脱钩：全球化何去何从.pdf

2021 by the European Union Chamber of Commerce in China,all rights reserved.This report may not be reproduced either in part or in full without prior written consent of the European Union Chamber of Commerce in China.The information contained herein is based on input and analysis from September 2020 to December 2020.The information is provided for informational purposes only and should not be construed as business or legal advice on any specific facts or circumstances.No users of this report should act or refrain from acting on the basis of any content included without seeking appropriate professional advice.The European Union Chamber of Commerce in China does not assume any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy and completeness of the information provided in the report.Table of Contents About the European Union Chamber of Commerce in China.1About MERICS.2Executive Summary.3Key Takeaways.7Chapter 1:The Drivers of Decoupling.9Chapter 2:The Layers of Decoupling.17-Macro Decoupling:Political and financial.20-Trade Decoupling:Supply chains and critical inputs.32-Innovation Decoupling:Standards and R&D.46-Digital Decoupling:Data governance,network equipment and telecommunications services.57Chapter 3:The Big Picture.73Chapter 4:Implications and Recommendations.85Abbreviations.90Contributors.93About the European Union Chamber of Commerce in China1DecouplingSevered Ties and Patchwork GlobalisationAbout the European Union Chamber of Commerce in ChinaThe European Union Chamber of Commerce in China(European Chamber)was founded in 2000 by 51 member companies that shared a goal of establishing a common voice for the various business sectors of the EU and European businesses operating in China.It is a member-driven,non-profit,fee-based organisation with a core structure of 34 working groups and fora representing European business in China.The European Chamber has more than 1,700 member companies in seven chapters operating in nine cities:Beijing,Nanjing,Shanghai,Shenyang,South China(Guangzhou and Shenzhen),Southwest China(Chengdu and Chongqing)and Tianjin.Each chapter is managed at the local level by local boards reporting directly to the Executive Committee.The European Chamber is recognised by the European Commission and the Chinese authorities as the official voice of European business in China.It is also recognised as a foreign chamber of commerce by the Ministry of Civil Affairs.The European Chamber is part of the growing network of European Business Organisations(EBOs),which connects European business associations and chambers of commerce from more than 40 non-EU countries around the world.As a member-based organisation,the European Chamber seeks several things:To Ensure greater market access and a level playing field for European companies operating in China.To Improve market conditions for all businesses in China.To Facilitate networking among members and stakeholders.To Provide specific,relevant information to its members on how to do business in China.To Update its members on economic trends and legislation in China.We are an independent,non-profit organisation governed by our members.We work for the benefit of European business as a whole.We operate as a single,networked organisation across Mainland China.We maintain close,constructive relations with the Chinese and European authorities,while retaining our independence.We seek the broadest possible representation of European business in China within our membership:small,medium and large enterprises from all business sectors and European Member States,which operate throughout China.We operate in accordance with Chinese laws and regulations.We treat all of our members,business partners and employees with fairness and integrity.ABOUT THE EUROPEAN UNION CHAMBER OF COMMERCE IN CHINA2000FO U N d E d I NBy 51 M E M B E R C O M PA N I E S34w O R K I N g g R O U P S A N d F O R A1,700M O R E T H A NM E M B E R C O M PA N I E S9O P E R AT I N g I NC I T I E S123457612345Mission statementPrinciples 2In partnership withAbout MERICSAbout MERICSSince its creation in 2013,MERICS has established itself as the go-to European think tank on China.With about 20 full-time research staff from different disciplines,MERICS is currently the largest European research institute focussing solely on contemporary China studies.Based in Berlin,MERICS plays an active role in informing European public debates on China and in providing senior decision-makers across Europe with in-depth China-related insights critical to their portfolios.MERICS was founded by the Stiftung Mercator to strengthen knowledge and debate about China in Germany and Europe.Independent research means MERICS experts will take a stand one firmly grounded in liberal-minded and democratic values.In doing so,MERICS experts provide new perspectives on China and advice for shaping relations with it.3DecouplingSevered Ties and Patchwork GlobalisationExecutive SummaryExecutive SummaryExecutive SummaryThe global COVID-19 