2016上海外国语大学翻译硕士初试真题与答案.doc

2016年上海外国语大学专业学位英语口译/笔译初试

英语翻译基础（100分）
12月26日14:00—17:00

I. Cloze. (共15个空，一空两分，共30分)

卷子上的标题是Here’s why the “American century” will survive rise of China

The American century will survive the rise of China
Joseph Nye March 25, 2015
Entropy is a greater challenge than Chinese growth, writes Joseph Nye

In 1941 Time editor Henry Luce proclaimed “the American century”. Some now see this coming to an end as 1. a result of the nation’s economic and political decline. Many point to the example of US failure to convince its allies to stay out of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, Beijing’s rival to the World Bank; but this was 2.more an example of a faulty decision than evidence of decline, which raises the question of what is the natural life cycle of a nation.

A century is generally the limit for a human organism but countries are social constructs. Rome did not collapse until more than three centuries after it reached its apogee of power in 117AD. After American independence in 1776 Horace Walpole, the British politician, lamented that his nation had been reduced to the level of Sardinia, just as Britain was about to enter the industrial revolution that 3. powered its second century as a global power.

Any effort at assessing American power in the coming decades should 4. take into account how many earlier efforts have been wide of the mark. It is chastening to remember how wildly 5. exaggerated US estimates of Soviet power in the 1970s and of Japanese power in the 1980s were. Today some see the Chinese as 10ft tall and proclaim this “the Chinese century”.

China’s size and relatively rapid economic growth will bring it closer to the US in terms of its power resources in the next few decades. But this does not necessarily mean it will surpass the US in military, economic and soft power.

6. Even if China suffers no big domestic political setback, many projections are simple linear extrapolations of growth rates that are likely to slow in the future. 7.Moreover, economic projections are one dimensional. They ignore US military and soft power advantages, such as the desire of students around the world to attend US universities. They also overlook China’s geopolitical 8. dis-advantages in the Asian balance of power, compared with America’s relations with Europe, Japan and India, which are likely to remain more favourable.

It is not impossible that a challenger such as China, Europe, Russia, India or Brazil will surpass the US in the first half of this century but it is but not likely.

On the question of absolute rather than 9. relative American decline, the US faces serious problems in areas such as debt, secondary education, income in?equality and political gridlock but these are only part of the picture. On the positive side of the ledger are favourable trends in demography, technology and energy as well as abiding factors such as geography and entrepreneurial culture.

The scenarios that could 10. precipitate decline include ones in which the US overreacts to terrorist attacks by turning inwards and thus cuts itself off from the strength it obtains from openness. Alternatively it could react by overcommitting itself, and wasting blood and treasure as it did in Vietnam and Iraq.

As an overall assessment, describing the 21st century as one of American decline is inaccurate and misleading. Though the US has problems it is not in absolute decline, unlike ancient Rome, and it is likely to remain more powerful than any single state in coming decades.

The real problem is not that it will be overtaken by China or another contender but rather that it faces a rise in the power resources of many others—both states and non-state actors such as transnational corporations, terrorist groups and cyber criminals. And it will face an increasing number of global problems that will 11. call on our ability to organise alliances and networks.

12. Contrary to the views of those who proclaim this the Chinese century, we have not entered a post-American world. But the American century of the future will not look the same as in previous decades. The US 13. share of the world economy will be smaller than it was in the middle of the past century.

Furthermore, the complexity created by the rise of other countries, as well as the increased role of non-state actors, will make it harder for even America, the biggest power, to 14. wield influence and organise action. Entropy is a greater challenge than China.

At the same time, even when the US had its greatest preponderance of power resources, it often failed to secure what it wanted. Those who argue that the disorder of today’s world is much worse than in the past should remember a year such as 1956, when the US was unable to prevent Soviet 15. repression of a revolt in Hungary; or the Suez invasion by our allies Britain, France and Israel.

