2024半导体供应链中新兴的弹性.pdf

About Boston Consulting Group(BCG)Boston Consulting Group(BCG)is a leading global management consulting firm,with offices in over 50 countries.BCG partners with leaders in business and society to tackle their most important challenges and capture their greatest opportunities.BCG was the pioneer in business strategy when it was founded in 1963.Today,we help clients with total transformationinspiring complex change,enabling organizations to grow,building competitive advantage,and driving bottom-line impact.About the Semiconductor Industry Association(SIA)The Semiconductor Industry Association(SIA)is the voice of the semiconductor industry in the US,one of Americas top export industries and a key driver of Americas economic strength,national security,and global competitiveness.The semiconductor industry directly employs more than 300,000 workers in the United States,and US semiconductor company sales totaled$264 billion in 2023.SIA represents 99 percent of the US semiconductor industry by revenue and nearly two-thirds of non-US chip firms.Through this coalition,SIA seeks to strengthen leadership of semiconductor manufacturing,design,and research by working with Congress,the Administration,and key industry stakeholders around the world to encourage policies that fuel innovation,propel business,and drive international competition.About the AuthorsRaj Varadarajan is a Senior Partner Emeritus of Boston Consulting Group.He has authored several reports on the semiconductor industry at BCG and in collaboration with the SIA.You may contact him as the corresponding author by email at Varadarajan.Rajbcg-.Iacob Koch-Weser is an Associate Director for Global Trade and Investment in the Boston office of Boston Consulting Group.You may contact him by email at koch-.Chris Richard is a Partner and Managing Director in the Denver office of Boston Consulting Group and is a core member of its Technology,Media&Telecommunications practice.You may contact him by email at .Joseph Fitzgerald is a Partner and Managing Director in the San Francisco office of Boston Consulting Group and is a core member of its Technology,Media&Telecommunications practice.You may contact him by email at .Jaskaran Singh is an Associate in the Dallas office of Boston Consulting Group.You may contact him by email at .Mary Thornton is the Vice President of Global Policy at the Semiconductor Industry Association.You may contact her at mthorntonsemiconductors.org.Robert Casanova is the Director of Industry Statistics and Economic Policy at the Semiconductor Industry Association.You may contact him at rcasanovasemiconductors.org.David Isaacs is the Vice President of Government Affairs at the Semiconductor Industry Association.You may contact him at disaacssemiconductors.org.AcknowledgmentsThis report would not have been possible without the contributions of our BCG Colleagues Ramiro Palma,Thomas Lopez,Trey Sexton,Ceci Joy Perez,and Peilu Chen,and our SIA colleagues Jennifer Meng and Alex Gordon.2Contents46810222728 Introduction The Expansion of Government IncentivesResilience in the Semiconductor Supply ChainLooking Aheadthe Pathway to Greater ResilienceExecutive Summary Future Needs of the IndustryAppendix3There are strengths and vulnerabilities in the global semiconductor supply chain.Our April 2021 report1 illustrated that the globally integrated nature of the semiconductor supply chain has realized$45 billion$125 billion in cost efficiencies each year,contributing to prices 35%65%lower than they would otherwise be with fully localized supply chains,resulting in enhanced adoption of downstream products and services.But we also showed that the industry has become vulnerable to geographic concentrationwith at least 50 points across the supply chain where one region held over 65%of global market share.Disruptions,such as pandemics,natural disasters,materials shortages,or conflicts,could substantially impact the global chip supply chain.Governments and companies are taking concerted action to increase resilience.The US CHIPS Act,signed into law in August 2022,committed$39 billion in grant incentives and a 25%investment tax credit(ITC)for semiconductor manufacturing.The European Union(EU)unveiled the European Chips Act,Mainland China initiated the third phase of its Integrated Circuit(IC)Industry Investment Fund,and various other incentive programs emerged or expanded in Taiwan,South Korea,Japan,India,and other countries.In parallel,companies have made significant investments,in both established and new regions.We project around$2.3 trillion in private sector investment in wafer fabrication in 20242032,compared with$720 billion in the 10 years prior to enactment of the CHIPS Act(20132022).The US is projected to capture 28%of these capital expenditures,as opposed to the pre-CHIPS Act pace of investment,in which the US would have captured just 9%of global capital expenditures.Wafer fabrication