the energy sector to achieve net-zero CO2 emissions by 2050.All three scenarios p
32、redict a swift rise in the demand for critical minerals used in clean-energy technologies.By 2040,the demand doubles in the STEPS scenario,while it increases by 3.4 times in the APS scenario and by 4.4 times in the NZE Scenario.This increase is primarily driven by EVs and battery storage,but low-emi
33、ssion power generation and electricity networks also significantly contribute1.In the Paris Agreement aligned NZ 2050 scenario,the share of demand from clean-energy technologies rises substantially in the next decade,reaching 50%for copper and rare-earth elements,around 60%for nickel and cobalt and
34、about 90%for lithium.By 2040,the total global use of these minerals,including uses related to clean technologies,is expected to rise by+60%for copper,between+100%-200%for neodymium,nickel and cobalt and by+900%for lithium.Figure 1:Expected development of mineral demand for clean energy technologies
35、by IEA scenariosFigure 2:Minerals demand for clean technologies in the Net Zero 2050 Scenario(total demand normalized to 100%in 2022)See also:IEA(2023):Critical Minerals Market Review 2023 IEA Critical Minerals Data Explorer9%10%40%33%1x2x3.4x4.4x01000020000300004000020222040 Statedpoliciesscenario2
36、040Announcedpledgesscenario2040 NetZeroEmissions by2050scenarioMineral demand for clean energy technologies(kt)Hydrogen technologiesElectricity networksGrid battery storageElectric vehiclesOther low emissions power generationSolar PVWindSource:IEA,Allianz ResearchSource:IEA0%100%200%300%202020252030
37、2035204020452050Copper share used in clean techCopper total use(2022=100%)Cobalt share used in clean techCobalt total use(2022=100%)Lithium share used in clean techLithium total use(2022=100%)Nickel share used in clean techNickel total use(2022=100%)Neodymium share used in clean techNeodymium total
38、use(2022=100%)300%400%500%600%700%800%900%1000%1100%01 August 20237Looking ahead,all planned critical mineral projects by 2030 could potentially meet various governments climate pledges.In contrast to traditional oil and gas markets,critical minerals are seeing increased exploration investment,with
39、a notable+20%growth in 2022,led by lithium.The production of EVs is prompting manufacturers to strategically invest in the raw material sector to ensure the necessary supplies.EV battery manufacturers are adopting a similar approach.Another positive trend is the mainstreaming of recycling,especially
40、 of batteries,with significant capacity planning and development occurring predominantly in China,Europe,and the US.This is crucial to both meet material demand and mitigate environmental impact.Nevertheless,the risk of delays and other hurdles calls for more initiatives by 2030,with an aim to limit
41、 global warming to 1.5C.Diversification of supply remains a concern.In fact,the market share of the top three critical-mineral producers,especially in the nickel and cobalt sectors,has either remained constant or increased over the last three years.At the same time,critical-mineral production has se
42、en uneven progress in environmental,social,and governance(ESG)practices.While notable improvements have been made in community investment,fair working conditions and prevention of forced and child labour and gender balance,challenges persist,with high greenhouse-gas emissions and a significant surge
43、 in water use.8Recent events such as the semiconductor crisis,supply difficulties brought about by pandemic-related measures and the outright war in Ukraine have highlighted the fragility of a global economy characterized by a concentration of resources that can suddenly become less accessible.In pa
44、st decades,the geopolitical framework has been shaped around resources still firmly anchored in the 20th century(oil,pipelines and the grabbing of extractive or agricultural areas in exchange for easy money).Today,we may be at the beginning of the division of the world into new spheres of influence
45、dictated by the energy reconfiguration,climate change and an overall de-democratization of the planet.Despite sufficient global resources to support ambitious climate-mitigation plans,raw material value chains spanning mineral extraction,refining and recycling have become highly centralized due to g
46、eographical distribution,economic specialization and geopolitical factors.China dominates this field,controlling nearly all of heavy rare earth elements,91%of magnesium and 76%of silicon metal supplies worldwide.Similarly,substantial market concentrations exist:The Democratic Republic of the Congo c
47、ommands over 60%of the global cobalt market,while South Africa holds a share of 71%for platinum and Russia 40%of palladium.Under these near-monopolistic conditions,the EU heavily relies on these countries to satisfy its demand for raw materials.The concentration of critical-metals production and ref
48、ining among a relatively small number of countries creates significant geopolitical risks(see Figure 3).Geostrategic alliances may become even more important in a highly fragmented world with potential supply risks,as well as increased chances of market,location or reputational risks.From OPEC to OM
49、EC(Organizationof Metal Exporting Countries)?Figure 3:Production of selected critical resources,in%Sources:USGS,BP,Allianz Research.Note:Countries included into a simulated“BRICS+”have been selected based on their shareholding capacity in the BRICS-related New Development Bank(i.e.,Bangladesh,UAE,Eg
50、ypt),formal applications or interest to join the group reported by the media and/or strong affiliation to one or more countries within the bloc.Aluminum data are based on smelter production;data on lithium are based on reserves as a proxy for future production.The risks could be further amplified if