We must not view the past through rose-tinted glasses. Now, with slightly less preponderance and a much more complex world, the American century will continue for at least a few decades, but it will look very different from when Luce first articulated it.

中国崛起能终结美国世纪吗？

美国哈佛大学教授约瑟夫-奈为英国《金融时报》撰稿

1941年，《时代》杂志(Time)主编亨利-卢斯(Henry Luce)宣称，“美国世纪”已经来临。现在有些人认为，随着美国在经济和政治上走向衰落，美国世纪正趋于结束。许多人援引美国未能阻止盟友加入亚洲基础设施投资银行（AIIB，简称：亚投行）作为一个例子——亚投行是中国政府提议创立、与世界银行(World Bank)争风头的一个机构。但这只能表明一个错误的决定，而不能表明美国已经衰落。这引出一个问题：一个国家正常的生命周期有多长？
　　一个世纪通常是人类机体生存的极限，但国家是社会结构。古罗马在公元117年达到实力的巅峰，但它随后又延续了300多年才解体。1776年美国独立后，英国政界人士霍勒斯-沃波尔(Horace Walpole)哀叹道，他的国家已沦为撒丁岛（Sardinia，位于意大利半岛的西南方，是地中海的第二大岛——译者注）的水平，可随后英国开启工业革命，在接下来的一个世纪里仍然是全球强国。
　　要评估美国在今后几十年的实力，就得考虑早先有多少评估不靠谱。别忘了，美国对上世纪70年代的苏联和上世纪80年代的日本都曾做出过离谱的高估，这足以令人引以为戒。如今，一些人认为中国人有10英尺高，并宣称现在是“中国世纪”。
　　就实力资源而言，庞大的规模和相对快速的经济增长将让中国在今后几十年逼近美国。但这未必意味着中国将在军事、经济和软实力方面超越美国。
　　即便中国国内没有发生重大的政治挫折，许多预测也只是对经济增长率作简单的线性外推，而未来经济增长是可能放缓的。此外，经济预测只是一个方面。他们忽视了美国在军事和软实力方面的优势，比如世界各地的学生都想到美国上大学。他们也忽视了，相对于美国与欧洲、日本和印度的关系（这些关系很可能保持在比较有利的状况），中国在亚洲实力平衡方面的地缘政治劣势。
　　中国、欧洲、俄罗斯、印度或巴西等挑战者在本世纪上半叶超越美国不是没有可能，但可能性不大。
　　在美国绝对（而非相对）衰落的问题上，美国在债务、中学教育、收入不平等以及政治僵局等领域面临严峻问题，但这些只是整个图景的一部分。有利的一面是，美国在人口结构、技术和能源方面的有利趋势以及地理和创业文化等长期有利因素。
　　可能触发美国衰落的情形包括，美国对恐怖袭击反应过度，转向闭关自守，切断自己从开放获取的力量。抑或它可能过度投入，浪费美国人的生命和财产，就像在越南和伊拉克那样。
　　作为一个总体评估，将21世纪称为美国衰落的世纪是不准确和误导的。尽管美国存在种种问题，但它并没有陷入绝对衰落——这与古罗马不同——在接下来的几十年里它很可能依然比任何一个国家都更加强大。
　　真正的问题不是美国将被中国或者另一个竞争对手超越，而是它面临其它许多实体（包括国家和非国家实体，如跨国企业、恐怖组织和网络罪犯）实力资源的上升。美国还将面临越来越多的全球问题，需要我们有能力组建联盟和网络。
　　与那些宣称21世纪是中国世纪的观点相反，我们并未进入“后美国”世界。但未来的美国世纪看上去将与过去几十年不同。美国在全球经济中所占的份额将小于上世纪中叶那段时期。
　　此外，其他国家崛起所导致的复杂性，加上非国家实体的角色上升，将让即便身为头号强国的美国也更难施加影响和组织行动。无序是比中国更大的挑战。
　　与此同时，即便在美国拥有最大实力资源的时候，它往往也无法得到自己想要的东西。那些辩称当今世界的混乱远比过去严重的人别忘了1956年，当时美国无力阻止苏联镇压匈牙利的起义，也未能阻止我们的盟友英国、法国和以色列入侵苏伊士运河。
　　我们不能透过玫瑰色的眼镜看待过去。现在，随着美国优势略有下降以及世界变得更加复杂，美国世纪至少还会持续数十年时间，但它看上去将与当年卢斯宣告的那个美国世纪颇为不同。

