070421022-鲍正雄-薪酬制度外文译文.doc

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毕业论文（设计）
外文译文

题 目 论独立董事制度的建设
系 部 管理系 　
专 业 人力资源管理 年级 2007级
学生姓名 鲍 正 雄 　
学 号 070421022 　
指导教师 罗 哲 　

论独立董事制度的建设
[论文关键词]
独立董事　直接薪酬　间接薪酬　激励与约束

[论文摘要]
本文拟从薪酬制度对独立董事的激励与约束效应的视角，就独立董事人员选任、薪酬制定、绩效考核、薪酬兑现、监督机制和保障机制等几个方面对直接薪酬制度与间接薪酬制度进行比较，以期更好地完善独立董事薪酬制度，强化对独立董事的激励。
目前国内外上市公司在实务中对独立董事薪酬都是采取直接薪酬制度，但是直接薪酬制度在我国的实践效果却不尽如人意，在解决内部人控制问题、维护中小股东权益方面没有发挥应有的职能。随着直接薪酬制度的弊端日益显露，有学者建议实施间接薪酬制度。本文将通过对两者的比较，特别是从激励与约束的角度来分析独立董事薪酬制度的完善方向。
一、直接薪酬制度与间接薪酬制度概述
直接薪酬制度，指独立董事以外部人身份介人公司事务，却同公司内部人一起从公司直接领取薪酬。而间接薪酬制度下独立董事虽以外部人身份介人公司事务，履行监督内部人的经营决策、提高决策的科学性、保护中小股东权益和其他利益相关者利益等职责，其劳动报酬却不从公司直接领取，而由非营利性的自律性行业组织根据一定的规章发放。
间接薪酬制度的设计者认为，间接薪酬制度下独立董事真正成为公司的“外部董事”，其不直接从公司领取报酬。这种制度割断了独立董事对上市公司心理上的依附感和与之过于密切的经济联系，从而能切实保障独立董事的独立性，对独立董事开展工作也是一种很好的支持。
二、两种薪酬制度在激励与约束效应上的比较
1.独立黄事人员选任方面。直接薪酬制度下，独立董事从提名到选任一般由公司内部人决定，各家公司各选各的，没有一个统一的规定，致使独立董事素质参差不齐。间接薪酬制度下，行业组织的引人使独立董事的人员选任不仅有统一的进入门槛，而且选任条件更加严格，行业组织负责独立董事职业资格的认定、后续的职业培训和向上市公司推荐独立董事候选人，改变了直接薪酬制度下由公司自行决定独立董事人选的做法，这也能够推动独立董事市场的形成，加速独立董事市场的完善。相比之下，间接薪酬制度下独立董事的选任程序公开、透明，独立董事进人公司后可以安心开展正常工作，没有后顾之忧。而直接薪酬制度下的独立董事则可能在工作中碍于公司大股东的情面而瞻前顾后，被束缚了手脚。
2.薪酬的制定方面。
(1)薪酬制定方的比较。间接薪酬制度下，由行业组织根据上市公司的具体情况负责制定上市公司独立董事的薪酬标准，指标统一又不乏弹性，不会再像直接薪酬制度下独立董事薪酬由公司内部人随意决定甚至不付薪酬，独立董事的付出与报酬不对等的局面也会得到改善。总体而言，间接薪酬是对独立董事工作的肯定，对独立董事能起到很好的物质激励作用，能极大地调动独立董事的工作积极性。这种规定表现在约束上则相对隐蔽，主要是如果独立董事不尽职勤勉，通过行业组织的监督或者独立董事工作的反馈，他就有可能拿不到最基本的物质补偿。
(2)薪酬制定程序的比较。通常认为程序的公平胜过结果的公平，间接薪酬制度在这方面就优于直接薪酬制度。上市公司将独立董事在公司的考勤以及参与决策的情况报送给行业组织，再由行业组织统一确定各家公司独立董事的薪酬。这样在最终兑现时，与直接薪酬制度下由大股东确定薪酬的随意性相比，客观性增强，独立董事所能得到的薪酬完全由其工作表现决定。
3.绩效考核方面。在这一方面，间接薪酬制度更多地注重中小股东的参与，这主要是由于独立董事是旨在维护中小股东利益的，那就必须由他所代表的人群来参与评判。目前关于独立董事绩效考核的讨论较少，有一种观点认为可以通过上市公司的网站开辟独立董事信息园地，结合上市公司信息披露制度，向全体股东和社会公众公开独立董事的有关工作情况，同时参考中小股东的意见和社会反应来进行评判。不过，这里面存在的问题是，中小股东获得的信息是否充分，他们又是否能对信息进行适当解析。所以采取这种方法的实践效果会不会优于直接薪酬制度下完全由公司内部考核的效果还很难分辨。但是可以肯定，间接薪酬制度下的考核会比直接薪酬制度下的考核更公开，能够让中小股东了解被维权的情况，也时刻提醒独立董事注意自己的使命和职责。另外，比较常见的绩效考核方法是发挥声誉机制的作用，这是典型的激励与约束并重的方法。因为如果独立董事在公司中表现出了应有的客观与独立，表现出了卓越的控制和决策能力，无形中将提高其声誉，增加其人力资本的价值。独立董事顾及自身的声誉，便不与管理者共谋，而会尽量利用自己的独立地位，客观公正地办事，以向外界传递有利于自身价值的信号。这就是说，一个优秀的独立董事，必然会努力维护其作为企业经营监督者的声誉。而如果其不尽心尽职的话，声誉一旦受损，则会导致巨大的机会成本。