will become more resilient.By 2032,we predict leading-edge wafer fabrication capacity to diversify beyond Taiwan and South Korea to include the US,Europe,and Japan.We expect the US to increase its fab capacity by 203%between 2022 and 2032,the largest increase in the world.As a result,the United States will reverse a decades-long downward trajectory and raise its share of global aggregate fab capacity from 10%today to 14%in 2032.In the absence of action,the US share would have slipped further to 8%by 2032.New markets and innovative technology can support resilience in assembly,test,and packaging(ATP).In ATP,Mainland China and Taiwan will continue to hold the largest share of global capacity.But with support from governments and foreign investors,we expect countries in Southeast Asia,Latin America,and Eastern Europe to expand ATP activity.The US State Department is supporting these efforts through International Technology Security and Innovation(ITSI)funding under the CHIPS Act.Emerging market governments are actively pursuing their own strategies to attract ATP investment.In parallel,the development of advanced packagingand associated innovations in chipletsis also driving leading players to build ATP capacity in the United States and Europe,proximate to new wafer fabrication capacity.Executive Summary4Other parts of the supply chain are also achieving a better balance.In design,core IP,and Electronic Design Automation(EDA),companies are diversifying where they hire,locate,and train talent.In semiconductor manufacturing equipment(“tools”),current industry leaders are establishing R&D and training centers in different regions.Although materials production remains concentrated in East Asia,we expect it to follow future fab capacity to the United States and Europe to realize cost and R&D benefits.A strong global talent pipeline is as important as ever.As semiconductor companies pursue ambitious development plans in the context of a tight labor market,they rely on access to engineers and technicians to fill both high-and mid-skill positions.Improving workforce development across established and emerging regions,while also advancing immigration policies to foster global talent flows,will be vital to the semiconductor industrys future resilience.Scale and openness are critical for resilience.To ensure new and diversified semiconductor facilities can operate at optimal capacity utilization rates to generate a positive return on investment,it is vital for chip companies to maintain continued access to global customers and a global network of suppliers.Governments are increasingly imposing constraints on where chip companies can sell their products and services,or where they can source inputs and equipment.Fortunately,global trade in semiconductors continues to grow at a rapid pace,reflecting the global interconnectedness of the industry.The United States and allied governments need to maintain open trade and cooperation by recognizing that extreme industrial policies,such as full country-level“self-sufficiency,”will undermine resilience,add cost,and stifle innovation.Industrial policies have the potential to create additional bottlenecks that increase supply chain risk.Certain segments of the semiconductor supply chain are at risk if incentive programs and large-scale industrial policies lead to non-market-based investment,which can result in overconcentration or oversupply.Government incentives should focus on enabling targeted,distributed,market-based investments.Sustained support for resilience is needed.Over the coming decade,the semiconductor supply chain will continue to face challenges,including industry cyclicality and the rapid evolution of downstream demand(for example,in AI,EVs,industrial automation,and robotics).Supply-demand imbalances in mature node capacity could become more evident.It will be critical for policymakers in the United States and elsewhere to“stay the course”by extending current support as well as considering additional measures to strengthen resilience.5Semiconductors power todays economy,from vehicles and mobile devices to data centers,medical equipment,clean technologies,and,of course,the upcoming AI revolution.The invention of the integrated circuit(IC)started the United States on a path to early leadership in design and manufacturing.Beginning in the 1980s,chip manufacturing rapidly shifted from North America to Japan and East Asia.While the United States remained preeminent in equipment and chip design,East Asian economies increased their share of wafer fabrication capacity,highlighted by the rise of South Korea in memory and Taiwan in the pure-play foundry business for all other semiconductors.This configuration enabled rapid advances and specialization,but over time,led to supply chain concentration.2 In Strengthening the Global Semiconductor Supply Chain in an Uncertain Era(April 2021),we analyzed the semiconductor supply