II. Answering the following questions depending on the passage above.（30分）
1. What aspects are ignored by many when assessing American power?
2. Did Britain decline after American independence in 1776?
3. Cite an example of the American decline?
4. What are the real problems facing the US?
5. What does the American century of the future look like?
III. Writing (40分)
Is damage to the environment an inevitable consequence of improving the standard of living? Writing in an essay format why or why not?

翻译硕士英语（150分）
12月27日8:30—11:30

I. Translate the following passage into Chinese.　

Why the term "sharing economy" needs to die
The Guardian（卫报）Alex Hern
Nothing is being shared when you hire a cleaner to tidy your house or a car to drive you to work, even if you use an app to do it.

　　The “sharing economy” is a meaningless term that was only coined in the first place because of the tech industry’s desire to pretend everything it does is new and groundbreaking.
　　Now, almost a decade after it started seeing use, it’s worse than simply being meaningless: it’s actively obfuscatory, lumping together a hugely disparate bunch of companies, many of which push the definition to its limits, and the biggest examples of which have nothing to do with “sharing” at all.
　　The term grew out of the open-source community, where coders contribute to programs released to the world free-of-charge. The push for a similar model to be applied to the real world dates back to the early 2000s, but it took the financial crisis for it to grow from a niche idea to one taken seriously.
　　By the 2010s, the focus had narrowed from a nebulous attempt to bring the open source ethos out of the coding world to a more specific look at how to use technology to enable more efficient use of scarce resources. At the same time, the buzzwords had also stabilised, with a number of academic-sounding terms such as “commons-based peer production” (as coined by NYU law professor Yochai Benkler) to two main contenders: “the sharing economy”, and “collaborative consumption”.
　　The time was ripe for both ideas to take off. With unemployment in the west still high, and ideas of “post-growth capitalism” floating in the ether, groups that could articulate an alternative view of the world were popular. And the archetypal collaborative consumption models were seemingly win-win. A typical analogy for the sort of model people wanted to build was focused on household tools: if you own a drill, you likely don’t use it 364 days of the year; why not let others use it in the meantime?
　　In its purest sense, that is the sharing economy. But it very quickly ran into an issue: while some people act out of altruism, most don’t. My drill is mine. Why should I share it with you?
　　Some sites, such as Freecycle, still focus on acting out of the goodness of one’s heart, but the success stories of the sharing economy solved the problem by looking to the old economy. And so “sharing” became “renting”. Even today, one report finds 20 companies in the sharing economy whose offering can be summed up as “you can borrow stuff you don’t want to buy”. Nine of them have a name beginning with “rent”.
　　Once money started changing hands in earnest, business really started booming. In 2011, the same year Time magazine named the “sharing society” one of the Ten Ideas That Will Change The World, AirBnB raised $120m in VC funding. The company was mentioned in Time’s piece, which still emphasised the feel-good backdrop to the story: “There’s a green element here, of course: sharing and renting more stuff means producing and wasting less stuff, which is good for the planet and even better for one’s self-image.”
　　While renting out a spare room in a flat (or even renting out a flat) may be close enough to “sharing” to be hair-splitting, it’s a different case for hiring a driver to take you across a city. And yet Uber（优步）is one of the most famous examples of the sharing economy in the world ― and certainly the highest capitalised, worth well north of $50bn.
　　The company’s defenders argue that it justifies that label because of the similarity to AirBnB: Uber drivers have an asset lying unused, which they want to monetise with the power of the internet. The difference, of course, is that an Uber driver’s labour is an integral part of the whole shebang. You aren’t renting their car: you’re renting their car and them.
　　If that’s still not clear-cut enough, consider TaskRabbit, the last member of the holy trinity of the Sharing Economy. The company allows customers to hire temporary labour to cook, clean, assemble furniture or queue for the latest iPhone. It’s a far cry from “collaborative consumption”.
　　Instead, the companies lumped together as examples of the sharing economy have come to be typified by something altogether different: a dependence on tenuous labour, particularly that provided by individuals working as third-party contractors rather than full employees.
　　For that reason, I’ve been using another term to describe these companies: “gig economy”. It’s not as well-known as “sharing economy”, which means it sounds weird to some ears (“do you mean Uber only hires musicians?”). But it emphasises the unifying aspect is short-term, tenuous “gigs” ― often more than one juggled at the same time.
　　But there are other popular alternatives as well. In the US, “1099 economy” is often used, referring to the American tax code for independent contractors, while in the UK, similar emphasis is placed on “zero-hour contracts”: terms of employment which provide no fixed hours and don’t even guarantee work will be provided at all.
　　Are those terms better term than “gig economy”? Is there a better phrase still? Let me know in the comments below.（最后这句是作者与读者的互动，试卷里当然要删去的。）