4.薪酬兑现方面。在薪酬兑现方面，间接薪酬制度下行业组织与上市公司各有分工，即薪酬由行业组织发放，但由上市公司承担。这与直接薪酬制度是明显不同的，直接薪酬制度下独立董事从公司获得的收益是在暗箱中操作的。实行间接薪酬制度后，独立董事与公司之间的给付受到中立的第三方的透明化监管，从而可最大限度地阻止灰色收人的产生。这种透明化的间接薪酬制度是对证券市场“公开、公平、公正”三大原则的维护。这种薪酬兑现方面的激励与约束效应和薪酬制定方面有异曲同工之妙，看似是对独立董事的明确激励，也暗藏着对他们的约束，只是这种约束的结果是滞后的。这是因为激励与约束对公司治理而言本身就是相互配合、无法取舍的有机整体，这一点对独立董事制度依然适用。一方面，激励与约束的区分十分微妙。以给予独立董事固定津贴为例，这些固定津贴或许只能使独立董事感觉“没有不满意”，也就是所起的是一种约束作用，而丝毫没有激励作用，直接薪酬制度下把给予报酬一股脑认定为是激励，显然是不科学的。另一方面，激励本身就是一种约束，某种机制的激励作用越大，其约束作用也就越大。当激励独立董事去履行其职责、提高其声誉时，也就是在约束独立董事不要读职，毕竟独立董事的时间和精力是有限的，而且放弃激励的机会成本也是巨大的。
5.监督机制。事实上，间接薪酬制度下，有效的监督体现在独立董事薪酬制度的每一个环节，不仅涉及物质方面，也涉及非物质方面，如对声誉、地位的影响。而直接薪酬制度下，很难做到这一点。这种情况不单纯是人的原因，更是一种不够完善的薪酬制度造成的，而制度的完善是比一般的技术指标的改进更能提高效率和促进经济增长的。比如，间接薪酬制度下可以根据股东大会、上市公司管理层和行业组织的综合考评，决定独立董事的薪酬和奖励，最后由行业组织按一定规章执行。行业组织应将各个独立董事的薪酬情况予以公布，并详细介绍各个独立董事的任职业绩，还应聘请会计师事务所等对其每年的账目进行审计，同时将审计结果予以公布。
6.保障机制。间接薪酬制度下，行业组织代表独立董事与公司订立合约，并作为投保人为独立董事群体投办风险责任险，形成一种责任保险制度。这种责任保险制度对独立董事而言应该是必要的。在直接薪酬制度下，上市公司内部人自行聘任独立董事，一旦独立董事玩忽职守就会给公司广大投资者和利益相关者的利益造成损害。事后根据法律追究独立董事的责任时，作为个人而言，独立董事往往无力承担损失。况且，让独立董事过重地承担经济赔偿责任的法理基础尚不十分充分，同时还会打击独立董事群体的工作积极性和创造性。间接薪酬制度引人行业组织则有助于防范各方的风险，一方面可以使独立董事感受到团体的关怀;另一方面由行业组织作为投保人为独立董事投办风险责任险，这不仅可以降低独立董事个人的责任风险，而且有利于保护公司股东和利益相关者的权益。这些措施能够使独立董事不再碍于上市公司管理层或是大股东的情面，不用额外担心个人的责任风险，而以一种更加独立和负责任的姿态来面对公司事务。这样的激励与约束能够很好地互补，是优于直接薪酬制度下没有实质内容的激励与约束的。
三、两种薪酬制度的激励观念
直接薪酬制度与间接薪酬制度在激励与约束效应上的不同，一方面是因为薪酬制度本身内容有所不同，于是客观上就导致了激励与约束效应的不同，另一方面是因为两种制度对激励与约束本身的认识有所不同。直接薪酬制度主要强调激励对独立董事的作用，认为现阶段独立董事之所以工作质量、工作积极性不高，是因为缺乏激励特别是物质上的薪酬激励，而忽视对独立董事履行职责的约束。从现实中很多学者提出的改进建议中就可以清楚地看出这种思路。比如:针对薪酬内容单一的问题，提出将薪酬内容多元化，除既有的固定津贴外，还给予股票期权等;在具体支付上，可以采用延期支付计划等。这些措施有一定的效果，但仅通过这些就指望独立董事同与自己利益不相关的中小股东同心同德，为其尽心工作，实在是不现实的。而间接薪酬制度则不同，它寻求制衡与激励间的相对合理平衡，而且强调的是制衡，突出独立董事的独立性，特别是经济上与利益相关者的独立，突出独立董事的职责和义务。在激励方面，之前提到的行业组织就是一个很好的激励载体。行业组织负责独立董事职业资格的认定，负责向上市公司推荐独立董事候选人，负责与上市公司签约;在责任保险制度中，由行业组织作为投保人为独立董事群体投办风险责任险。所有这些措施都能够使独立董事以一种更加独立和负责任的姿态来面对公司事务，从而有利于维护公司整体利益和股东们的权益。
独立董事薪酬问题可能是独立董事制度中争议最多、最难解决的问题。薪酬问题的妥善解决关系着独立董事制度在我国的顺利实施，也关系着与独立董事制度相关的其他制度的合理制定与顺利推行。