chain to understand its value for the global economy,while also identifying points of vulnerability.We recommended policies and other actions to improve supply chain resilience through greater geographic diversification.Since then,the global supply chain has evolved rapidly,with major private sector investments in multiple geographies and public sector policies and support programs directed at the industry.The US CHIPS Act,signed into law in August 2022,committed$39 billion in grants and loans for semiconductor manufacturing.Likewise,the European Union unveiled the European CHIPS Act,Mainland China initiated the third vintage of its IC Industry Investment Fund,and various other incentive programs emerged across Asia and other regions.In parallel,over 100 new semiconductor manufacturing investments have been announced to meet increased market demand,dispersed worldwide across every major region.Introduction6Our report then highlights the path toward greater resilience,including sustaining government support,guarding against supply-demand imbalances,integrating new countries,maintaining vibrant global trade,and fostering global talent.As geopolitical frictions persist,it is important to maintain a global supply chain and support a more diverse global production footprint.Accordingly,we close our report by highlighting future needs of the industry.In this report,we provide an updated view on the impact of policies today on future investment in the global semiconductor supply chain and the implications for resilience.We define resilience,broadly speaking,as improved geographic diversification of the supply chain.We begin by reviewing public and private sector strategies across major geographies,with additional detail provided in the Appendix.We then assess the likely effects of these trends over the coming decade,specifically forecasting changes in distribution of wafer fabrication and ATP capacity.We also consider geographic diversification in other segments of the supply chain,3 including design,core IP,and EDA,equipment,and materials.7Semiconductor companies weigh many factors when making investment decisions,including overall business conditions,supplier networks,site availability,infrastructure,and workforcebut a significant overarching factor is government policy.Well-crafted and durable incentive programs,along with an enabling regulatory environment and effective talent development initiatives,also signal a governments commitment to the industrys long-term success.For individual companies,effective policies can improve the cost and efficiency of constructing and operating a facility.Since our report in April 2021,governments around the world have made substantial efforts to increase their support for the semiconductor industry(see Exhibit 1;for more information on incentive programs in each key region,see the Appendix).The United States passed the CHIPS Act to incentivize growth of the semiconductor ecosystem through both direct grants and a 25%ITC for semiconductor manufacturing,and several states have enacted incentive programs to supplement the federal efforts.$11 billion of the$52 billion appropriated in the CHIPS Act is to be used to develop US leadership in semiconductor R&D,emphasizing the importance of an all-encompassing industrial policy to success.In the EU and Japan,governments have appropriated large grant funds to be allocated on a national and project-specific basis,coupled with tax incentives.The South Korean and Taiwanese governments are offering comparatively larger tax incentive programs and R&D supportfor example,in the Taiwan Chip Innovation Program and South Koreas K-CHIPS Act.These direct incentives are complemented by indirect tools to attract investment,such as infrastructure support,low-cost access to land,and streamlining government approvals.The Expansion of Government Incentives8Government incentives by major region(left to right by size of GDP)E X H I B I T 1$39B$142B$47B$17.5B$55B$16BTargetKey Incentive amountsAchieve resiliency in semiconductor supply chainin grants1 in equity funds in grantsin grantsin tax incentivesin tax incentives4CHIPS and Science Act,100-Day Supply Chain Review25%investment tax creditBig Fund I,II,III and local fundsGrants and loans under EU Chips Act National fiscal fundingTax incentives under K-Chips ActFinancial subsidies under the Chip Innovation ProgramGrants under the CHIPS ActState-owned enterprise leadersTax creditsLeading-Edge Semiconductor Technology CenterPrivate-public education programsState-level supportNational science fundState aid allowances2Industry-academiaco-op,taxcreditsReach 70%self-sufficiency by 2025National IC Outline,14th Five Year PlanGain 20%global share by 2030Digital Compass 2030Earn$112B sales by 2030Secure foothold in Logic,bolster fab leadershipK-BeltSemiconductorStrategyBreakthrough 1 nm by 2030Angstrom Semiconductor Initiative,Moonshot programStrategy for Semisa