II. Translate the following passage into English.

恐怖主义是现代人类社会之癌
2015年11月14日 来源：环球时报

巴黎连环恐怖袭击事件震惊全球，相信全人类有基本正义感的力量都会予以谴责。

　　发生在当地时间13日晚的恐怖袭击显然经过了认真策划和组织，巴黎有剧院、足球场和一些餐馆同时成为袭击目标。这是西方世界近年遭遇的最严重恐怖袭击，在全球范围内，它也是一段时间以来发生在大城市最具组织性和颇具杀伤力规模的恐袭事件。
　　“9·11”事件以来，恐怖主义消耗了人类的大量精力，发达社会包括很多发展中社会的反恐成本急剧增加。然而恐怖主义像癌细胞一样继续扩散，“基地”组织被重创，更凶残的极端组织IS却“应运而生”。西方世界陷入了隔一段时间就发生一起轰动性恐袭的节奏，在一些动荡的发展中国家，恐怖袭击成为极端反政府力量的日常斗争手段。中国新疆也有极少数年轻人受极端主义蛊惑，走上暴力恐怖主义道路，使得新疆成为世界反恐的前沿之一。
　　大中东的动荡和贫困国家仍是恐怖主义最活跃地区，也是它的最大扩散源。中东向外输送的难民以及经济移民把一些深层问题带进欧美社会，欧美一方面需要新移民，它们的社会结构已不可能回到较为单一的过去。但同时发达社会又对来自第三世界的新移民产生一些抵触情绪，甚至有反移民的激进表现上演。
　　欧美国家不断有激进分子跑到中东参加“圣战”，他们有些后来又回到欧美，成为危险的恐怖主义“病毒携带者”。欧美的恐袭活动很多时候已不像十几年前那样全都由中东恐怖组织策划并实施，恐袭者和恐袭组织的身份、性质趋于复杂化，防范起来更加困难。
　　由于全球化不可逆，社会的开放、自由也很难收紧，现代社会的运行方式与反恐机制天然地南辕北辙。一个安全部门认定的“高危”分子可以是完全自由的，时代保护了他们的权利，也意味着社会为防范恐袭发生不断增加巨额成本。
　　各国政府都在反恐问题上严防死守，但各国的态度加在一起却构成了对恐怖主义模糊且充满争议的认识。地缘政治和意识形态在这当中扮演了离间各国的角色，有些国家只反对针对本国及盟国的恐怖主义，却对在竞争国家发生的恐怖主义态度暧昧，对恐怖分子的经济或社会处境公开表示同情。
　　IS能在中东快速崛起，这当中被普遍认为有美欧想利用它打击阿萨德政权的因素，美国在是否剿灭IS或投入多大力量打击它的问题上三心二意。
　　不难看出，恐怖主义只要善于利用大国的分歧，就不难找到有利于自己存活的事实上的国际空间。而现代社会的广泛自由又为它们间歇性实施突袭创造了条件。此外，恐怖主义会在一些国家里得到反社会极端主义的呼应，一些仇视社会的“独狼”也会造成类似恐袭的严重损失。
　　人类需要把恐怖主义作为现代社会的“癌症”进行长期、坚决的打击。随着战争爆发的几率越来越小，恐怖分子造成的爆炸声和枪声很可能将是现代社会最具挑战的暴力回响。