Concerning the construction of the system of independent directors

[Paper Keywords] indirectly pay direct compensation of independent directors incentives and constraints

[Abstract] This paper from the pay system of independent directors incentive and restrictive effects of perspective, choosing the personnel of the independent directors, compensation development, performance appraisal, pay cash, supervision and safeguard mechanism, and several other aspects of direct and indirect remuneration system compare the pay system to better improve the salary system of independent directors, and strengthen the incentives of independent directors.
In practice, at home and abroad in listed companies pay for independent directors is to take direct pay system, but the pay system directly to the practice effect in China is not satisfactory in solving the problem of internal control to safeguard the rights and interests of minority shareholders should not play functions. With the drawbacks of direct pay system is showing, and some scholars have suggested the implementation of indirect compensation system. This article on the comparison, especially from the perspective of incentives and constraints to analyze the Independent Director System direction.

First, direct and indirect compensation system pay system overview.
Direct pay system means the identity of the independent directors of intervention by external affairs of the company, but together with the company to receive compensation directly from the company. And indirect compensation of independent directors under the system, although the identity of intervention by external affairs of the company, to perform oversight of the insider business decisions and improve the scientific nature of decision making, protection of minority shareholders rights and interests of stakeholders other duties, their remuneration is not received from the company direct, and self-discipline from the non-profit trade organization based on certain rules and regulations issued.Indirect remuneration system designers that indirectly pay system truly independent directors under the company's "external directors", which does not receive compensation directly from the company. This system cut the independent directors of listed companies, and with it a sense of psychological attachment too close Economic links, which can effectively protect the independence of independent directors on the work of independent directors is also a good support.

Second, the two kinds of incentive pay system in comparison with the constraint effect on
One. Independently choosing the personnel aspects of yellow things. Direct compensation system, the independent directors elected from the general nomination to the decision by the company insiders, companies of all the election, and there is no single provision, resulting in uneven quality of independent directors. Indirect pay system, the introduction of Industry organizations to appoint independent directors who not only unified the barriers to entry, and more stringent conditions for selection, the Industry organization responsible for the independent directors of vocational qualification as follow-up of vocational training and independent directors to recommend candidates for listed companies who changed the pay system directly by the companies to decide candidates for the practice of independent directors, which also can promote the formation of an independent director of market and accelerate the improvement of independent directors markets. In contrast, indirect remuneration system of elective procedures for independent directors under the public , transparent, independent directors into the safe after the company carried out work, no worries. and direct an independent director under the pay system is likely to work because of the substantial shareholder of the sensibilities and indecisive, and was shackled hand and foot.