pandemic turned 2020 into a year of uncertainty,individual suffering,economic disruption and heightened geopolitical tensions.While the roll-out of vaccinations has created something of a silver lining,the closing weeks of 2020 saw an acceleration of decoupling trends,pulling major economies further apart and disrupting commercial flows and other exchanges:The outgoing Trump Administration took another,maybe final,swipe at a major Chinese technology company:Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation(SMIC),Chinas most advanced semiconductor firm,was blacklisted by the United States(US),effectively making them a company non grata for global investors.Disputes between China and Australia led to a ban on Australian coal imports that has resulted in rolling power outages across various parts of China.China released measures to expand its national security review process for foreign investment.Even the news that the European Union(EU)-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment(CAI)had been concluded at the political level was met with significant scepticism across Europe,with many expressing doubts over the possibility of arriving at a fairer,more reciprocal EU-China economic relationship.Meanwhile,China-based automotive manufacturers have been getting a taste of what disruptions to critical inputs like semiconductors can result in.Pandemic-related fluctuations in supply and demand have led to a shortage of certain semiconductors required for electronic control units(ECUs),which collectively form the computer of a vehicle.1 As a result,manufacturers are shuttering much of their production until the shortage is corrected,which is expected to take up to nine months.2 To casual observers,such examples are part of a recent story that began in 2018,when the Trump Administration imposed the first round of tariffs on Chinese imports to the US.In reality,however,decoupling is a much longer-term trend that stretches back to the earliest days of Chinas opening up and reform.Through market access and other barriers,China has long managed its interdependence with the world economy in a highly strategic and limited manner:selective coupling where it needed foreign technology or competitionsuch as in high-speed rail and the financial sector respectivelyand remaining uncoupled in sectors reserved for Chinas,often state-owned,national champions.For more than 15 years,Chinas leaders have also advanced extensive industrial policies in an attempt to develop self-reliance in critical technologies and seek dominance in high-value-added industries.The now infamous China Manufacturing 2025(CM2025)initiative,which aims to substitute global competitors in ten strategic technologies,was just the most visible expression of a deeply engrained and extensive support system that protects Chinas rising stars.It is this blend of Chinas conditional coupling,a vast state-aid apparatus and protectionism extended to national champions,and Beijings new-found self-confidence in its non-convergence with Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development(OECD)norms and principles that is driving the current crisis of interdependence with China.The Trump Administration may have provided the spark,but the powder keg China had created was bound to ignite eventually.1 Zhang,Fanny,China auto industry recovery faces challenges from Europe chip shortage,ICIS,9th December 2020,viewed 22nd December 2020,2 Semiconductor bottlenecks hit auto sector,VW,suppliers warn,Automotive News,4th December 2020,viewed 22nd December 2020,4In partnership withExecutive SummaryThe future of globalisation with China is at stakeThings are now at a turning point.A Biden Administration will likely be less caustic and create fewer disruptions within the global economic order.But the massive shift in public opinion towards China,as well as a growing bipartisan consensus in Washington to consider China a strategic competitor on a divergent trajectory,means things are unlikely to result in globalisation renewed.Unfortunately,Chinas response to this crisis of interdependence seems to be a redoubling of its drive to build self-reliance,and European companies in China report that this drive is different and more radical than in the past.As the December 2020 Central Economic Work Conference summaries noted,Chinas top two priorities for 2021 are:1)to build scientific and technological strength,with a call for a“new type of whole-of-nation system”;3 and 2)developing greater autonomy and control in industrial supply-chains.Any further market opening and deeper coupling with China will therefore be conditional upon whether doing so supports these two goals.The current impact of decoupling on European companiesNavigating the current and potential effects of this rapidly evolving reality is both complicated and distressing for European companies,particularly as they seek to expand their contribution and exposure to Chinas post-COVID growth story.Chinas long-standing non-coupling,combined