汉语写作与百科知识（150分）
12月27日 14:00—17:00

一． 填空（30分）

1. 新文化运动的核心刊物是《新青年》。
注：1915年，陈独秀在其主编的《新青年》（原名《青年杂志》）刊载文章，提倡民主与科学（旧称“德先生”与“赛先生”）。随着新文化运动的发展，《新青年》实际上成了新文化运动的思想领导中心。

2. 中国历史上由女真族建立的朝代（国） 金 和 清 。
注：女真（又名女贞和女直），亦作女真族。17世纪初建州女真满洲部逐渐强大，其首领努尔哈赤建立后金政权，至其子皇太极时期已基本统一女真各部，遂颁布谕旨改女真族号为满洲，女真一词就此停止使用，后来满洲人又融纳了蒙古、汉、朝鲜等民族，逐渐形成了今天的满族。所以他们是建立了清朝！

3. 编钟是一种大型打击乐器。
注：编钟是中国古代重要的打击乐器，是钟的一种。编钟兴起于西周，盛于春秋战国直至秦汉。编钟由若干个大小不同的钟有次序地悬挂在木架上编成一组或几组，每个钟敲击的音高各不相同。

4. 唐代诗人杜牧在《阿房宫赋》中描述了秦王朝统治者大兴土木的情景。
注：《阿房宫赋》描绘了阿房宫雄伟壮丽，美女之盛，珍宝之多，及秦人挥霍无度的情况。秦始皇实行高压政策，过度掠夺挥霍，终于激起农民起义，导致秦王朝灭亡，阿房宫也化为焦土。

5. 中国五岳是泰山、华山、嵩山、衡山、恒山。
注：东岳泰山（位于山东）、西岳华山（位于陕西）、北岳恒山（位于山西）、中岳嵩山（位于河南）、南岳衡山（位于湖南），其中泰山居首。

6. 汉字历史悠久，其主要构造方法象形、指事、假借、会意和形声。
注：关于汉字的造字法，从汉朝以来，相沿有“六书”的说法。六书之首，就是象形法。一般来说，汉字的造字方法有象形、指事、会意、形声。我国古代对造字法有“六书”的提法，除了上述四种外，还包括转注和假借。但严格说来这两种应属于用字的方法。

7. 被称作“元曲四大家”的元杂剧作者是关汉卿、郑光祖、马致远、白朴。
注：关汉卿，号己斋叟，其代表作为《窦娥冤》。马致远，字千里，号东篱，其代表作为《汉宫秋》。郑光祖，字德辉，其代表作为《倩女离魂》。白朴，字太素，号兰谷，其代表作为《墙头马上》。

二、 成语解释，写出词义、典故出处并造句。（40分）

1. 满腹经纶
词义：一肚子学问和才干。比喻人有才学，有治理国家的才能。 经纶：整理过的蚕丝，比喻规划、治理国家的才能本领。
出处：《周易·屯》：“云雷屯，君子以经纶。”
造句：经过几十年的知识积累，李老师现在～，博学多才。

2. 卧薪尝胆
词义：原指中国春秋时期的越王勾践励精图治以图复国的事迹，后演变成成语，形容人刻苦自励，立志雪耻图强。薪：柴草。卧