Two. Pay the formulation.
(1) pay to develop side comparison. Indirect compensation system, listed companies by Industry organizations in accordance with the specific circumstances of the independent directors of listed companies is responsible for the remuneration criteria, indicators and no lack of flexibility in uniform, will never again be an independent director under the direct pay compensation system arbitrary decision by the company who do not even pay the salaries and remuneration of independent directors does not pay such a situation will be improved. Generally speaking, indirect compensation is a recognition of the work independent directors, independent directors can play a very good material incentives, can greatly mobilized the enthusiasm of independent directors. This provides constraints on the performance of the relatively subtle, mainly due diligence if the independent directors do not diligent supervision by industry organizations, the work of independent directors or the feedback, he may take less than the most basic material compensation.
(2) pay to develop procedures for comparison. Generally considered better than the results of fair procedures fair and indirect compensation system in this respect, better than direct pay. The independent directors of listed companies in the company's attendance and participation in decision-making submit to the industry organizations, then the unified industry of independent directors determine the remuneration of each. This in the end kept, and under the direct pay system established by the major shareholder of the arbitrary pay compared to the objectivity of enhanced compensation can get independent directors completely determined by its performance.

Three. Performance appraisal. In this regard, the indirect compensation system to focus more on the participation of minority shareholders, which was mainly due to the independent directors to safeguard the interests of minority shareholders, it must be represented by his people to participate in the evaluation. current performance evaluation on the independent directors to discuss less, there is a view that the listed company's Web site can open up an independent director of Information garden, combined with the Information disclosure system of listed companies, to all shareholders and the public about the work of independent directors, also refer to opinions of minority shareholders and the social reaction to the judge. However, this is a problem there is that minority shareholders receive the Information is sufficient and whether they can properly parse the information. So the practical effect of this approach will not be optimal Under the direct pay system is entirely internal assessment results were difficult to distinguish. But certainly, an indirect assessment under the pay system than under the pay system directly to the assessment more open, to allow minority shareholders to understand the situation to be activists, but also time reminded the independent directors pay attention to their mission and duties. In addition, the relatively common method of performance evaluation is to play the role of reputation mechanism, this is a typical method of both incentives and constraints. because if independent directors in the company's objective should be demonstrated and independence, showed excellent control and policy-making capacity, potentially to improve its reputation and increase the value of its human capital. independent directors take into account its own reputation, and managers will not seek, and will try to use their independent status , act objectively and fairly in order to transfer to the outside world is conducive to signal their value. This means that a good independent director, will certainly hard to maintain its reputation as a business supervisor. and if it does not try their best case, once the reputation of damage will result in huge opportunity costs.

Four Pay cash on. In terms of cash compensation, indirect compensation system organizations and listed companies in each industry division, the remuneration paid by the industry organizations, but by the listed company. This is a direct pay system is obviously different, direct pay system independent directors under the income from the company operating in the black box. to implement the system of indirect compensation, independent directors and the company paid between the transparency by a neutral third party monitoring, which can maximize the income to prevent the generation of gray . This indirect remuneration system more transparent securities market is "open, fair and just" three principles of maintenance. reposted elsewhere in this paper for free download 's incentive and pay cash constraint effect and the pay-setting has the same purpose, appears to be a clear incentive for independent directors, also hidden on their constraints, only the result of this constraint is lagging behind. This is because the incentives and constraints on corporate governance in terms of itself complement each other, can not choose an organic whole, which is the independent director system is still applicable. the one hand, the distinction between incentive and restraint is very subtle. to give independent directors a fixed allowance, for example, the fixed allowance of independent directors may only make sense "Not satisfied" that is, played the role of a constraint, but in no way incentive, direct compensation system to provide incentive compensation is determined to fall into is clearly unscientific. On the other hand, is itself an incentive kinds of constraints, a greater incentive mechanism, the greater its restraints. When the incentives of independent directors to fulfill their res