with the growing chorus of countries committing to,or flirting with,active decoupling measures,is making this endeavour more complicated in a number of ways.This report identifies nine interrelated layers of decoupling organised under four main categories that are impacting businesses to varying degrees:Macro decoupling political and financial;Trade decoupling supply chains and critical inputs;Innovation decoupling research and development(R&D),and standards;and digital decoupling data governance,network equipment and telecommunications services.Underpinning the analysis of this study are European Chamber members reported experiences,expectations and impacts of decoupling trends.This information was gathered through a general survey,as well as several layer-specific surveys and scores of in-depth interviews.Following these exchanges,the concerns identified by members were categorised into three levels of urgency:1.Some of the most visible aspects of the decoupling story are only of moderate concern.The political dimension of global decoupling was identified as a dangerous catalyst for decoupling across the different layers but considered mostly manageable,apart from the growing impacts of human rights concerns on business in China.While deepening financial decoupling could lead to highly specific impacts for certain companies,the nuclear options of direct confrontation or cutting China off from the US dollar(USD)-backed financial system were universally considered unlikely by companies interviewed for this report.Companies were generally resilient enough to endure most aspects of trade decoupling with only limited wounds being suffered,with multinational companies(MNCs)having adapted comparatively better than small and medium-sized enterprises(SMEs).2.Members recognised two emerging areas of divergence and decoupling that are of rapidly growing concern:standards and data.In non-contentious areas like machinery and chemicals,Chinas standards are largely aligned with international ones.But in the areas that China has either labelled as strategic or in areas where its digital champions are world leaders,divergence in standards is ongoing.Meanwhile,the EU and China look likely to mutually decouple on the data front,with their different data-governance systems pushing an agenda of extensive data localisation requirements and erecting barriers to cross-border data transfer.3 The Central Economic Work Conference was held in Beijing,Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang delivered important speeches,Xinhua,18th December 2020,viewed 21st December 2020,5DecouplingSevered Ties and Patchwork GlobalisationExecutive SummaryExecutive Summary3.Access to certain critical inputs is already a major concern for anyone with operations or even just supply chains in China.While most of the discussion about the tech war has been limited to critical inputs like semiconductors,the effects of the conflict are actually far more pervasive.In order to calculate decoupling risks,companies need to urgently audit their own operations,as well as the operations of those up-and downstream of them,to identify critical bottlenecks that could be potentially targeted by either the US or China for strategic purposes.Digital decoupling is also having a sharp impact on companies,with telecommunications and network equipment manufacturers feeling increasingly squeezed out of the market.Most worryingly,information and communication technology(ICT)companies,and a growing number of firms across all industries,are unable to integrate their digital solutions in China,in large part due to market access barriers to the provision of both basic and value-added telecommunications services.The present and future tech quagmire:preventing digital dilemmas,tech autarky and a weaponisation of interdependenceTaken in isolation,decoupling dynamics within each layer are causing at least some suffering to European companies,but when these layers intersect the pain becomes excruciating.The picture painted by European Chamber members of the growing divergence in technology ecosystems can best be described as a quagmire.High-tech commercial flows are being securitised at a growing pace.Direct market access barriers,like negative lists and national security measures,are increasingly joined by indirect ones,like national standards or licensing requirements,to prevent developing technology ecosystems in the US and China from overlapping.Whether its the US Clean Network proposal or measures by Chinese authorities aimed at creating“autonomous and controllable”technology,it is all part of the same slippery slope:the technologies that are defining the future,and which are increasingly integrated into every sector of the economy,are being divided between two of the worlds three largest economies,each of which has a growing firewall separating itself from the other.The US is moving towards a world in which Chinese technology should be purged from supply chains servicing Americans,